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Latin America has for long been the most unequal continent in the world. 
At the turn of the millennium, voters rebelled against this situation by 
ushering left-wing and centre-left political candidates into power in 
country after country. The so-called Pink Tide emerged, and hopes of 
more equal, economically self-supported societies sprung up all over the 
continent. After decades of neoliberal policies, increasing inequality and 
 escalating protest, questions of redistribution and social and economic 
rights were now finally central to the political agenda. In that process, 
socio- cultural hierarchies and their interconnections with economic 
inequalities were also forcefully contested and challenged.
Ever since the colonial encounter between pre-Hispanic peoples and 
European conquistadors, Latin American social orders have been built on 
a foundation of inequality. This foundation is the outcome of a complex 
interplay between economic and political relations, social imaginaries and 
notions of “otherness”, kinship and morality—usually conceptualised as 
class, ethnicity, “race” and gender. Thus, both historically and today, 
I.Å. Strønen 
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inequality in Latin America has never been a question of economic rela-
tions alone, but an outcome of their entanglements with social relations, 
value systems, ideals and notions of morality and of human difference (see, 
e.g. Casaús Arzú 2007; Edmonds 2010; Hale 2006; Larkins 2015; 
Martinez-Alier 1989; Milton 2007; Nelson 1999; Scheper-Hughes 1993; 
Stepan 1991; Streicker 1995; Ystanes 2016). Latin American social orders 
are therefore complex and hierarchical, based on a multifaceted set of 
principles, and have been so since their inception.
This edited volume explores how attempts to change historically consti-
tuted inequalities rubbed against their foundation during the Pink Tide. 
The two decades that have passed since the election of Hugo Chávez in 
1998, representing the beginning of a new era, have indeed been marked 
by change. However, those pushing for change also found that their scope 
of possibility was far from unlimited. Furthermore, many key issues, such as 
security politics, land distribution and taxation, neoliberal policies, modes 
of governance and so on, have frequently not been genuinely re- thought or 
questioned, even by Pink Tide governments. The neoliberal strategies for 
addressing these issues are indeed part of a deeply integrated doxa for large 
segments of society. They also dovetail with ideas and approaches that have 
long historical roots in Latin America. Hence, the purpose of this volume is 
to deepen existing understandings of what was achieved during the Pink 
Tide era in Latin America and of what was outside the scope of possibility.
Among the  unquestionable achievements are the formation of new 
political and social subjectivities and the advancement of political and 
socio-cultural agendas from below. Concurrently, many people experi-
enced significant improvements in their material well-being. Even so, as 
many of the chapters in this book point to, gains in the social and eco-
nomic domain were and are fragile. They have proved highly susceptible 
to reversal in the face of a return to right-wing politics, falling commodity 
prices and economic austerity. An important conclusion emerging from 
this edited volume is thus that the achievements towards greater equality 
during the Pink Tide were important and substantial, yet the basic tenets 
of hierarchical social models remain.
This conclusion is not only supported by what took place in Pink Tide 
countries, but also by a comparison with processes unfolding in countries 
that only flirted superficially with the turn to the left, such as Peru and 
Honduras. For example, Ystanes’ chapter (Chap. 4, this volume) shows 
that the militarisation of urban spaces in Rio de Janeiro has common 
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 features with the criminalisation of male, dark-skinned, poor youth in 
Honduras, as explored in the chapter by Gutierrez Rivera, Strønen and 
Ystanes (Chap. 9). Furthermore, unequal access to land and the legacy of 
slavery are both fundamental causes of contemporary inequality in Latin 
America. Nevertheless, as Brown discusses (Chap. 11), a genuine redistri-
bution of land or reparations for slavery to Afro-descendants have not 
been prioritised on the political agenda anywhere on the continent, Pink 
Tide countries or elsewhere. The comparative approach of this volume 
thus presents us with a sobering reminder of the ruptures produced by the 
Pink Tide as well as the continuities. As the Pink Tide ebbs, much has 
changed, yet Latin America remains marked by economic models interwo-
ven in global capitalism, disproportionally benefiting local and global 
elites, and social models continuously reproducing hierarchical lifeworlds 
and social orders.
Several of the chapters in this book deal with Brazil, and we have organ-
ised them together as a separate section. Our justification for paying such 
keen attention to the Brazilian case, and in particular how it unfolded in 
Rio de Janeiro, at the expense of a more diverse selection of case studies, 
is threefold. Firstly, Brazil has overwhelmingly been considered one of the 
most successful instances of Pink Tide politics. This makes taking a closer 
look at the contradictions of this case worthwhile. Secondly, by exploring 
both the successes of the Pink Tide, such as the Bolsa Familia programme, 
and parallel processes based on neoliberal thinking, such as the militarisa-
tion of urban spaces, this helps us understand the complexity of Pink Tide 
contexts. Thirdly, by contrasting limitations in the macro-political scope 
of possibility with social and political struggles as they unfold locally, we 
gain a better insight into how these two levels shape and inform each 
other. With regard to the latter two points, Rio de Janeiro constitutes a 
particularly interesting location. During the Pink Tide years, this city 
hosted four sporting mega-events.1 Such events are known to accelerate 
urban development processes (Gaffney 2010), yet also create considerable 
resistance (Cornelissen 2012), and indeed, intense contestations between 
political, social and economic aspirations from above and below played 
out in Rio during the Pink Tide years. This makes Rio de Janeiro an inter-
esting location for exploring the gains and limitations of official policies 
and social movements alike. Underlying all of these efforts is an attention 
to the historically constituted values and ideas contributing to shaping 




The title of this book, The Social Life of Economic Inequalities in 
Contemporary Latin America: Decades of Change, points to the impor-
tance of grasping the complex interplay between multifaceted and histori-
cally constituted configurations of inequality, economic processes and 
social life. The temporal-analytical axis guiding our analysis has three ele-
ments. The starting point is historically constituted forms of inequality on 
the Latin American continent, and their contemporary configuration. The 
second element is the accentuation of inequalities during the neoliberal 
turn. The third analytical frame is how different forms of inequalities have 
been contested, challenged as well as reproduced during the so-called Pink 
Tide. The majority of the chapters are qualitative in their approach, allow-
ing us to draw upon the capacity of ethnography to engage with human 
existence as it unfolds within “thickly” conceived lifeworlds. This approach 
challenges us to think through the complex entanglements between eco-
nomic processes and socio-cultural hierarchies.
Given that economic inequality is a constituent and defining feature of 
Latin American societies, we pose that this feature has to be an integral 
part of any meaningful analysis of how the Pink Tide era unfolded. The 
economic domain, in a reductionist sense, may be understood as mone-
tary policies, economic reforms, macroeconomic structures and fluctua-
tions, budgetary allocations and so on. However, as anthropologists, we 
are trained to think about the economic domain in a much wider sense. 
Indeed, the economic life of any society is firmly tied in with its social life 
and notions of morality and value. This insight was firmly established by 
Polyani (1944), who argued that the ascendancy of market rationality and 
its accompanying economistic reductionism was not only incompatible 
with, but also ultimately experienced as, an assault on social life and social 
processes. Nevertheless, just like the Kula exchange of bracelets and neck-
laces that Bronislaw Malinowski (2014) famously studied in the Trobriand 
Islands during World War I (and which inspired Polyani’s work), contem-
porary capitalist exchange is not an outcome of “natural economic laws”, 
but of the actions, beliefs and values of those involved in it. These pro-
cesses are always historically contingent, and always affecting, shaping, 
experienced and conceptualised incongruously by unequally positioned 
groups and persons. Different socio-economic groups, in turn, are config-
ured by complex cultural, social and moral hierarchical schemes.
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As the Pink Tide is now ebbing, the critique of its shortcomings often 
centres on the choice of economic policies of the governments in ques-
tion. Our contribution to this debate is to firmly state that economic pro-
cesses cannot be understood through assessing economic policy choices or 
models alone, because social imaginaries and economic ideas are embed-
ded in one another. Together they contribute to shaping and moulding 
human communities and economic conditions (Brown 2010). Indeed, 
while often perceived as neutral and objective, our ideas, models and sci-
entific concepts grow out of culturally and historically specific contexts 
(see, e.g. Buck-Morss 2009; Daston and Galison 1992; Martin 1990; 
Ortner 2016; Stepan 1991). The work they do in the world is discursive 
in the Foucaultian (1981) sense—they do not only represent attempts to 
describe and analyse reality, they also reflect ideological currents and con-
tribute to shaping the world. Within the economic discipline, this prob-
lematic rose to the surface after the financial crisis in 2007, when the 
orthodoxy that undergirded the crisis was critiqued by students and aca-
demics alike (see, e.g. Inman 2013). Indeed, critical economists suggest 
the discipline has privileged tools that are incompatible with the analysis of 
the real world (Reinert et al. 2017:10).
Here, our ambition is to explore the encounter with the “real world” of 
some of the economic policies shaping and moulding Latin American soci-
eties at this historical moment. We do this through ethnographic explora-
tions of social life as it unfolds in contexts marked by these policies, and 
through discussions of the contexts and principles framing contemporary 
inequalities. The volume is multidisciplinary, bringing together scholars 
from different fields. What unites us all is the critical lens through which 
we approach economic policies and the historically and socially consti-
tuted ideas that undergird them.
Fragile changes
As mentioned above, the most central argument presented in this volume 
is that in spite of the advances made during the Pink Tide, deep-seated 
aspects of Latin American lifeworlds upholding hierarchal social orders 
remain largely intact. This, in turn, makes for an unstable foundation for 
advancing equality, in both its material and socio-cultural dimensions. As 
the chapters from Brazil and Venezuela show, popular movements, taking 
advantage of the political space opened up by socially progressive govern-
ments, challenged historical discrimination based on class, ethnicity, “race” 
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and gender. Yet, this also produced a counter-reaction amongst traditional 
power holders—that is, the lighter skinned and socio-economically more 
privileged parts of society—who fiercely contested claims to socio- 
economic redistribution and socio-cultural recognition emerging from 
below. In Brazil, the traditional, right-wing elites have regained power, 
and there are very real possibilities that Venezuela, in deep crisis as we 
finalise this work, will soon find itself in the same position. What the out-
comes of these processes will be remains to be seen.
Another important dimension of the Pink Tide era is the absence of a 
fundamental restructuring of “trickle-up” economic models. As Costa 
(Chap. 3, this volume) shows, the tax systems of Latin American countries 
remain skewed towards upholding rather than mitigating inequalities pro-
duced by capitalist markets. Income and consumption are taxed highly, 
while taxation on capital, profit and high income is low or non-existent. 
This means that lower-income families and individuals, who spend a much 
larger chunk of their income on consumption, carry the tax burden dis-
proportionately. At the same time, the concentration of wealth on a few 
hands remains largely unchallenged, even under Pink Tide governments. 
Why, when as Costa (Chap. 3) demonstrates, tax reform would be the 
most efficient way to reduce inequality, has this not been done? In answer-
ing this question, as Costa points to, one has to take into consideration 
that traditional political and economic elites continue to define the scope 
of possibility in Latin America—also in the Pink Tide countries. One of 
the consequences of this limited scope for de facto redistribution is, as 
Loureiro (Chap. 2, this volume) shows, that Pink Tide governments relied 
on increased state spending in order to strengthen socio-economic vulner-
able groups, rather than progressive redistribution. Significantly, the 
increased state spending was made possible by the favourable boom in 
global commodity prices—not least oil and gas—occurring in parallel with 
the Pink Tide era. The fragility of this model is highly evident now, after 
the economic downturn starting in 2013—above all in oil-reliant 
Venezuela. Whilst it is very easy to criticise various Pink Tide governments 
for pursuing such a model, it is analytically unsatisfactory if we do not 
simultaneously consider their actual scope of possibility in the economic 
and political domain. As Lazar emphasises in the postscript (Chap. 12), 
this space has been quite limited during the Pink Tide. This concerns both 
Latin American nations’ unequal integration into global commodity and 
financial markets, and the limited room for bargaining vis-à-vis domestic 
and foreign powerholders.
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colonial inequality: conquest, slavery 
anD the invention oF “race”
Before we continue to analyse the economic dimensions of Latin American 
societal developments, it is useful to go back to the early formations of 
Latin American societies. It is important to remember that they have been 
highly complex, yet essentially unequal social orders since their inception. 
This can be illustrated by Martinez-Alier’s (1989) comparison of 
nineteenth- century Cuba to Dumont’s (1980) analysis of the Indian caste 
system. While Dumont considers hierarchy in India to be governed by a 
single principle that encompasses all others—the ritual opposition between 
purity and impurity—Cuba prior to the abolishment of slavery in 1886 was 
more complicated. Here, people were positioned in a hierarchical social 
order according to numerous principles that were often expressed in con-
tradictory ways in a single person. The opposition between slaves and free 
persons, illegitimate and legitimate birth, dark skinned and light skinned 
persons, African and European origin, poor and rich, infamous and hon-
ourable, mixed and unmixed, plebeians and nobles, and so on, were all 
operative principles in the Cuban slave society (Martinez-Alier 1989:131). 
People did not always fall neatly into one side of these oppositions; a light 
skinned person was not necessarily wealthy, honourable and of legitimate 
birth, just like a dark-skinned person was not necessarily poor, of illegiti-
mate birth or a slave. As such, Latin American colonial hierarchies were 
multifaceted sites of contestation rather than fixed entities.
The origins of this situation can be traced back to how the Europeans’ 
encounter in 1492 with what they coined the “New World” profoundly 
shaped their ideas of human difference. Earlier, notions of European 
superiority rested partly on medieval theology, in which blackness was 
often linked to the devil and sin. Africans were considered inferior 
because Europeans associated their appearance with this colour. There 
was thus a focus on differences in physical appearance, but this was not 
yet thought about as biological “race”. Instead, the word “race” was 
understood as “lineage” in European languages at the time—that is, it 
referred to a notion of kinship rather than fundamentally different 
kinds of human beings (Wade 1997). However, as Europe embarked 
on the era of discovery and colonialism, a multitude of concerns— 
economical, practical, philosophical and theological—merged in a sin-
gle conception—that of human “races” (see Ystanes 2011:92–108 for a 
discussion of this process). DaMatta points out that “‘contact  situations’ 
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tend to create an ideology to explain the relationship of domination or 
subordination among social systems” (1991:13). In the European sub-
ordination of what eventually came to be known as Latin America, the 
concept of human “races” played an important role in legitimising it. 
This concept was used not only to gain acceptance for various aspects 
of the colonial project, but also to structure the colonies into exceed-
ingly complex hierarchies, as illustrated by Martinez-Alier’s (1989) 
study of nineteenth-century Cuba (see also Casaús Arzú 2007).
In Spanish America, “race” was first and foremost conceptualised as 
pureza de sangre (blood purity); a concept derived from a Catholic doctrine 
dating back to the thirteenth century (Stolcke 1993). Up until this point, 
Christians, Muslims and Jews were presented as living harmoniously 
together on the Iberian Peninsula. However, during the thirteenth century, 
this situation changed. The segregation of Christians from non- Christians 
was done with reference to the doctrine of pureza de sangre. Originally, this 
idea was derived from medieval physiological theories and the belief that a 
child’s substance was provided by the mother’s blood. Purity of blood in 
this context meant descent from Christian women. During the sixteenth 
century, however, the doctrine of blood purity acquired new meaning. 
From being considered a religious/cultural discrimination that could be 
overcome through conversion to Christianity, it was now transformed into 
a racist doctrine of original sin. Descent from Jews or Muslims was now 
regarded as a permanent and indelible stain. When these ideas were later 
applied in the colonial setting, the doctrine of blood purity led to a height-
ened concern among Europeans and their descendants over endogamous 
marriage and legitimate birth (Stolcke 1993:31−32).
Legitimate birth was used as a means to ensure and attest racial purity, 
which were prerequisites for inclusion into the upper echelons of colonial 
society. When a child was born, his or her birth certificate would state 
whether or not the child had purity of blood. Essentially, purity of blood 
in this context meant that the child was born from European born or 
“white” parents who were married to each other. This status would deter-
mine the child’s position in the social system; any kind of higher-status 
occupations or positions could be held only by people who were of pure 
blood. People of mixed blood or Africans and indigenous people were 
assigned to different positions of slavery, servitude or lower-paid jobs. By 
now, blood purity had come to be understood as “racial” purity (see, e.g. 
Casaús Arzú 2007; Martinez-Allier 1989; Wade 1997 for more on these 
processes).
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The Creole elites—people of Spanish origin born in the Americas—
who became the new power holders after independence, were inspired by 
ideas from the Enlightenment in Europe. However, they were highly 
selective in how they interpreted and absorbed them. Whilst they eagerly 
fought for national sovereignty and free trade, “modern ideas about indi-
vidual freedom, right of man, and equality” (Grosfoguel 2000:349) were 
underplayed. Rather, the Creole elites continued formerly colonial prac-
tices of coerced labour carried out by those on the bottom of the racial 
hierarchies, as well as maintaining the hierarchies themselves (Grosfoguel 
2000:349). This is of course not very different from how Europeans and 
North Americans approached the ideas of the Enlightenment, for this was 
indeed a period filled with contradiction and ambiguity:
The Age of the Enlightenment was an age in which the slave drivers of 
Nantes bought titles of nobility to better parade with philosophers, an age 
in which a freedom fighter such as Thomas Jefferson owned slaves without 
bursting under the weight of his intellectual and moral contradictions. 
(Trouillot 1995:78)
In similar ways, “white” Creole elites carved out the structural features 
of the nascent Latin American nation states in such a way that it continued 
to reproduce and legitimise their dominance, and colonial subjects were 
never really fully extended complete citizenship in the new sociopolitical 
order (Grosfoguel 2000:368). Quijano has termed this situation 
“Coloniality of Power” (2000), and its implication is that “the first deco-
lonialization was incomplete” (Grosfoguel 2000:368). Hence, as the 
chapters in this volume show, the ideas undergirding these hierarchies 
continue to mark Latin American societies today. This is an important 
reminder that poverty or economic disparity is never just about money, 
but is constituted in the encounter between economic processes, moral 
concerns and political ambitions. Before we start addressing these issues in 
their contemporary configuration, we will make an interlude of recent 
Latin American economic history.
structuralism anD DepenDency theory
In the 1950s and 1960s, attempts to build up national industry through 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) were at the centrepiece of Latin 
American economic development theories and practices. The cepalistas, 
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spearheading what came to be known as (Latin American) structuralism, 
were working through the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
(CELAC) under its influential director Raúl Prebisch. The core of struc-
turalist theory was that countries that produced manufactured goods 
would always have better terms of trade at international markets than 
countries exporting primary products. Hence, if Latin American countries 
were to be able to compete with the industrialised world, they had to build 
up their own industrial and manufacturing sectors through protective poli-
cies. Industrialisation policies, pursued to counter the effects of the Great 
Depression on Latin American economies, had been well under way at the 
continent also well before CELAC was established in 1948 (Love 
2005:103). Indeed, many Latin American regimes pursued developmen-
talist agendas during the first half of the century. The focus was on infra-
structural, agricultural and industrial development, as well as some degree 
of social development. Notable examples here are Juan Domingo Perón in 
Argentina, Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, 
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru and Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico.
However, CELAC, with its vast networks of intellectuals and policy 
analysts, systematically assessed regional economic development trajecto-
ries into a broader theoretical and empirical framework, and had great 
success in making contacts with governments, industrialists and interna-
tional organisations (Love 2005:117). The structuralist school also fos-
tered the emergence of dependency theorists. Whilst a central feature of 
the dependentistas’ intellectual positioning was criticism of CEPAL’s ideo-
logical affiliation with developmentalism and modernisation theories 
(Grosfoguel 2000:358), many of the most notable dependency theorists 
were also direct offshoots of the Prebisch-school, including Prebisch him-
self (Love 2005:119).
Dependency theory’s criticism of developmentalism and modernisa-
tion theory was focused on debunking the notion that underdeveloped 
countries would, through applying the right policies, follow the same 
development trajectories as the Western world and eventually reach the 
stage of industrialised modernity. Rather, they maintained that develop-
ment and underdevelopment were mutually constitutive features, because 
“the underdeveloped” world (i.e. the former colonial regions) is continu-
ously politically, economically, technologically, culturally and epistemo-
logically subordinated by the capitalist (previously colonialising/imperial) 
centres. In contrast to the original cepalistas, who maintained that under-
developed countries could industrialise and develop within the capitalist 
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system, many dependency theorists maintained that underdeveloped 
nations had to separate themselves from it, with revolution if necessary, in 
order to gain independence and prosper.
Developmentalism anD the “Discovery”  
oF the thirD WorlD
Intellectually, developmentalism and modernisation theories were princi-
pally emerging from Western academic institutions. However, as Arturo 
Escobar argues, a “hegemonic worldview of development” (Escobar 
1995:19) was crafted through deeply interlinked political, economic and 
discursive rearrangement of large parts of the globe. Following the “dis-
covery” of mass poverty in countries outside European, North-American 
and communist-controlled territories after the World War II, the so-called 
Third World regions in the world were constituted as a site of intervention 
and “development.” Scientists, technocrats and “experts”, sent out by 
Western institutions, universities and governments, descended upon Third 
World countries and populations with the aim of propelling them into tak-
ing the great leap from their underdeveloped state of being into modern, 
progressive peoples and places. In the words of June Nash: “The discourse 
of modernization presumed that Third World countries (those not aligned 
with the superpowers in the ‘Cold War’), would, with the right combina-
tion of investment and disengagement from traditional pursuits, evolve in 
the same way as ‘advanced’ capitalist countries” (Nash 2003:60).
However, as Escobar has shown, the development agenda was also as 
much about domestic economic concerns in the West, particularly the 
USA, as it was about benevolent enlightenment of underdeveloped 
regions. Following the economic downturn after World War II, the USA 
was in dire need to open up new markets for capitalist expansion and to 
put US dollars into circulation at the global market. Third World coun-
tries were endowed with generous loans to pursue large-scale develop-
ment projects and national development agendas. When the world 
economy started to slump in the late 1970s and eventually turned into 
crisis in the 1980s, these debt burdens would be the principal means of 
coercion for forcing countries across the continent into pursuing struc-
tural adjustment policies and the neoliberalisation of Latin American 
 societies and economies.
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the rise oF neoliberalism in latin america
As Love (2005) indicates, there was a range of structural, political and 
economic factors that contributed to the ISI strategy’s eventual demise, an 
issue that is far beyond the scope of this chapter to address. However, 
what is important to assess in depth is the broader context in which the 
neoliberal era was ushered in.
Before proceeding, we will briefly state what we mean by neoliberalism 
in response to Laidlaw’s polemic, but not entirely unjust, claim that neo-
liberalism often appears in anthropological texts as a designation for 
“everything the author doesn’t like” rather than for a specific set of ideas 
or policies (2016:20). Indeed, the economic policies, modes of gover-
nance and techniques of the self that are at times included under the label 
“neoliberalism” are numerous and fragmented (see, e.g. Cook 2016; 
Coombe 2016; Gershon 2016; Hale 2006). Here, we take neoliberalism 
to be a particular set of economic policies and modes of governance as well 
as an ideological template. As we will expand upon below, these two 
dimensions are inseparable.
The neoliberal “policy package” was implemented unevenly across the 
Latin American continent. At first, as we will discuss further below, it was 
implemented by authoritarian governments. Later, this process was deep-
ened and expanded following the transition to electoral democracy. Yet, in 
general terms, the neoliberal recipe consisted of fiscal discipline, privatisa-
tion, restructuring of labour markets, trade and financial markets, as well 
as the re-organisation (and reduction) of the public sector and public ser-
vices (Gwynne and Kay 2000:144; Margheritis and Pereira 2007:34). 
Illustrating the dominant role of US-based institutions in spearheading 
this shift, its implementation across the globe  became known as the 
Washington Consensus.
In Latin America, the neoliberal consensus was by and large crafted 
within a limited, yet transnational sphere consisting of domestic economic 
and political elites, and foreign policy makers, politicians, intellectuals, 
academics and business interests. In essence, it represented the ideas and 
interests of transnational capitalist sectors within and beyond Latin 
America’s borders (Margheritis and Pereira 2007:42). Local opposition 
and subaltern critique was excluded, conditioned and muted. Within this 
echo chamber, social concerns were extraneous to the ideological and 
political premise of the model, namely macroeconomic stability. At the 
time, it was pursued with near-religious fervour. Complex economic, socio 
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and political realities were ignored at the expense of a “one-size fits all 
blueprint model”. As Arturo Escobar has polemically worded it, “‘the 
essential is to press on with structural reforms’, or so the litany goes. 
People’s welfare can be bracketed for a while, even if hundreds of thou-
sands might die. Hail the market” (Escobar 1995:58). Or, as Immanuel 
Wallenstein equally polemically worded it, invoking Margaret Thatcher’s 
dogmatic statement: “(…) let us face Mecca five times a day and intone 
Allahu Akhbar TINA—There is No Alternative” (Wallenstein 2005:1265).
As the social consequences of the first round of neoliberal reforms 
became too evident in the course of the so-called lost decade in the 1980s, 
policy makers and academics sought to come up with suggestions as how 
to mitigate these through some formula for “neoliberalism with a human 
face”. Yet, these suggestions were highly patchy and underdeveloped, and 
the basic premises of a neoliberal model as such were never challenged 
(Margheritis and Pereira 2007:37–39).
“trickle-up” eFFects anD mounting opposition
In order to understand both the temporal heterogeneity of the neolib-
eral expansion and its continuous universality for nearly two decades, it 
is important to note that in the short term, neoliberal policies frequently 
produced some immediate stabilising macroeconomic results. It reduced 
inflation, brought in new capital and fomented economic growth 
(Margheritis and Pereira 2007:26). However, it also created new cycles 
of boom and bust. Economic growth tended to slow down, new rounds 
of financial volatility set in and a host of social problems deepened as 
poverty, unemployment and socio-economic inequality grew. In reality, 
privatisation processes often consisted of transferring state monopolies 
into private hands, and became associated with massive corruption 
scandals. In country after country, social protests against not only neo-
liberal policies per se, but also the political classes that implemented 
them, gained pace.
In sum, a political crisis was under way, whereby the legitimacy of the 
political system at large was gravely undermined. In the years leading up to 
the end of the millennium, country after country saw political protests and 
uprisings directed against politicians associated with neoliberal policies. In 
Bolivia this led to the resignation of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2002, 
in Ecuador it led to the resignation of Jorge Jamil Mahuad in 2000 and 
in Argentina it led to the resignation of Fernando de La Rua in 2001. 
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The  popular Argentine slogan que se vayan todos (everyone must go), 
meaning that everyone associated with the political establishment had to be 
replaced, expressed the sentiment that swept across the continent. When 
Lula won the presidency in Brazil in 2002, social protests against the neo-
liberal prescription of Fernando Henrique Cardoso had marked the coun-
try for several years. In Venezuela, Chavez’s ascendance to power in 1998 
marked the end of a decade of intense political conflict and increasing resis-
tance against neoliberal policies and the political system associated with 
them. Emblematic in this respect is the bloody popular uprising in 1989, 
the so-called Caracazo. Erupting as a spontaneous response to a new pack-
age of structural adjustments, and resulting in an unofficial death toll of 
somewhere between 1000 and 3000 casualties, el Caracazo has been char-
acterised as “the largest and most violently repressed revolt against austerity 
measures in Latin American history” (Coronil 1997:376). In hindsight, it 
remains clear that the memories of el Caracazo and the years preceding it 
provided a powerful contrasting backdrop and incitement to the explicit 
anti-neoliberal ideology and sentiments characterising the Chávez years in 
Venezuela (see Strønen, Chap. 7, this volume, for more on the Caracazo).
Before we turn to the culmination of these processes in the Pink Tide, 
we will expand upon the implementation and outcomes of neoliberalism 
in Latin America.
authoritarian experiments in neoliberalism
In ideological terms, neoliberalism can be understood as a utopian project 
with freedom as its highest purpose (Harvey 2007; Klein 2007). It is 
based on the theory that human well-being can best be achieved with the 
maximisation of “entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional frame-
work characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencum-
bered markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2007:22). Ironically, perhaps, 
given the emphasis of freedom in the neoliberal project, its initial intro-
duction in Latin America was enforced by an authoritarian regime. In fact, 
Chile became a virtual laboratory for neoliberal experimentation after the 
democratically elected president Salvador Allende was ousted in a CIA- 
backed coup on 11 September 1973 and replaced by General Augusto 
Pinochet (Klein 2007). At the time, the Chilean economy suffered from 
hyperinflation, and Milton Friedman and a group of Chilean economists 
educated under him known as the “Chicago boys” were enlisted to coun-
sel the new regime on how to address this situation.
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Soon, other authoritarian regimes such as Argentina and Brazil fol-
lowed Friedman’s prescription for their troubled economies. The wider 
context for this development was the “dirty wars” unfolding in Latin 
America during the Cold War era, where the USA involved themselves on 
the side of right-wing military dictatorships as a means of curbing social-
ism. During the early neoliberal experiments in authoritarian Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil, resistance was met with violence: torture, massacres, 
disappearances, assassinations and concentration-camp-style prisons (see, 
e.g. Feitlowitz 1998; Klein 2007).
While the marriage between authoritarian regimes and projects of pol-
icy reform oriented towards freedom may appear contradictory, this was 
not so for Milton Friedman. He believed that for neoliberalism to be fully 
implemented, a degree of shock, a clearing out of the old, a blank slate, 
was required. After the 1973 coup in Chile, Friedman advised Pinochet 
“to impose a rapid-fire transformation of the economy—tax cuts, free 
trade, privatized services, cuts to social spending and deregulation” (Klein 
2007:8). He theorised that the speed, suddenness and scope of these eco-
nomic shifts would provoke psychological reactions in the population that 
would “facilitate the adjustment” (Milton and Rose D. Friedman cited in 
Klein 2007:8). The term Friedman coined for this tactic was “economic 
shock treatment”.
Harvey characterises the brutal experiments carried out in the Latin 
American “laboratories” of the 1970s and 1980s as creative destruction 
carried out in the periphery, only to later become a model for the formula-
tion of policies in the centre (Harvey 2007). In other words, Latin America 
became a testing ground for neoliberalism before it was later introduced 
in the USA and the UK under Reagan and Thatcher.
One of the defining features of neoliberalism, even as it was lopsidedly 
implemented across the globe, was that it contributed to eroding the meta-
phorical social contracts that protected industrial labour and the citizenry 
alike from the worst excesses of capitalism (Ortner 2011). The unwilling-
ness of the citizenry to give up these social contracts was what motivated 
the Latin American authoritarian experiments in neoliberalism during the 
1970s and 80s. Klein notes that “while Friedman’s economic model is 
capable of being partially imposed under democracy, authoritarian condi-
tions are required for the implementation of its true vision” (2007:12). 
The main reasons for this can be found in one of the conclusions from the 
Chilean experiment; the outcome of neoliberal economic policies is deep-
ened inequality. Its initial introduction culminated in a new economic  crisis, 
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as Chile’s economy crashed in 1982. Debt exploded, hyperinflation 
returned and unemployment hit 30 per cent—ten times higher than under 
Allende (Klein 2007:104). By 1988, the economy had stabilised and was 
growing rapidly, yet 45 per cent of the population had fallen below the 
poverty line. In contrast, the richest 10 per cent had increased their income 
by 83 per cent, and even in the mid-2000s, Chile remained one of the most 
unequal societies in the world (Klein 2007:105). The outcome of neolib-
eral economic policies, then, was not a stable economy and steady growth, 
but rather, increased inequality and volatility.
class struggle From above
One might ask why an economic model that has produced such staggering 
inequality and repeated financial crises could become hegemonic. As the 
uneven geographical distribution of neoliberalism and its partial and lop-
sided application from one country to another shows; it was by far the 
only imaginable solution to the recession of the early 1970s (Harvey 
2007:27). It was, however, a solution that successfully restored the eco-
nomic and political power of elites, who found their position threatened 
by the conjoining of labour and social movements throughout much of 
the advanced capitalist world. Harvey therefore suggests that we should 
regard neoliberalism not as the utopian project of freedom it is often pre-
sented as, but rather, as a project to re-establish conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore class power. Indeed, its primary achievement 
has been precisely the restoration of class power, and its principles are 
quickly abandoned whenever they conflict with this particular project 
(Harvey 2007:27–29).
Despite the rhetoric about curing sick economies, Harvey notes that 
the record of neoliberalism in stimulating economic growth is poor; 
between 2000 and 2007, global growth rates barely touched 1 per cent. 
In contrast, in the 1960s, before the introduction of neoliberal economic 
policies, aggregate growth rates were around 3.5 per cent. Episodes of 
periodic growth have nevertheless served to obscure the reality that, 
 generally, neoliberalism was producing low growth and numerous finan-
cial crises. However, neoliberalism has worked very well to restore class 
position to ruling elites in countries such as the USA and the UK, or create 
conditions for capitalist class formation in countries such as China, India 
and Russia. Thus, the effect of neoliberalism has been redistributive rather 
than generative, transferring wealth from the masses towards the upper 
I.Å. STRØNEN AND M. YSTANES
 19
classes, and from vulnerable to wealthier countries (Harvey 2007:33–34). 
Another outcome of neoliberalism has been continued destruction of the 
natural environment, which together with the numerous economic crises 
has produced an all-encompassing existential precariousness for humans 
and non-humans alike (Tsing 2015).
In Latin American lifeworlds, the consequences of this class struggle 
from above were acutely felt by the lower classes. Eduardo Silva (2012), 
for example, argues with reference to Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador that 
neoliberalism was perceived of as an assault on life itself. Not only did it 
subject people to hunger, misery and unemployment, but it also denied 
them the possibility to live a life with dignity, and to “affirm the value in 
the rituals of living (birth, puberty, marriage, childrearing, anniversaries, 
public festivals, close friendship and death)” (Silva 2012:23). Likewise, in 
Venezuela, neoliberalism created a perfect storm of unemployment, 
declining wages, harsher working conditions and an increasingly com-
modified “welfare marked” in which the poor were unable to participate. 
For the popular classes, this left them in a state of permanent scarcity and 
insecurity, fomenting social violence and personal tragedies, and excluding 
people from aspirations of a life project (Strønen 2017). In short, the 
consequences of neoliberal politics not only affected the structural condi-
tions for social life and social reproduction (i.e. school, employment, wel-
fare), but it also reached into the deepest sentiments of personal and 
collective human existence.
neoliberalism anD conFineD possibilities
While increased inequality has undoubtedly become the main narrative 
about neoliberalism, Tsing urges us to study capitalism without the crip-
pling assumption that there can be only one powerful current at a time 
(2015:4). And indeed, there are some currents diverging from the main 
narrative in the events we are exploring here. For example, neoliberalism 
in Latin America has to some extent implied the transfer of power 
away  from central governments and towards other entities. Municipal 
 government has been strengthened, as has community organisations, col-
lective institutions and links with transnational fields of networked power 
(Coombe 2016:251). However, such formal decentralisation of power has 
not necessarily empowered local actors as it has often been accompanied 
by de facto transfers of power away from the local level (Hale cited in 
Coombe 2016:251). New spaces of contestation and struggle have 
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 nevertheless been created as the neoliberal project worked to expand 
marked relations into culturally defined zones of life. These processes have 
been embraced by a variety of actors2, and have tended “to incite new 
forms of struggle, knowledge mobilization and identity formation” 
(Coombe 2016:251). Hale (2006:75) argues that from the early 1990s, 
two strands of state ideology—orthodox neoliberal economic policies and 
a progressive stand on cultural rights—merged to yield a new mode of 
governance throughout Latin America. The reasons why these apparently 
contradictive principles could coexist so successfully, according to Hale, 
are that:
[…] if civil society organizations opt for development models that reinforce 
the ideology of capitalist productive relations, they can embody and advance 
the neoliberal projects as collectives not individuals. As long as cultural 
rights remain within these basic parameters, they contribute directly to the 
goal of neoliberal self-governance; they reinforce its ideological tenets while 
meeting deeply felt needs; they register dissent, while directing these collec-
tive political energies toward unthreatening ends. (Hale 2006:75)
In the case of Guatemala, these developments created conditions that 
made it possible for the pan-Mayan movement to make considerable 
advances in challenging racism and discrimination. However, these 
advances are not without ambivalence and hindrances. As the biological 
racism that previously undergirded the Guatemalan social hierarchy 
became increasingly untenable, other ideas supporting “racialised” hierar-
chisation have moved to the foreground. Thus, many ladino3 Guatemalans 
now consider indigenous people to be inferior, not because of their “race”, 
but because of their culture, or because they are poor (Hale 2006; see also 
Nelson 1999; Ystanes 2016).
Furthermore, while neoliberalism has contributed to the conditions 
that made it possible for the indigenous population to advance their claims 
for equal rights, it has also led to a deepening of gendered forms of labour 
exploitation (Nelson 1999). The introduction of maquila work and the 
Guatemalan standards for the minimum wage reflect this. Previously, a 
distinction was made between agricultural labour and other kinds of work. 
Agricultural work was mostly performed by indigenous people, and had a 
lower minimum wage. In recent years, however, the distinction is made 
between work in the maquila industry and other kinds of work, where the 
former is mostly performed by women and has a lower minimum wage. To 
some extent, poor women have come to occupy a stigmatised position that 
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was previously associated with indigenous people. Hence, since the nature 
of hierarchising notions of difference in Latin America is fluid and inter-
connected, wage discrimination can shift from “racial” to gendered justifi-
cation and has done so within the neoliberal context (Ystanes 2011:149).
Another example of the lopsided potential offered to marginalised 
groups in the neoliberal economy is offered by Ødegaard (Chap. 8). 
Neoliberal expansion in Peru has in some respects opened up an economic 
space for indigenous women to manoeuvre, the chola, as largely informal 
vendors of diverse commodity products. Through navigating back and 
forth between the formal and informal economy:
the chola may appear as the ‘perfect neoliberal citizen’; as hard-working 
and self-made, and accommodating her own quest for social mobility to 
growing demands of growth, flow and consumption. (Ødegaard, Chap. 8, 
this volume)
Yet, the chola’s position in the socio-economic domains is continuously 
fragile, and frequently considered illicit or illegitimate by the authorities 
and the dominant classes.
Likewise, as Stensrud (Chap. 10, this volume) asserts, the neoliberalisa-
tion of the agricultural economy in Peru has provided peasants with a 
partial integration into domestic and global markets. Nevertheless, this 
market insertion is characterised by highly insecure access to water, land 
and capital, as well as frenzied attempts to interpret and navigate in fluctu-
ating market demands. Seen together, these two chapters from Peru per-
fectly illustrate how the neoliberalisation of Latin American economies has 
facilitated certain spaces for economic survival for those on the lower soci-
etal ladder; yet these spaces are highly circumscribed by, as well as accentu-
ate, historically constituted modes of inequality. Whilst capital under 
neoliberalism is allowed to thrive, those on the bottom are often left to 
“creatively” scramble for existence within a socio-cultural and economic 
matrix where the cards are stacked against them.
the pink tiDe
The Pink Tide, post-neoliberalism, the turn to the left, the neoliberal 
backlash: these are some of the terms and concepts that have been used to 
describe the political shifts taking place on the Latin American continent 
at the turn of the millennium. Garavito, Barrett and Chavez date the 
emergence of “the new left” to the Zapatista uprising on 1 January 1994 in 
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protest of the free trade NAFTA-agreement between Mexico, the United 
States and Canada (Garavito et  al. 2004:27). As their edited volume 
shows, leftist candidates’ success at the ballot box a few years later has to 
be intrinsically understood in relation to social mobilisations from below 
that had been taking place for a long time (Garavito et al. 2004).
However, at the level of government, the Pink Tide can be dated to 
Hugo Chávez’s election victory in Venezuela in 1998, followed by Lula’s 
electoral victory in Brazil in 2002, Néstor Kirchner’s election victory in 
Argentina in 2003, Evo Morales’ electoral victory in Bolivia in 2006, 
Rafael Correa’s election victory in Ecuador in 2006, Manuel Zelaya’s elec-
tion victory in Honduras in 2006, Michelle Bachelet’s election victory in 
Chile in 2006, Daniel Ortega’s electoral victory in Nicaragua in 2007, 
Álvaro Colom’s electoral victory in Guatemala in 2007, Fernando Lugo’s 
electoral victory in Paraguay in 2008, José “Pepe” Mujica electoral victory 
in Uruguay in 2010 and Ollanta Humala in Peru in 2011.
As Ruckert et  al.’s (2017) review of scholarly approaches to “post- 
neoliberal” governments in Latin America reveals, these governments, as 
well as the analytical and classificatory characterisations of them, were 
extremely heterogeneous. Academic debates, and not to speak of media 
reports, have been circumscribed and coloured by the highly politically 
contentious context in which the turn to the left unfolded. As Escobar 
noted, “how one thinks about these processes is itself an object of struggle 
and debate” (Escobar 2010:2).
Echoing Castañeda’s much-discussed categorisation of the “good” and 
the “bad” left (Castañeda 2006), divisions were often made by scholars, 
journalist and other observers between “moderate”, “centre-left”, “prag-
matic”, “reformist” or “good” governments on the one hand, and “popu-
list”, “radical” and “bad” governments on the other hand. Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia, and sometimes also Argentina, were commonly 
lumped together as the prime examples in the “bad” populist leftist cate-
gory, whilst Brazil and Chile were taken to be the lead examples of moder-
ate “good leftists”. The remaining governments were placed at the 
different points of this sliding matrix, depending on context and the eye 
of the observer.
Indeed, there were enormous differences between both the ideological 
focus and the actual policies of these governments. As Escobar (2010) 
commented, the State projects instigated by formal political power were 
“not panaceas of any sort, on the contrary, they are seen as fragile and full 
of contradictions” (Escobar 2010:2). This observation is even more  evident 
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today. However, at the time and in the big picture, the turn to the left in 
the formal political landscape were interpreted as a broad backlash against 
the neoliberal hegemony, right-wing politics and traditional political elites. 
It was the fruit of a long struggle, made possible by long-term social mobil-
isation from below. This backdrop eventually provided a broad spectrum of 
popular movements with considerably more space and leverage as political 
and social actors, crafting a new (though highly heterogeneous and contra-
dictory) nexus between formal power and non-elitist actors.
Indeed, as Moraña (2008) argues, the political experiences of the 
“institutionalised left” in Latin America in the course of the Pink Tide 
“cannot be understood except as the counterpart of social movements that 
exists outside the limits of traditional politics (…)” (Moraña 2008:34). 
Even though the genesis, strength and form of social movements and pop-
ular mobilisation varied considerably from one country to another, a wave 
of popular empowerment, optimism and solidarity swept across national 
borders. This was accompanied by a prevailing sense that the time had 
come to truly challenge the complex hierarchies that left so many Latin 
Americans in positions of social, cultural and economic “otherness”. The 
World Social Forum, first organised in Porto Alegre in 2001, is a case in 
point. It managed to bring together tens of thousands of heterogeneous 
groups of activist under the slogan “Another World is Possible”, making 
visible and asserting “the existence of alternatives to neoliberal globaliza-
tion” (de Sousa Santos 2008:253). In the years after the millennium, the 
multiplicity of cultural-political projects, cosmologies, ideologies and uto-
pias crafted and imagined as alternatives to neoliberalism and liberal 
democracy gained visibility. The coining of projects such as “socialismo del 
Siglo XXI, plurinationality, interculturality, direct and substantive democ-
racy, revolución ciudadana, endogenous development centered on the 
buen vivir of the people, territorial and cultural autonomy, and decolonial 
projects” (Escobar 2010:2) were not only discursive novelties, but they 
also denoted the emergence of multiple counter-hegemonic visions of 
ways to organise human society.
re-inserting the social
It is essential to recognise that the Pink Tide was far more than an orienta-
tion to “classical” left-wing postures such as increased social welfare, state 
involvement in the economy and increased articulation between the state 
and non-elite sectors. Rather, echoing Polyani’s thesis of capitalism’s 
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 double movement, it was a popular reaction against the expanding com-
modification of ambits that are essentially part of social life and survival 
such as labour, land and money (Silva 2009; Margheritis and Pereira 
2007:28). In contesting the increasing gap between human needs and 
economic realities, it was a call for a re-articulation between the social and 
the political; “a call for a new kind of politics, rooted in and responsive to 
local traditions and communities, and an attempt to forge a new pact 
between society and the state” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012:3).
During the Pink Tide, attempts to reverse neoliberalism’s socially 
destructive legacy was characterised by the merging of claims for the rec-
ognition of cultural and social diversity with claims for socio-economic 
redistribution and poverty reduction. In Venezuela, the Bolivarian dis-
course stressed popular identities and practices as the basis for crafting new 
social and political models, at the same time as diverse experiments with 
popular participatory democracy was directly contraposed to liberal 
democracy’s elitist nature. “Bolivarianism” offered previously marginalised 
sectors a new historical narrative and new moral grounding for asserting 
themselves as a historical subject, el pueblo, whose time had come to claim 
rectification for accumulated injustice (Strønen, Chap. 7 this volume).
In Bolivia, the country’s indigenous majority was for the first time in 
history represented by “one of their own”, and indigenous cosmologies 
and socialities became part of the official story about the nation’s collec-
tive foundation and heritage. In no way were the relationships between 
these governments and their constituencies peaceful and streamlined. 
Rather, they were fraught by contradictions, complex political manoeu-
vring, or what is perhaps best captured by the Aymaran scholar Pablo 
Mamani’s concept “strategic ambiguity” (Fernandes 2010:28). It is nev-
ertheless important to recognise that the new relationship between formal 
powerholders and popular subjects opened up a space where claims for 
recognition, social and economic rights, and a seat at the political table 
could be legitimately articulated and negotiated. Generally speaking, the 
coming-to-power of new political actors from non-elitists background is 
highly important for understanding the qualitative shift in the texture of 
relations between formal political power and socioculturally marginalised 
groups. As de Sousa Santos notes, “absent from the minds [of the domi-
nant classes] has always been their own inexperience of the suffering, 
death, pillage, imposed as experience upon the oppressed classes, groups 
or peoples” (de Sousa Santos 2001:191). What the Pink Tide did, was to 
recognise these life experiences sustained by large parts of Latin American 
peoples, and to name it by its rightful name: inequality and injustice.
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As part of this process, efforts to address socio-economic inequalities in 
more comprehensive ways were introduced at the state level. According to 
Costas and de Lavra Pinto (Chaps. 3 and 6, this volume), the Lula and 
Rousseff governments in Brazil managed to significantly improve key indi-
cators of poverty, unemployment and access to social welfare. Likewise, as 
Strønen (Chap. 7) indicates, the Chávez government quickly reduced the 
country’s poverty rates as well as the Gini-indicator between 2004 and 
2012, before the economic crisis struck. In that period, Venezuela’s poor 
and marginalised enjoyed an unprecedented access to healthcare, educa-
tion and pensions, as well as significant improvements in housing and 
infrastructure. Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina also introduced or expanded 
targeted welfare programmes, leading to notable reductions in poverty 
levels (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012:9–10).
Lavra Pinto (Chap. 6) brings our attention to interesting aspects of 
these processes, which is indicative of how they differ from neoliberal con-
ceptions of welfare based on strict evaluations of economic need (see, e.g. 
Haney 2000). She found that social workers tasked with the implementa-
tion of the Bolsa Familia programme in Rio de Janeiro, employed a wider 
conceptualisation of “poverty” than economic scarcity alone. Often, they 
showed solidarity with beneficiaries based on knowledge of their whole life 
situation, and helped them navigate the system accordingly. This exempli-
fies how policies introduced by Pink Tide governments often allowed for 
an enhanced attention to people’s whole lives, and a recognition of the 
social aspects of inequality.
the (partial) return oF the right
During the Pink Tide era, successive attempts were made to halt the turn 
to the left and to restore traditional right-wing power. Lugo’s presidency 
in Paraguay was aborted by a parliamentary coup in 2012, and Zelaya was 
effectively shut out from power through a parliamentary/military coup in 
2009. In Venezuela, the aborted coup against Chávez in 2002 and the oil 
strike/sabotage in 2002/2003 were effectively attempts to restore class 
power, and both Bolivia and Ecuador have been through episodes of tense 
conflict, including an alleged attempted coup against Correa in 2010. In 
Brazil, the country’s ruling elites managed to put an end to the Lula- 
Rousseff era in 2016, through a process that is difficult to assess as any-
thing else than a parliamentary coup.
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Current experiences from Paraguay, Brazil and Honduras, as well as 
from Argentina where the business mogul Mauricio Macri won the presi-
dential elections in 2016, indicates that when the traditional elites return 
to power, they are eager to curb social mobilisation from below and pur-
sue classic right-wing politics. In Brazil, for example, the Michel Temer 
government has already passed legislation that will deepen and reinforce 
inequalities, rather than working to undo them. The official reason for this 
is to reduce government spending as a way of tackling the unfolding finan-
cial crisis. However, such austerity measures have been discredited as they 
deepened the depression and delayed recovery after they were imple-
mented in European countries after the 2007–2008 financial crisis 
(Krugman 2015). It is also well known that large-scale cuts in public 
spending combined with privatisation reinforce economic inequality, as 
they redistribute resources away from the wider public and into the hands 
of elites (Klein 2007). Despite all this, in Brazil, austerity measures are 
now being introduced against the backdrop of elite and upper-middle 
class anxieties about “poor” people gaining access to more and more dis-
tinguishing forms of consumption (Ystanes 2015:230), education, posi-
tions and gains in identity politics. As a result, those Brazilians who rose to 
the lower rungs of the middle class during the last couple of decades may 
now find their new class position to be quite insecure.
the social liFe oF economic inequality
As the chapters in this volume show, neoliberalism and neoliberal rational-
ity continue to imbue Latin American societies, in spite of the counter 
currents produced by the Pink Tide. Indeed, much of the increased par-
ticipation in consumption for Latin America’s “poor” is achieved through 
access to credit, granted by stores and other entities eager to capture this 
segment of society as consumers (see, e.g. Han 2012). An intervention 
that illustrates this well is the “pacification” of Rio’s favelas prior to the 
2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (see, e.g. Larkins 2015; 
Salem 2016; Savell 2014; Sørbøe 2013). The rhetoric employed to legiti-
mise this grand-scale militarisation of urban neighbourhoods is to force 
out drug traffickers who are operating from these areas, and to “re- 
conquer” the territories for the Brazilian state. This would allow favela 
residents to be finally included in the formal city as full members of soci-
ety. The army is enlisted in this effort; on preannounced dates they arrive 
with tanks and soldiers, and once the area is secured, the military police set 
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up permanent presence. However, the full inclusion of favela residents as 
citizens has not been achieved through this project, which has been tar-
nished by police violence, an inability to contain drug trafficking and lack 
of social programmes. What has been achieved, however, has been the 
penetration of the formal economy into favela territories that were previ-
ously off limits because of the dominance of organised crime. Those who 
observed the “pacification” of Rio’s favelas say that the cable TV compa-
nies literally entered just behind the invading army. Chain stores and other 
formal businesses soon followed. When the Special Forces (BOPE) 
advanced into the Rocinha favela, corporate representatives eager to tap 
the lucrative favela market outnumbered the invading police threefold. 
Salespeople distributed flyers for bundled service packages even before 
victory had been declared (Larkins 2015:139). While previously favela 
residents had affordable access to the Internet, cable TV and various other 
services via a black market controlled by traffickers, “pacification” cap-
tured them as consumers for the formal economy. In true neoliberal spirit, 
the markets were significantly expanded; by 2014, 264 favelas housing 
1.5 million residents were included in this project (Salem 2016:4).
In tandem with Pink Tide policies, then, neoliberal approaches to gover-
nance, where one of the main purposes of the state is to create markets 
(Harvey 2007:22–23), have been continued. The pacification of Rio’s favelas 
exemplifies how the efforts to secure the city before the recent mega-events 
simultaneously constituted the creation of new formal markets. The chapters 
by Lavra Pinto, Sørbøe and Ystanes (Chaps. 6, 5 and 4) explore some of the 
lives lived within these ambiguous contexts. As they show, residents in “paci-
fied” favelas found both empowerment and improved economic situations, 
as well as the continuation of structural and physical violence, exclusion 
forced evictions, and new forms of economic marginalisation. This ambiguity 
is illustrative of processes explored also in other chapters.
For example, Brown (Chap. 11) makes an important point about the 
contradictions involved in some of the gains in identity politics. Brazilian 
Quilombo communities, that is, descendants of communities founded by 
runaway slaves during the colonial era, have been recognised as ethnic 
groups with collective rights to their own culture and ways of life. However, 
recognition has not included the means whereby these rights could be 
meaningfully exercised, such as land. In fact, more than 2400 communities 
are recognised as Quilombo, yet only 220 have received land titles. 
Although social rights and the right to exercise them in particular places 
are intimately connected, as the chapters by Stensrud, Sørbøe and Ystanes 
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(Chaps. 10, 5 and 4) also show, the distribution and occupation of land 
remain firmly governed by market concerns (see also Rolnik 2015). The 
valuation of land in the market, however, is in turn governed by social 
structures imbuing different locations with dissimilar values, as Brown 
(Chap. 11) emphasises. The role of land in the reproduction of inequality 
is therefore created by a circular movement between social and financial 
processes. On the one hand, spatial politics produce a geography of 
inequality which informs markets of the value of a piece of land. On the 
other hand, this precise quantification of inequality through the valuation 
of land reinforces its inscription in the physical landscape.
The question of land goes to the core of why the scope for challenging 
inequality has been circumscribed in Pink Tide countries. A legacy of 
inequality, established through conquest, colonialism, slavery and forced 
labour, racism, gender discrimination, authoritarian regimes and neolib-
eral policies, is inscribed in Latin American social landscapes through 
unequal access to, ownership over, life conditions in and the right to exist 
in, particular places.
The ethnographic chapters in this volume all explore different configu-
rations of this problematic. Sørbøe (Chap. 5), for example, shows that the 
“pacification” of Rocinha and its accompanying urban upgrade pro-
gramme centred on the notion of the favela as a particular kind of place; 
one that could simultaneously be opened up for the formal economy and 
for tourists, be the location of spectacular infrastructure projects aimed to 
promote Rio as a “global city”, and one where criminals could be con-
tained in order to make the formal city more secure. The life conditions of 
those who already had their lives and relationships embedded in this place 
were of less concern. The ideological foundation for such an approach 
rests upon the inscription of inequality in the physical landscape, as 
described above. In similar ways, Ødegaard (Chap. 8) argues that the pro-
duction of a particular kind of “governable spaces” in Peru may serve to 
exclude some actors and forms of economic activities from these spaces, 
and therefore, reinforce existing inequalities. De Lavra Pinto (Chap. 6) 
shows how inequality is also inscribed into the landscape within Rio’s fave-
las; the closer a person lives to the edge of the favela, near the “asphalt”, 
the wealthier they are perceived to be. Strønen (Chap. 7) describes the 
division over Chávez’s Bolivarian process as one where the different opin-
ions are more or less located on separate sides of the Caracas valley. 
Stensrud (Chap. 10) analyses how the Majes Irrigation Project in southern 
Peru has turned a desert into fertile land and a place of opportunity, yet 
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also a place where inequality is reproduced. Gutiérrez Rivera, Strønen and 
Ystanes (Chap. 9) discuss how the War on Drugs has contributed to repro-
ducing and reinforcing the marginalisation of young, “racially othered” 
men living in poor neighbourhoods in Honduras, Venezuela and Brazil. 
Finally, Ystanes (Chap. 4) analyses the social media-based activism-as- 
journalism that has arisen in favelas that were adversely affected by mega-
event preparations in Rio, and how it thematises the inscription of 
inequality in the city’s urban landscape.
In discussing how reparations associated with land can play a role in 
challenging entrenched inequalities, Brown (Chap. 11) emphasises that 
this is not a question of eliminating private property, but of changing the 
distribution of the values produced by and attributed to land. This could 
happen through economic tools like taxation, through a deeper recogni-
tion of the social role of land and the idea of land as commons, rather than 
merely a financial asset. Most fundamentally, though, Brown argues that 
reparations are not just about acknowledging past injustices through pay-
ments or land title, but of repairing human relationships. In order to 
achieve such a thing, close attention must be paid to the social life of eco-
nomic inequality: the worldviews that uphold it, their historical legacies 
and how they are embedded in contemporary relationships. Indeed, 
inequality in Latin America is an outcome of a complex interweaving of 
the ambitions, beliefs, actions and worldviews of past and present persons 
and institutions. Inequality is a feature of a relationship between different 
social groups, and this relationship is continuously both reproduced and 
challenged by contemporary Latin Americans. The struggle for more egal-
itarian societies has therefore been fought on several fronts during the 
Pink Tide; in the field of economic policies, as well as social rights and 
identity politics. As the chapters in this volume show, for those advocating 
or supporting this process from below, it is essentially about repairing 
human relationships; about working towards social worlds where their 
common humanity is fully recognised, and their life projects, dreams and 
ambitions can be valued the same as others’.
notes
1. The 2007 Pan-American Games, the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, the 
2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.
2. See also Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) for a comparative discussion of 
such processes beyond Latin America.
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3. Ladinos are Guatemalans of mixed origin who foreground the European 
part of their heritage and identify with national culture, while shoving the 
indigenous part into the background.
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CHAPTER 2
Reformism, Class Conciliation and the Pink 
Tide: Material Gains and Their Limits
Pedro Mendes Loureiro
IntroductIon
Towards the end of a long period of developmental regimes, from roughly 
1930 to 1980, Latin America became the world’s laboratory for neoliberalism, 
pioneering transitions in Chile and Argentina in the early and mid- 1970s. This 
soon spread to most of the continent, and, alongside a crisis-ridden decade of 
the 1980s, Latin America underwent the most thorough neoliberal transfor-
mation in the world (Sader 2011). Countries across the region promoted 
trade and financial liberalisation, cut the already small welfare entitlements and 
privatised state assets, whilst firms integrated themselves into low-value-added 
sections of global value chains (Medeiros 2011). What resulted was an unsta-
ble, low-growth model dependent on foreign direct investment, as well as 
rising unemployment, labour market informality, poverty and inequality.
Towards the end of the 1990s, popular approval of neoliberal govern-
ments consequently fell and, starting with Venezuela in 1998, many 
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countries elected presidents running on platforms allegedly antithetical to 
neoliberalism. This continental movement, known as the ‘Pink Tide’, made 
use of particularly positive global conditions to deliver material gains. 
Relatively fast growth rates in central countries, the strong Chinese demand 
for commodities underpinning its breakneck development and abundant 
international liquidity combined to benefit low- and middle- income econo-
mies (Saad-Filho 2013). Left-leaning Latin American governments capital-
ised on this moment to implement economic planning initiatives and novel 
welfare policies, such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs). These latter 
policies were financed mostly through higher taxation of soaring commod-
ity exports. Under a changed economic and social policy mix, growth rates 
picked up and social conditions improved, partially reverting the negative 
consequences of neoliberalism and cementing popular support.
The Pink Tide would soon ebb, however, in a spiral of economic and 
political crises. Governments could not continue to deliver social improve-
ments when, under deteriorating international conditions, tougher distri-
butional choices had to be made. Combined with allegations of corruption 
and the repression of worker and indigenous struggles, important con-
stituencies were alienated and a growing sense of disillusionment took 
hold. Traditional right-wing parties furthermore took hold of these sce-
narios to reorganise themselves and regain power. Several left-of-centre 
governments have thus been, legally or not, ousted from power since the 
2009 Honduran military coup against Manuel Zelaya. This picked up 
speed with the 2015 right-wing victory of Mauricio Macri in Argentina 
and the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff in Brazil.
In light of the Pink Tide’s unravelling, the moment thus seems ripe for 
an appreciation of the significance of this historical moment and what it 
entailed. This chapter attempts to offer such a contribution: understand-
ing to which extent have the Pink Tide governments implemented or not 
a clear break with neoliberalism and contributed to launching a sustained 
process of material gains for the working classes in Latin America. In order 
to do so, it discusses the economic and political trends prevailing in the 
continent as a whole, focusing on changes to the productive structure of 
the economies, the new matrix of social policies and the political strategies 
carried out to keep these governments in power. These three dimensions 
can be respectively synthesised in a shift towards neo-extractivism, or the 
renewed dependence on the export of primary commodities; the rise of 
conditional cash transfer policies (CCTs) as the main form of social safety 
nets; and the establishment of broad electoral fronts and a neo-corporatist 
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pattern of class relations, which is to say, a state-centred mediation of 
capital- labour-social movements relations.
The main argument of this chapter is that the Pink Tide governments 
have indeed promoted changes that economically benefitted the working 
classes, but they could not secure the sustainability of this process. As 
explored below, the very processes that led to better standards of living 
reinforced a precarious international insertion of the countries, as they 
stimulated a neo-extractivist pattern of accumulation. Politically, the gov-
ernments’ strategies disorganised the working classes and social move-
ments, as they depended on class conciliation measures and the repression 
of independent struggles. Without, furthermore, a clear battle for ideas 
and a vision of the future, the terrain on which the struggle was to be 
fought became shallow, limited to defending material gains. Therefore, 
these improvements were not accompanied by self-reinforcing economic 
and political conditions, but rather by an increased likelihood of any situ-
ation of crisis being ‘solved’ via an exclusionary shift in policies or govern-
ment. In broad terms, the forces behind these governments have advanced 
an ‘inconsequential’ attempt at counter-hegemony, which relied too much 
on short-term factors and did not transform the state, the economy and 
prevalent ideas in ways that would progressively establish structural condi-
tions compatible with popular goals.
The argument can be divided into four elements. First, there were sub-
stantial material gains for the working classes not entirely ascribable to 
positive international economic conditions, but partially due to active 
government policies, especially minimum wage hikes and CCTs.
Second, to bring about these improvements, the governments (i) relied 
on and promoted a neo-extractivist pattern of accumulation; (ii) repro-
duced themselves politically via broad fronts, centrally relying on neo- 
corporatist class conciliation measures, cash transfers to the most destitute 
groups and the repression of struggles by groups not aligned to the gov-
ernment, and (iii) did not promote far-reaching transformations of the 
state institutionality, of class relations or of visions about the trajectories 
development should assume.
Third, neo-extractivism and neo-corporatist class conciliation eroded 
the sustainability of this process, as they respectively (i) cemented a periph-
eral insertion in the world market and a class structure with a sizeable 
amount of precarious employment and (ii) disorganised the working classes 
and social movements, which were then incapable of mounting (extra-
institutional) pressure. Finally, it therefore became increasingly likely that, 
when these social formations faced a crisis, it would not be the progressive 
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elements in these hybrid state forms to be deepened. On the contrary, a 
transformation of state power in an exclusionary direction was to be 
expected, as indeed has been happening throughout the region.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The second sec-
tion reviews the changing productive structure and international insertion 
of Latin American economies, differentiating between national experi-
ences where possible. This comprised the rising importance of extractive 
activities and deindustrialisation, leading to a re-primarisation of exports—
that is, the decrease of manufactured goods and the rise of low-value- 
added, unprocessed commodities in total exports. The third brings forth 
the class structures associated to this pattern of accumulation and changes 
to the standards of living. It is shown that the latter improved and there 
was reduced labour informality, but also structural precariousness in face 
of the poor quality of the jobs created.
The text then covers the changes to the state form, in two steps. The 
section ‘The Changing Character of State Power: A Neo-corporatist Medi-
ation of Class Relations’ shows how the Pink Tide governments were 
neo-corporatist, as they attempted to directly mediate class relations by 
bringing them into the state apparatus. The support for domestic capital-
ists and the dissemination CCTs, which reduced poverty and inequality, 
are highlighted. The section ‘Class Conciliation, Demobilisation and 
Repression’ then explores the political underpinnings of this class concili-
ation process, namely, the incorporation cum co-option of social move-
ments and class entities into the state and the repression of independent 
struggles. The section ‘Final Remarks’ summarises and concludes the 
chapter, underscoring the inherent limits to the non-confrontational 
strategy advanced by the Pink Tide.
the ProductIve Structure: neo-extractIvISm 
and deInduStrIalISatIon
Neoliberalism and the debt crisis of the 1980s promoted deep transforma-
tions to the economy of Latin America. The continent’s growth rate, on 
average 5.8 and never below 3.0 per cent between 1961 and 1980, 
dropped to 2.3 per cent between 1981 and 2000, with several years of nega-
tive or near-zero growth (World Bank 2015). At the same time, the region’s 
insertion in the world market was made more precarious, with manufactur-
ing decreasing substantially (see below). The abandonment of active indus-
trial policies and the trade and financial opening were the main factors 
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behind this (Bogliaccini 2013), leading to greater vulnerability and the 
recurrent crises of the 1990s.
Since the 2000s, however, the renewed dependence on the extraction 
and export of primary commodities has been the central feature of the 
Latin American economy. This has been variously described as a neo- 
extractivist pattern of accumulation (Veltmeyer 2013; Webber 2014), a re-
primarisation of the structure of exports (Gonçalves et al. 2009) or, indeed, 
a commodities consensus (Svampa 2013). The central feature this charac-
terisation conveys is that the extraction and export of primary goods has 
become the driving element of capital accumulation in Latin America. This 
does not imply such activities are the largest element of GDP, but rather 
that they are the main dynamic force in the economic cycle.
Estimations show how the foreign sector drove the growth of Latin 
American economies during the 2000s, led by commodity exports 
(Caldentey and Vernengo 2010).1 Accordingly, agricultural and extractive 
commodities have risen from 41 to 53 per cent of total Latin American 
exports between 1999 and 2013, whilst manufacturing decreased from 58 
to 44 per cent (Ray et al. 2015, 5). If the centrality of unprocessed com-
modity exports is similar to ‘old’ extractivism, what qualifies it as neo- 
extractivism is, in turn, the greater participation of the state in these 
activities, essentially via taxation on which social policies are funded (Arsel 
and Angel 2012; Arsel 2012; Gudynas 2012).
The implications of this process can be felt at different levels. On a local 
scale, the communities directly affected by extractive projects are sub-
jected to environmental degradation and a destabilisation of their social 
reproduction, given that very few benefits spill over (Veltmeyer 2013). 
This heightens the spatial inequality of accumulation and sponsors pro-
cesses of accumulation by dispossession, in which transnational  companies, 
guarded by state power, continuously advance over natural resources. This 
amounts to the expanded commodification of nature and the forced pro-
letarianisation of small farmers and peasants (Webber 2014).
On a macro level, the results are more complex. The currency inflows 
obtained with commodity exports present both opportunities and risks, 
which can be analysed under the so-called Dutch disease and the possibili-
ties of avoiding it. The risks exist insofar as a rapid inflow of money, gener-
ally due to higher export prices, might appreciate the domestic currency 
(i.e., make foreign currency, and thus also foreign-produced goods, cheaper) 
and thus decrease the international competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector. As imports become cheaper, domestic manufacturers are forced out 
 REFORMISM, CLASS CONCILIATION AND THE PINK TIDE: MATERIAL GAINS... 
40 
of business, which forestalls the diversification of the economy and decreases 
the quality of available jobs (Bresser-Pereira 2011; Frenkel and Rapetti 
2012). Once this boom is over, the economy would find itself in a worse 
position, given that the production of commodities generates less and 
worse-quality jobs and does not promote technological upgrading. This is 
what is referred to as the Dutch disease, but it is not, it should be stressed, 
a necessary outcome of higher export prices. Given appropriate policies, the 
currency overvaluation can be checked and the resources directed to devel-
opmental objectives (Saad-Filho and Weeks 2013).
The actual results are mixed. On the one hand, higher commodity 
exports helped sustain growth (for a look into the different transmission 
mechanisms, see Ocampo 2009). Every single Latin American country 
accumulated a substantial amount of foreign reserves, and with the excep-
tion of Jamaica and Barbados the same happened for the Caribbean. 
Altogether, the region’s gross international reserves increased from US$ 
163 billion in 2001 (ECLAC 2010, 272) to US$ 830 billion in 2013 
(ECLAC 2014, 191). Moreover, higher growth rates and taxation of 
exports provided resources for social policies.2 On the other hand, except 
for Argentina, the region’s exchange rates were overvalued during the 
2000s (Frenkel and Rapetti 2012). Hence, the turn to neo-extractivism 
has contributed to an already existent and ongoing process of deindustri-
alisation (Bresser-Pereira 2011; Brady et al. 2011).
Following the initial dismantling of manufacturing under neoliberal gov-
ernments, there thus was a ‘standing still’, defensive policy that perpetuated 
deindustrialisation. The region has, moreover, also been specialising in less 
competitive manufacturing sectors, which means that the manufacturing 
sectors and jobs that did manage to remain are lagging behind world com-
petitors (CEPAL 2007; Cimoli et al. 2010). Consequently, whilst the Pink 
Tide governments cannot be held responsible for initiating deindustrialisa-
tion, their rule deepened it due to the reliance on a neo-extractivist pattern 
of accumulation.
Summing up, under the pressure of the commodities boom, virtually all 
Latin American countries shifted to neo-extractivism. If this allowed for 
financing social policies and alleviated the balance-of-payments constraint, 
it also entailed negative environmental consequences, spurred deindustri-
alisation and heightened mid-term external vulnerability. In other words, 
the Pink Tide marked an inflection with regard to the neoliberal govern-
ments insofar as they used a positive international scenario to finance social 
goals, but no greater breaks were to be found. Deindustrialisation was 
deepened, without any prospect for improving the region’s peripheral 
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position in the global market and the problems of its economic structure. 
The chapter now explores how this reflected on changing class structures, 
employment patterns and the standards of living of the population.
claSS StructureS and StandardS of lIvIng 
under the PInk tIde
During the neoliberal period, there was a general tendency towards greater 
inequality and labour precarisation in Latin America, with five major 
trends (Portes and Hoffman 2003; Robinson 2008; Cornia 2012). First, 
unemployment rose substantially and tended to remain high. Second, par-
ticularly for Central American and Caribbean countries, a migrant labour 
class grew and, with it, numerous households came to rely on remittances. 
Labour market informality was another main trend, which also took the 
form of precarious self-employment and micro-entrepreneurialism. This 
was associated to the fourth trend, widespread labour deregulation. 
Finally, the feminisation of labour was present throughout.
These processes had clear impacts in terms of inequality, poverty and 
wages. The Gini index of household per capita income, the most common 
measure of inequality, increased by 0.05 between the early 1980s and 2002 
(Cornia 2012, 4). This represented an increase of approximately 10 per 
cent, starting from what was already a very high level. Poverty followed 
suit, as the proportion of the population below the poverty line increased 
from 40.5 to 44 per cent between 1980 and 2002 (Robinson 2008, 252). 
In absolute terms, this meant 84 million more people living in poverty. As 
for wages, the real minimum wage dropped on average 30 per cent between 
1980 and 1990 and was mostly stagnant until 2000 (ILO 2002, 115).
In the beginning of the century, however, at least a partial reversal of 
these trends was underway, as poverty, income inequality and informality 
undoubtedly decreased (Cornia 2014; Lustig et  al. 2013). During the 
2000s, inequality decreased by almost the same amount it had increased in 
the previous two decades. Thus, the average Gini coefficient for Latin 
America fell by 0.04 between 2002 and 2010. Another way of looking at 
this is that the share of national income appropriated by the richest 10 per 
cent of the population decreased in almost all countries, whereas the bot-
tom 50 per cent got more (Cornia 2012, 4).3 The proportion of the urban 
population living in poverty decreased very substantially, more than 
reverting the neoliberal trend: poverty dropped 14 percentage points 
between 2002 and 2012 (ECLAC 2014, 137). There were also striking 
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differences in terms of labour informality. If 80 per cent of the jobs created 
during the 1990s were in the informal sector, informality dropped by 
about 8 per cent during the 2000s (ILO 2013). Finally, real minimum 
wages increased, on average, by 54 per cent between 2000 and 2012 (ILO 
2013, 127). This holds for all Latin American countries, with the excep-
tion of the Dominican Republic.
Importantly, there is strong evidence that these developments were in 
large measure due to government policies (Cornia 2012, 2014). In a study 
of 18 Latin American countries to explain what caused the changes to 
income inequality, Cornia (2012, 37) finds that external conditions and 
economic growth were of minor importance. The main factors responsible 
for the decrease of inequality were greater access to secondary education, 
higher minimum wages and lower labour informality, and greater govern-
ment transfers. Government policies such as increasing the minimum 
wage and instituting conditional cash transfers were, therefore, central to 
the decrease of inequality.
Furthermore, the left-of-centre governments were seen to have reduced 
inequality considerably more than the rest. The broad left, including Bolivia 
under Evo Morales, Brazil under the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian 
Workers’ Party, PT) and Venezuela, all decreased their levels of inequality 
during the 2000s. As for centre and centre-rights administrations, such as 
Uruguay in the first half of the 2000s and Mexico, there were mixed results 
and in some of them inequality rose. On average, the decrease was much 
slower for countries not under the Pink Tide governments (Cornia 2012).
In light of this, it is clear that the Pink Tide governments positively 
impacted the living standards of the working classes. These results dis-
credit interpretations that ascribe to foreign conditions the direct determi-
nant of improved living standards, such as considering that the commodities 
boom would have had positive results regardless of the orientation of the 
governments in power. As seen above, domestic political choices were key. 
That inequality and living standards improved more rapidly under the 
Pink Tide is also of central importance. The issue is then to explore the 
limits of this process.
the changIng character of State Power:  
a neo- corPoratISt medIatIon of claSS relatIonS
If the neoliberal state was mainly the enforcer of market discipline on capi-
tal and labour, under the Pink Tide it took on a more flexible character, 
which attempted to mediate (intra-)class relations via economic and social 
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policies and negotiation procedures. A useful way of looking at this is 
through tripartite negotiation forums, or negotiation tables between state 
representatives, capital and labour to determine wages and working condi-
tions. This meant, first, that capital-labour relations were explicitly brought 
into the state. This was predicated upon a more direct participation of 
state power in the relations between capitalists of different economics sec-
tors, as well as in the reproduction of labour power. As regards the former, 
the main element was the attempt to steer accumulation towards a ‘national 
development project’, for which the governments had to prioritise the 
relevant sectors and companies. This was done, for example, by actively 
using procurement policies to stimulate domestic firms, offering tax sub-
sidies for strategic sectors and the like. As for workers, a significant increase 
in social policies, however not universal, and rising minimum wages were 
key. Finally, as these processes of class conciliation reached their limits, the 
continued repression of ‘hardliner’ popular organisations ensued (see the 
examples of the TIPNIS march and the repression of Piqueteros below).
This state form, on the one hand, was capable of securing greater gains 
(as compared to the neoliberal state) for the working classes, as seen in the 
previous section. On the other hand, as its legitimacy was strictly associ-
ated to securing the profitability of various fractions of capital and certain 
gains for the working classes, it was largely dependent on maintaining high 
growth rates. It was thus inherently prone to destabilisation as growth 
faltered. Furthermore, this commitment to negotiation and the concilia-
tory dynamics it implied made it incapable of promoting wide-ranging 
transformations. In short, it secured certain gains for the working classes 
whilst preventing greater transformations: it could manage neoliberalism 
in a relatively progressive direction, but not break with it. These develop-
ments are reviewed in order.
In the transition to neoliberalism, state power was used to push the pri-
vatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), market liberalisation and the 
rollback of sector-specific policies, such as discontinuing subsidies for strate-
gic sectors or state-run research and development initiatives. Thereafter, it 
sought to advance the integration of national economies to the world mar-
ket, privileging the interests of financial forms of capital and arbitrating less 
between other fractions. Likewise, the state did not participate directly in 
wage negotiations, but rather repressed workers’ mobilisations. Therefore, 
competing in a globally integrated market became the central locus of class 
relations and the way to achieve wage gains or higher profitability, and state 
power actively enforced this (Bonnet and Piva 2012).
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On the other hand, under the Pink Tide state power assumed more the 
role of an arbiter. Negotiation forums were central in this process. Through 
these, class representatives and social movements entered into negotiation 
processes with the government and capitalists, so that issues related to 
distributional conflicts, wage levels, investment priorities and so on were 
addressed in an explicitly politicised and state-centred manner (Bonnet 
and Piva 2012; Piva 2011).4
There are three main results that came from this neo-corporatist pat-
tern of organising class relations. First, to a certain extent it routinised 
social conflicts and directed capitalist accumulation strategies towards 
potentially developmental objectives (such as a pro-poor growth pattern, 
or growth with high wages). Second, it directly politicised accumulation, 
as state power came to be seen as responsible for the material outcomes of 
the various class fractions. Third, and as a consequence of this, the legiti-
macy of governments became increasingly attached to securing modest 
gains for the relevant classes—bankruptcies of industrialists, for example, 
could no longer be ‘explained away’ as a result of inefficient competition 
(as in the 1990s), but become a directly political problem. As govern-
ments’ legitimacy came to depend on securing—and being held responsi-
ble for—these material gains, the strategies below were put in place to 
tend to capitalists and the population at large.
With the Pink Tide, there was a recovery of state planning capacities 
and, in some cases, a partial re-nationalisation of formerly privatised SOEs. 
This is what many authors (Leiva 2008; Bresser-Pereira 2011; Féliz 2012) 
saw as a neodevelopmental state form, which actively intervened via subsi-
dies and tax exemptions to stimulate particular economic sectors, used 
development banks to finance domestic firms, took on a greater role in 
providing infrastructure and other public goods and so on. In short, the 
neodevelopmental state attempted to steer accumulation towards a pat-
tern compatible with a particular—and always selective—view of what 
national development would be (Boito Jr and Berringer 2014; Féliz 2012; 
Petras and Veltmeyer 2007). National development came to be associated, 
in particular, with the accumulation strategies of the internal bourgeoisie,5 
and this class fraction displaced the hegemonic position of transnation-
alised financial capital (Boito Jr and Berringer 2014).
Differently from the ‘traditional’ Latin American developmental state 
of the mid-twentieth century, however, the neodevelopmental state did 
not seek to overcome the countries’ position in the world market; it was a 
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watered-down version of its precursor (Leiva 2008). Thus, growth rates 
were lower, the structure of the economy (in terms of the predominant 
sectors) did not change substantially, and the local capitalists politically 
behind this state form were not interested in antagonising those of devel-
oped countries. In Boito Jr’s and Berringer’s words, ‘neodevelopmental-
ism is the developmentalism of the era of neoliberal capitalism[…] the 
development policy that is possible within the limits of the neoliberal capi-
talist model’ (2014, 97, emphasis in the original). In this sense, it was an 
inflection within neoliberalism, but not a break with the latter.
The neo-corporatist state also had to guarantee at least moderately ris-
ing living standards for the working classes, if some stability was to obtain. 
The main instruments employed were raising minimum wages and CCTs. 
The latter did increase profusely, whilst universal social safety nets and 
public services showed little improvement. In 2013, CCTs were present in 
20 countries and reached approximately 120 million people, or 20 per 
cent of the region’s population (Cecchini 2013). On the positive side, 
there is strong evidence that they were indeed able to reach the poor and 
very poor. There is also no evidence that if properly designed, they signifi-
cantly stimulated labour market segmentation and informality, increased 
the fertility rate of beneficiaries (Stecklov et al. 2007) or reduced labour 
market participation (Alzúa et al. 2013). That they have lifted millions out 
of poverty at a very low cost of approximately 0.4 per cent of the region’s 
GDP is no mean feat (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011).
In spite of this positive record for CCTs, the claims about their capacity 
of achieving longer-term goals—breaking the inter-generational transmis-
sion of poverty—are much harder to sustain, and as of yet there is no evi-
dence in this regard (Valencia Lomelí 2008; Handa and Davis 2006). 
Moreover, given the small amount of the benefits provided, in most cases 
poverty vulnerability has not been adequately addressed, and improve-
ments in the labour market were more important in reducing inequality. 
Finally, cheap though they might be, their cost-effectiveness is by no 
means demonstrated, given leakages and higher administrative costs as 
compared to universal programmes (Saad-Filho 2015). The extension of 
CCTs can thus be considered a welcome, if far from sufficient, develop-
ment. Their widespread recommendation by the World Bank (Fiszbein 
et al. 2009) is a further indication that this form of social policy is safely 
within the realm of neoliberal policymaking.
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claSS concIlIatIon, demobIlISatIon and rePreSSIon
As regards the strictly political relation between the government and class 
entities, a two-sided process was in place. It comprehended, first, incorpo-
rating or co-opting the representatives of trade unions and social move-
ments, who would participate in negotiation forums. As a corollary, it also 
involved isolating or repressing independent entities. The central element 
was thus ‘convincing’ labour and social movements to abandon extra- 
institutional mobilisation and direct action in favour of official channels. 
As part of this, many leaders of trade unions and social movements were 
incorporated into the state apparatus, assuming offices (Oliveira et  al. 
2010; Farthing and Kohl 2014). This amounted to a routinisation of 
social conflicts and the possibility of sharing, to an extent, in the gains 
capital enjoyed, albeit at the price of curtailing the tools popular sectors 
can use in their struggles (see examples below).
The second element was dividing class entities and social movements 
into ‘good’, negotiating ones, and ‘bad’, independent ones (Castorina 
2013; Webber 2014; Galvão 2014). A line was thus drawn between the 
demands that could be processed and those that had to be ignored and 
repressed. This ‘us versus them’ approach created divisions within the 
popular sectors, and thus further restricted the horizons of what was at 
stake in official negotiations (Modenesi 2012). Combined as it was to 
actively repressing all forms of independent struggle, it led to demobilisa-
tion and less independent grassroots organising. Ironically, then, in the 
mid-term they hampered the continuity of reforms by hindering popular 
mobilisation from below, an important element in obtaining concessions 
from capital. This combination of improved material conditions without 
political empowerment, promoting instead class conciliation, is another 
illustration of the limits of the inflection under the Pink Tide.
All of these were widespread processes, of which three examples are 
offered. In Brazil, after the PT came to power, it appointed many union 
leaders to key positions in the state apparatus. The Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (CUT), the main trade union federation, became organically 
linked to the routine management of the state. Once a combative and inno-
vative organisation, it was already moderating itself throughout the 1990s; 
with the PT in power, however, it clearly opted for a negotiating strategy 
and abandoned tactics reliant on wide mobilisations of its base (Galvão 
2014). As for the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (MST), 
they did not establish organic links with the government, but likewise opted 
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for a negotiating strategy in which the resort to direct action was strongly 
curtailed. As a militant put it, ‘When government is ours, it’s worse. The 
MST stops organizing protests’ (Vergara-Camus 2009, 186). Finally, inde-
pendent struggles were met with indifference to their demands, repression 
and police violence. The countrywide 2012 strike of federal university work-
ers is a good example, but the response to the mobilisations of 2013 is the 
strongest. What came to be known as Jornadas de Junho were the first mass 
demonstrations in the country for decades, with millions of participants and 
outside the influence of government- aligned trade unions and social move-
ments. Police violence caused them to grow and continued to be present 
throughout their whole unfolding, but was never condemned by president 
Dilma Rousseff, and their demands were not met (Moraes et al. 2014).
In Argentina, the introduction of Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (PJyJH), a 
CCT programme, had important implications for the unemployed workers 
organisations known as Piqueteros, hitherto at the forefront of popular 
resistance to neoliberalism and the 2001–2002 crisis (Castorina 2013). The 
government selectively incorporated the leaders of certain organisations 
into the state apparatus to administer PJyJH benefits whilst repressing those 
that did not cooperate. ‘Good Piqueteros’ thus became government allies 
and received the power to administer cash transfers, and ‘bad’ ones were 
alienated and dwindled. This destroyed horizontal  linkages between the 
various grassroots movements, but at the same time stabilised conflicts. As 
for labour struggles, the Labour and Social Development ministries were 
reinstated as the site of tripartite negotiations, with important implications 
for moderating workers’ strategies. This state-sponsored negotiating strat-
egy could bring important trade unions along, such as the Confederación 
General del Trabajo de la República Argentina (CGT) (Bonnet and Piva 
2012; Bonnet 2012).
In the case of Bolivia a similar process of incorporation and repression 
took place. On the one hand, various organisations that formed the basis 
of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), 
the left governing party since 2006) have become part of the state appara-
tus and opted for institutional-based forms of struggle. The leaders of 
entities representing indigenous movements and trade unions, such as the 
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(CSUTCB), have assumed several positions in office (Farthing and Kohl 
2014). This ‘de-colonisation’ of the state, a central platform of the MAS 
government, has arguably led many marginalised groups to see themselves 
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reflected in the state apparatus and allowed for real gains in negotiation 
processes (Ikemura Amaral 2014).
This incorporation of historically excluded groups in Bolivia comes 
with a caveat, nevertheless. When social movements understand the state 
is not acquiescing to their demands and go for direct action—which, it 
must be remembered, stands behind the insurrectionary movement that 
culminated in MAS’s rise to power (Webber 2011)—they have been 
deemed ‘imperialist conspiracies’ or the agents of foreign NGOs, and are 
repressed. The clearest example of this process came in the wake of the 
conflicts around the TIPNIS national park (Territorio Indígena y Parque 
Nacional Isiboro Sécure), when mostly indigenous groups protested 
against government plans to build a motorway through it. As Sanchez- 
Lopez reports, ‘the government disqualified the legitimacy of this civic 
action arguing that the indigenous organizations were manipulated by the 
“oligarchy elites, the green imperialism of Western NGOs and the US 
government”’ and brutally repressed them (Sanchez-Lopez 2015, 24).
This whole process receives its perhaps clearest expression in the thought 
of Álvaro García Linera, Bolivia’s vice-president and a prolific theoretician. 
As he puts it, ‘the Bolivian people have consolidated their historical unity 
around a single project for the state, the economy and the society’ (García 
Linera 2011, 7, our emphasis). In fact, since the consolidation of the revo-
lutionary process we would be witnessing the  dissolution of the state form 
into society, creating an ‘integral state’ (p. 10). The government and its 
allies would thus concentrate in themselves all the ‘creative tensions’ of the 
revolution, the only paths capable of further advancing popular goals 
(p. 28). The corollary is that every mobilisation not contained within these 
limits, such as those of communities that resist extractivism, must of neces-
sity be denounced as particularistic, counterproductive or even imperialist 
(Webber 2014). The state form is thus the arbiter of all that is progressive, 
and there are only two positions: one is either for it, and (critically) sup-
ports it from within, or a right-wing agent of counter-revolution. No pro-
gressive stance outside of the state’s realm is possible. Whilst García Linera 
restricts his analysis to Bolivia, it can arguably be extended to encompass 
the strategies and rhetoric of various other Pink Tide governments.6
fInal remarkS
Latin America underwent a multifaceted process of social change that 
defies all summary interpretations. Neither a clear continuity with the 
immediately preceding neoliberal past nor a deep-rooted break with it, the 
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Pink Tide was a nuanced and internally differentiated inflection. There 
were undeniable material gains for the popular classes, as inequality, pov-
erty and labour informality levels decreased, in large measure due to the 
political initiative of Pink Tide governments. This occurred, nevertheless, 
under very particular foreign conditions, given the coincidence of the high 
international commodity prices and capital flows to less-developed econo-
mies. Whilst the latter did not determine the processes indicated above, 
they do seem to have played a contradictory enabling role, and their over-
all impact is still far from clear. Additionally, the Pink Tide governments 
promoted problematic economic and political developments, which 
sapped the potential for a continued process of gains for the population.
The main inflections in the pattern of accumulation, social policies and 
the state form can be respectively described as the rise of neo-extractivism, 
the expansion of CCTs and minimum wage hikes and the transition to a neo-
corporatist state. Neo-extractivism or the commodity consensus (Veltmeyer 
2013; Svampa 2013) thus highlights the centrality of commodity exports, as 
well as the state’s role in fostering them. This is linked to the idea of a com-
pensatory state (Gudynas 2012), which taxed such activities to promote 
CCTs and minimum wage hikes. If this brought about material gains, it fell 
short, however, of instituting universal safety nets or de- commodifying basic 
needs, underscoring the limits of the transformations that took place. Finally, 
neo-corporatism suggests a state form that internalised class conflicts, cir-
cumscribing them to what was compatible with the then-prevailing pattern 
of accumulation. This is seen as an attempt to promote class conciliation by 
distributing material gains to various social movements and class fractions, 
whilst moderating their goals (Bonnet and Piva 2012).
A synthesis is proposed combining elements from these three 
 dimensions—neo-extractivism, the expansion of CCTs and minimum 
wage hikes and the transition to a neo-corporatist state. This is intended 
both as a general interpretive framework of the Pink Tide governments 
and, more importantly, as a framework for comparing the different experi-
ences within the continent. The main thread that runs through these 
dimensions is that, to different degrees, the Pink Tide governments chose 
the paths of least resistance in trying to advance a reformist project. They 
restricted their goals, adopted tactics consistent with this and delivered 
what was possible under these circumstances: some gains to the working 
classes when compared to the neoliberal past, but without promoting 
structural changes and at the cost of preventing popular empowering. 
Lower informality combined to precarious employment, reducing inequal-
ity but only to the levels of the 1980s, and achieving higher growth rates 
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whilst cementing a peripheral insertion in the world market are illustrative. 
These were undoubtedly important inflections, but not strong enough 
breaks to institute self-sustaining processes that would endure.7
In this vein, there was a strategic complementarity between neo- 
extractivism, a CCT-based social policy mix and neo-corporatism. These 
were all mechanisms for social compromise that, compared to the preced-
ing phase of strict neoliberalism, allowed for relatively greater gains for the 
working classes. The inherent downside, however, was that they prevented 
popular empowering, contentious politics and a clearer break with the 
prevailing productive and class structure. Whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to try to discern the precedence or causation of each of these 
elements, it is argued that over time, through a trial-and-error process, 
they reinforced and supported each other. As neo-extractivism offered 
funding for CCTs, there was interest in stimulating commodity exports; 
CCTs together with rising real minimum wages sustained popular approval 
of the governments; and faster growth with lower inequality legitimated 
neo-corporatist, conciliatory class relations—which, in turn, helped guar-
antee the interests of local capitalists and so on.
This strategic complementary also explains the brittleness of the Pink 
Tide, as pursuing paths of least resistance eroded the political and eco-
nomic resilience of these countries and hence made them vulnerable to 
destabilisation. The point is that there was a tendency for these forms 
(neo-extractivism, CCT-based social policies and neo-corporatism) to 
develop alongside each other and forestall alternatives in any single dimen-
sion. Why go for independent labour mobilisation when neo-corporatism 
was delivering wage gains? Why attempt a larger overhaul of macroeco-
nomic policies if there had been growth and this would require confront-
ing powerful interests? Fundamentally, how could any of these possibilities 
obtain without strong popular organisation? Attempting to change one 
dimension without supporting transformations in the others was hence 
extremely unlikely. The different elements were thus likely to stand and 
fall together, in the latter case particularly if subjected to foreign- 
determined shocks, of which the fall in commodity prices offers a prime 
example.
It is thus no surprise that, as foreign conditions worsened in the early 
and mid-2010s, the social formations found themselves in a debilitated 
position and the processes that sustained these governments in power 
were no longer operative. The predictable crisis that ensued thus did not 
lead to a deepening of the progressive elements in these hybrid state forms, 
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particularly given the demobilisation of popular forces, but rather to 
exclusionary adjustments. Which is to say, instead of trying to solve the 
crises via public investment in infrastructure, tax reforms to redistribute 
money to the poor and so on, austerity measures were instead called for. 
This is diametrically opposed to the neoliberal crises of the late 1990s, 
which occurred in the wake of long-term processes of popular organisa-
tion and eventually led to the election of left-of-centre governments.
In the medium term, these paths of least resistance ironically went from 
being the most realistic options to utopic ones. They eroded their condi-
tions of existence, without promoting structural economic and political 
transformations that could deepen their progressive impact. This under-
scores the dangers of broad political fronts and minimalist reformist pro-
grammes. Their very condition of success in the short term—appealing to 
a broad section of the population and avoiding overt conflict—prevents 
them from confronting established interests, particularly capitalist ones. 
On the contrary, the dynamics that unfold are all geared towards class 
conciliation and incremental reforms, thwarting more transformative 
actions and the very continuity of such already-diminished goals.
noteS
1. In Central America, remittances are the driving factor, which can be concep-
tualised as an export of labour (Robinson 2008; Caldentey and Vernengo 
2010). Brazil is an outlier in terms of its drivers of growth, which were 
domestic after 2006 (Serrano and Summa 2015), but the commodities 
boom was still central as it provided reserves that displaced the balance-of- 
payments constraint to growth.
2. There is regional variation in the channels that connected higher exports to 
taxation and social policies. For example, Bolivia directly increased royalties 
and taxes on natural gas exports and earmarked some of these proceeds for 
social programmes. In Brazil, on the other hand, it was higher growth rates 
and labour formalisation that allowed the government to increase spending 
(Serrano and Summa 2015).
3. In Peru, for example, the 10 per cent richest got about 7 per cent less of 
national income between 2002 and 2009, whereas the bottom 50 per cent 
got about 3 per cent more. Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia are the 
only exceptions to this trend (Cornia 2012).
4. Traditionally, corporatism refers to negotiation forums between organised 
labour, firm representatives and state managers. The distinction for Latin 
America, which merits the neo- qualifier, is the presence of social movements.
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5. A Poulantzian concept, their interests are somewhat tied to accumulation in 
the domestic or regional market, as opposed to fully transnationalised class 
fractions, but not to the extent of the now-defunct national bourgeoisie 
(Boito Jr and Berringer 2014, 95).
6. As Sader (2013) put it for Brazil: ‘This group, which allegedly took to the 
left of the PT to found PSOL [Partido Socialismo e Liberdade], quickly 
added itself, in a subordinate manner, to the right-wing attack on the gov-
ernment. […] The extreme left […] has, tacitly or explicitly, allied itself with 
the right against these [Pink Tide] governments.’
7. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the political alternatives and 
draft a different programme, which would in any case depend strongly on 
the conjuncture. Nevertheless, three general elements are central: timing, 
structural transformations and extra-institutional mobilisation. A pragmatic 
approach was arguably necessary in the initial moments of the Pink Tide 
governments, and the feasibility of openly class-confrontational programmes 
is indeed debatable. To overcome this, entrenching transformations of the 
economy and political institutions would be essential (such as universalising 
public services, preventing private financing of political campaigns and so 
on). When these governments enjoyed massive popular support, for exam-
ple, towards the end of Lula’s second term in Brazil (2010), these changes 
could be attempted. Popular mobilisation would be a means of pressuring 
for them, and this would in turn firmly cement the support basis of the par-
ties. The precise changes and moments are sure to vary, but by merely man-
aging the state without transforming, it the Pink Tide governments would 
increasingly trap themselves in a corner.
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IntroductIon: EntanglEd InEqualItIEs
As a topic dating back to the very beginnings of sociology and economics, 
social inequalities have been subject to a wide array of definitions backed 
for different analytical and political purposes. In the past decades, neoclas-
sical approaches rose to prominence both within the disciplinary field of 
economics and leading international organisations such as UN develop-
ment agencies and the World Bank. This, in turn, resulted in a specific defi-
nition of inequalities that is dominant in international academia and politics 
alike: according to this interpretation, social inequalities refer to asymmet-
ric individual chances to access socially valuable goods. Consequently, indi-
vidual income differences within national borders as measured by the Gini 
index have become the central instrument to measure inequalities.
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This narrow definition of inequalities presents practical advantages 
insofar as it offers a measurable basis for comparisons between individuals 
and national societies. However, it does not adequately take into account 
other crucial dimensions of inequalities as captured by more complex con-
ceptualisations. Recent objections to this narrow definition can be classified 
into four groups related to the interest in researching inequalities: inequali-
ties (1) of what, (2) between whom, (3) when, and (4) where. In the fol-
lowing, I will discuss these objections with regard to recent developments 
in Brazil. In particular, I will show how a more complex conceptualisation 
of inequality is necessary to adequately assess the gains in inequality reduc-
tion achieved during Brazil’s engagement with the Pink Tide.
Inequalities of What?
A focus on inequalities of chances implicitly or explicitly rests on a liberal 
assumption according to which social positions in modern societies are 
solely or mainly determined by individual achievements. Therefore, if 
individuals have similar social opportunities, disparities in their life condi-
tions allegedly reflect differences in terms of their individual effort. This 
supposition has been largely criticised by authors demonstrating that 
ascriptions concerning gender, race, ethnicity, and social prejudices 
remain relevant for individual opportunities of social mobility—also in 
contemporary societies (for an encompassing critique: Boatca ̆ and Roth 
2016). In Latin American societies, the role of ascriptions in shaping 
social inequalities is especially relevant due to the fact that being identi-
fied with categories coined to describe subordinated groups during the 
colonial period such as “black”, “mestiza/mestizo”, and “india/indio” 
still determines, to a large extent, the position occupied by individuals in 
current socio- economic hierarchies. In most cases, these colonial catego-
ries have been removed from the legal or policy framework, and, in cases 
where they do still appear, they are used not for discriminating against 
groups but rather for naming target groups of affirmative action policies 
in favour of blacks, women, indigenous peoples, and so on. However, as 
outlined in the introduction of this volume, these categories operate as 
ascriptive filters in everyday life, hindering the correspondent groups 
from accessing higher social positions, even in those cases for which for-
mal equality of  opportunities do exist. Because of this ascriptive bias, it 
seems analytically more accurate to shift the focus from inequality of 
opportunities in formal terms to inequality of results, understood as the 
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final positions which individuals or groups of individuals achieve in the 
socio-economic structure.
Of course, socio-economic inequalities in terms of income and wealth are 
crucial for determining differences in concrete living conditions—after all, 
the wealthiest groups have better housing, better medical assistance, more 
and better leisure as well as longer life expectancies than groups which 
occupy a lower position in the social-economic structure. Nevertheless, two 
other dimensions of social inequalities, mostly faded out in conventional 
inequality research, are also decisive in determining distances between living 
conditions faced by different social groups: power asymmetries and socio-
ecological inequalities. Power inequalities refers to both unequal capabilities 
to exert influence in decisions which affect one’s personal trajectory and the 
asymmetric distribution of political and social rights and entitlements. 
Power asymmetries are obviously connected with socio-economic inequali-
ties; however, they also encompass inequalities related to the level of enforce-
ment of citizenship rights and welfare schemes. Accordingly, welfare states 
able to offer good public educational, health or transportation services 
enormously contribute to reducing the impact of (existing) socio-economic 
inequalities on (existing) living conditions (Kreckel 2004; Therborn 2013). 
In contrast, states which concentrate their social policies on cash transfers to 
the poor make only a small contribution to the reduction of disparities in 
living conditions (Lavinas 2013).
Socio-ecological inequalities, for their part, refers to both the unequal 
access to environmental goods such as fresh water, clean air, parks, and 
so on and the unevenly distributed capacity to obtain protection against 
ecological risks, including natural disasters and also manufactured jeop-
ardies (pollution, irradiation, etc.). Provided that environmental goods 
are vastly commodified in contemporary societies and ecological risks 
can be outsourced and even exported, socio-ecological inequalities are 
not a lineal product of the “natural” geography of environmental goods 
and “bads”. On the contrary, recent scholarship in this field defends the 
idea of a “constitutive interconnectedness” of nature and society inas-
much as:
Social relations of power and domination are constitutive for environmental 
problems; and vice versa that the way in which nature is appropriated, 
 transformed and represented is constitutive for the (re-)production of social 
relations of power, domination and inequality. (Dietz 2014, 16)
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To sum up the arguments developed up to this point, researching inequali-
ties from an encompassing perspective firstly requires a change of perspec-
tive, moving from inequalities of opportunities to inequalities of positions. 
Secondly, it implies a multidimensional concept of inequality able to consis-
tently connect socio-economic, socio-ecological, and power inequalities.
Inequalities Between Whom?
Using concepts and references such as horizontal inequalities (in contrast 
to vertical inequalities; Stewart 2010), categorical inequalities (Tilly 
1999), and intersectional inequalities (Anthias 2013, 2016), various 
authors stress the importance of researching inequalities not only between 
individuals but also between groups defined by social ascriptions. As sum-
marised by Tilly,
[l]arge, significant inequalities in advantages among human beings corre-
spond mainly to categorical differences such as black/white, male/female, 
citizen/foreigner, or Muslim/Jew rather than to individual differences in 
attributes, propensities, or performances. (Tilly 1999, 7)
Today, more than 15 years after the publication of Tilly’s seminal book on 
durable inequalities, several studies in a variety of fields have demonstrated 
the importance of intermediate categories, between and within the seem-
ingly binary constructions Tilly used, in determining social inequalities. 
For example, it has been shown that within the categorical pair citizen/
foreigner, one can identify key series of gradations such as the legal status 
of immigrants, their country of origin, and so on that determine their 
rights and possibilities, varying significantly among “foreigners” (see, e.g. 
Góngora-Mera et  al. 2014). Similarly, as Lavra Pinto shows (this vol-
ume), there are significant inequalities within Rio de Janeiro’s favelas—
not just between favela residents and those of formal neighbourhoods. 
Moreover, the temporal aspect is often neglected: positions and labels 
adopted by individuals or groups may vary considerably over time, with 
groups who defined themselves as peasants later identifying themselves as 
indigenous or of African origin. That is to say that persistent inequality 
affecting  similar demographic groups may be expressed by different cate-
gories (e.g. peasant, indigenous, indigenous women, etc.) in different 
historical circumstances (see Gonçalves and Costa 2016). Aside from 
that, definitions such as categorical inequalities or horizontal inequalities 
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remain analytically useful because they reinforce the importance of social 
ascriptions in stabilising inequality patterns. In particular, intersectional 
approaches, for their part, have convincingly shown that positions in social 
structures always derive from complex interplays of categorisations of race, 
gender, class, and so on.
Inequalities When?
Economists usually study inequalities from a synchronic, contemporary 
perspective paying no attention to the fact that existing social structures 
reflect necessarily long-time historical processes (e.g. López-Calva and 
Lustig 2010).
Since the paradigmatic contribution of Tilly (1999), different studies 
have sought to enlarge their temporal perspective in order to unpack the 
historical formations of inequality structures. In the case of Latin America, 
several historiographic studies have reconstructed the nexus between con-
temporary inequalities and the history of this region shaped by colonial-
ism, slavery, as well as by the reception of scientific racism after national 
independence (e.g. Stepan 1991; Andrews 2004). Conceptually, linking 
past and contemporary inequalities found in Latin America remains a chal-
lenge. This is because historically “persistent inequalities” have assumed 
new faces through history based on internal or external factors such as the 
enforcement of citizenship rights or the integration of local and global 
economies. Baquero (2015) draws on the geological metaphor “layered 
inequalities” to respond to this conceptual gap. According to this concept, 
inequalities which emerged in a certain historical epoch are superposed 
(but not substituted) by more recent structures of inequalities.
Other authors have also tried to solve this conceptual temporal problem 
by drawing on the idea of inequality regimes (Costa 2011; Góngora- Mera 
2018). At the theoretical level, “inequality regimes” combines the idea of 
regime as a relational unity of analysis as found in concepts such as the 
human rights regime or the global climate regime with a more critical 
Foucauldian perspective, according to which a regime always implies power 
asymmetries and social control. A regime of inequality encompasses at least 
four dimensions: (i) logics of stratification/redistribution defined as static 
(caste societies), dynamic (class societies) or combined (class with racial/
ethnic/gender ascription); (ii) political, scientific, and popular discourses 
according to which individuals or groups interpret and construct their 
own positions and that of others in society; (iii) legal and institutional 
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frameworks (e.g. apartheid law, multicultural or antidiscrimination laws, 
policies); and (iv) models of conviviality in everyday life (segregating or 
integrating convivial forms). Empirically, this approach has been applied 
to the study of inequalities which affect Afro-descendants in Latin America. 
In this case, we could identify four regimes of inequalities: slavery (until 
the nineteenth century), racist nationalism (from the end of the nine-
teenth century to the first decades of the twentieth century), Mestizo 
nationalism (from the 1930s to the 1980s), and the compensatory regime 
(from the 1980s). The transition to the next historical regime of inequality 
does not imply a complete disappearance of inequalities created in a previ-
ous regime. Consequently, racist discourses which had appeared during 
slavery, for instance, were later reinforced during the prevalence of racist 
nationalism. Packed in new imageries (emphasis rather on cultural than on 
the biological inferiority of blacks), these racist discourses subsisted 
Mestizo nationalism and are still present in the current regime of inequal-
ity characterised by compensatory policies in favour of black populations.
Inequalities Where?
While conventional scholarship researches inequalities on a local or 
national scale, new approaches seek for understanding inequalities with a 
widened angle in order to capture transnational and global entanglements 
that shape local and national social structures. There are two main 
approaches which have recently dealt with inequalities from an amplified 
perspective: while transnationalism (see, e.g. the contributions assembled 
in Weiß and Berger 2008) is interested in understanding how different 
national social structures interact, for instance, in the case of social posi-
tions of migrants, world systems approaches are rather concerned with 
macro-structural persistent inequalities (see, for instance, Korzeniewicz 
and Moran 2009).
In accordance with these new developments in the field of inequality 
research, the network desiguALdades.net—a research network on 
 interdependent inequalities in Latin America—coined the concept of 
entangled inequalities1 understood as distances
[…] between positions of certain individuals or groups of individuals in a 
relationally (not spatially) determined context. This concerns economic 
positions (defined by income, access to resources and so on) as well as 
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political and legal entitlements (rights, political power etc.). In order to 
understand the linkages from which unequal positions arise, it is necessary 
to have relational units of analysis that are dynamically defined in the process 
of inquiry itself. In a similar way, the interplay of social categorisations (gen-
der, race, class, ethnicity etc.) cannot be articulated ex-ante in a formula. It 
can only be studied in the respective specific context. (Costa 2011, 21)
The approach “entangled inequalities” displays broad affinities with the 
interest of understanding inequalities in Latin America from an ethno-
graphic perspective as outlined in the introduction of this book. Both the 
entangled inequalities and the ethnographic approach insist on the histori-
cal constitution and the intersectional character of social inequalities. 
Accordingly, both perspectives extend the scope of inequality research far 
beyond economic indicators in order to capture the impact of structural 
inequalities on lifeworlds. This does not imply a dichotomistic separation 
of social structures and everyday life, but just the opposite: by integrating 
the structural and life world dimensions of inequalities, these approaches 
shed light on the interconnections between these two dimensions to dem-
onstrate that everyday interactions are both spaces of reproduction of 
social structures and also arenas in which social hierarchies are negotiated 
and transformed.
Recent changes promoted by Pink Tide governments in Latin America 
represent a privileged context to analyse the interplay between these two 
dimensions of inequalities. While cash transfer policies adopted by these 
governments have hugely reduced poverty, this kind of intervention has 
demonstrated a very limited power to transform “deep-seated aspects” of 
inequalities as described in the introduction of the present volume. 
Furthermore, if Pink Tide governments have tried to promote more 
emphatic shifts in existing social hierarchies, local elites have reacted by 
destabilising these governments. This happened in different terms but 
with a similar political plot in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. The 
Brazilian case in particular is paradigmatic. Here, cash transfer policies 
have halved poverty rates in about 10 years. Real increases in the mini-
mum wage and new economic opportunities created during the cycle of 
economic growth also started changing inequalities in everyday life, inas-
much as “newcomers” disputed spaces and goods of distinction reserved 
hitherto to the established middle classes. At this point oppositional forces 
became insurgent. Indeed, this dispute of previously reserved spaces and 
goods, in combination with the economic recession starting in 2015, led 
to the parliamentary coup d’état of 2016 (Costa 2018).
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However, exploring the impact on everyday life produced by the poli-
cies adopted during the Pink Tide cycle in Brazil would go beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Therefore, I limit myself to analysing the redistribu-
tive shortcomings of these policies, and, in doing so, applying the frame-
work of entangled inequalities.
InEqualItIEs In BrazIl: rEcEnt dEvElopmEnts
After the Workers’ Party (PT) came to power in 2003, remarkable eco-
nomic and social improvements have been reached in Brazil. Thus, in line 
with developments observed in several Latin American countries, inequal-
ities in Brazil have declined in this period. During the two administra-
tions of former President Lula da Silva (2003–2006 and 2007–2010) and 
the first administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2010–2014), eco-
nomic growth, improvements in the labour market, progress in deprived 
regions, and pro-poor policies interacted positively as drivers of inequality 
reduction. Accordingly, between 2002 and 2013, GDP per capita has 
increased by 64 per cent, poverty rates among Brazilians—including 
extreme poverty—declined from 48.4 to 23.9 per cent of the Brazilian 
population, and social policy expenditures rose from 12.7 to 16.8 per 
cent of the Brazilian GDP (Bielschowsky 2014; CEPAL 2014). In the 
same period, the Brazilian labour market underwent an auspicious change 
as unemployment rates declined from 11.7 to 5.4 per cent among the eco-
nomically active population while the formal employment rate has impres-
sively increased from 49.7 per cent in 2003 to 71.4 per cent in 2012.
It was also between 2002 and 2013 that income inequality as measured 
by the Gini coefficient decreased from 0.59 to 0.53. Yet despite this 
improvement, the Brazilian Gini coefficient for income is still above the 
Latin American average of 0.486. With the richest quintile possessing 53.6 
per cent of all income, Brazil also remains the most unequal Latin American 
country when it comes to income concentration by upper classes (as a com-
parison, this rate amounts to 36.4 per cent in Latin America’s least unequal 
country, i.e. Uruguay; see CEPAL 2014).
Concerning inequalities related to racial and gender categorisations, 
they remain at a high level, but there has been also an important reduc-
tion of income asymmetries during the administrations led by the 
Workers’ Party. In 2002, women’s total average income represented only 
half of the male average income, while in 2012 this proportion rose to 58 
per cent. A similar change can be observed for racial income asymmetries: 
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In 2002, the average income among blacks corresponded to 47 per cent 
of whites’ average income. Yet in 2012, this proportion amounted to 55 
per cent. A similar tendency can also be observed in the case of regional 
inequalities since the Northeast, Brazil’s poorest region, has recently 
experienced more development than other regions. But regional inequal-
ities still matter, especially if combined with gender and race-related 
asymmetries, as the figure below illustrates quite well (Fig. 3.1).
Among analysts of Brazilian social structure, there is a broad consensus 
that the reduction in inequalities between 2003 and 2015 is rather a conse-
quence of economic processes (such as increasing prices for commodities in 
international markets and moves in domestic labour markets) than of social 
policies. Accordingly, social policies based on cash transfers have a crucial 
impact on poverty reduction, but they are seen to be less effective for pro-















Fig. 3.1 Average monthly earnings in Brazil, 2012 (average earnings from the 
main occupation of the population over 16 years old) calculated for the intersec-
tion of inequality factors: sex, race, and region (figures in Brazilian Reais as of 
September 2012). NE Northeast, CW Center West
Source: Data from IBGE (2012) for selected groups
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Analysts also question the sustainability of the decrease in inequalities 
in Brazil given the current adverse confluence of modest (or even nega-
tive) economic growth, “premature” deindustrialisation, a “reprimarisa-
tion” of exports, and falling commodity prices.2
Inequality analysts are also concerned about recent political develop-
ments. Due to the economic stagnation and political instability, former 
President Dilma Rousseff, in her second administration started in 2015, 
faced serious difficulties in sustaining the social gains obtained during the 
previous administrations. At the end of 2015, the Brazilian congress 
started an impeachment process against President Rousseff, who has alleg-
edly violated Brazilian budgetary laws. The president was first suspended 
in April of 2016 and finally removed from office in August 2016. Vice- 
president Michel Temer assumed the government, promising to promote 
fiscal austerity and to cut social benefits introduced during the PT admin-
istrations. When he assumed the presidency, he first abolished the agency 
with ministerial status responsible for implementing policies meant to 
mitigate inequalities in terms of gender and race. In subsequent months, 
his administration has also adopted a series of unsocial and  business- friendly 
measures, including but not limited to (i) a new programme of privatisa-
tion, ranging from oil exploration to public service, with the aim of boost-
ing the economy; (ii) a constitutional amendment freezing social 
expenditures for 20 years which is expected to produce huge negative 
impacts for poor populations which are the most dependent on public 
services; and (iii) a plan to reform the pension system in a way which dra-
matically restricts benefits and increases contributions paid by employees 
(Fórum 21 et al. 2016).
thE (rE)dIstrIButIvE Impact of statE IntErvEntIon
States remain key actors for promoting the mitigation of domestic inequali-
ties created by economic interactions in capitalist societies—at least at the 
domestic level. Fiscal policies, including tax and social policies, and the offer 
of public and quasi-public goods represent classical instruments used by 
states to intervene in inequality structures. States can also intervene indi-
rectly through measures—such as the introduction or increase of minimum 
wages—which lead to a redistribution in favour of low-paid workers.
Comparisons of the Gini coefficient before and after tax deductions 
and state transfers in different countries give a sense of how states use 
their redistributive power with very different intensities, as shown by data 
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compiled by the World Bank (2014). Accordingly, the Gini coefficient 
before taxes and transfers in European OECD countries and in the Latin 
American countries is virtually identical. However, the final Gini coeffi-
cient, that is, after state’s intervention through fiscal policy, is much 
higher in Latin American countries than in Europe. A comparison 
between two OECD countries, France and Mexico, makes this general 
tendency clear: the Gini coefficient in both countries before taxes and 
transfers is about 0.50. After fiscal policy, the French Gini coefficient 
decreases to 0.30; in Mexico it remains very high: 0.48.
Hence, Latin American states lack the power or the political will to 
strongly reduce market-produced income inequalities. In European coun-
tries, state interventions use to mitigate income inequalities by up to 50 per 
cent as, for instance, in the case of Slovenia and Norway (see World Bank 
2014, 27). Although distinctive patterns of state transfers (comprehending 
how much and for whom the state invests its resources) partly explain these 
contrasting results of state intervention between Europe and Latin America, 
the pivotal difference lies in the tax structures which are much more pro-
gressive in Europe than in Latin America. Pink Tide governments in Latin 
America have not changed this tendency since tax reforms recently imple-
mented in the different countries aimed to increment tax revenues follow-
ing established patterns. That is, tax systems continue to be based on a high 
taxation of salaries and consumption and low or even inexistent taxation of 
capital gains and profits (Jiménez and López Azcúnaga 2012).
In the case of Brazil, overall tax collection did in fact increase from 31.8 
per cent of the GDP in 2003 to 35.9 per cent in 2012, exceeding thus the 
average number of OECD states which is 34.6 per cent (Castro 2014). 
However, the composition of tax revenues in Brazil differs substantially 
from that of those countries which are more effective in diminishing 
inequalities. While indirect taxes, which are regressive,3 represent 49.7 per 
cent of all collected taxes in Brazil, they held a much lower share of all col-
lected taxes in European countries such as Germany (29.2 per cent) and 
Norway (27.3 per cent) (Castro 2014; data for 2012 from European 
Union 2014). In Brazil, the current composition of tax revenues has not 
varied substantively since the Workers’ Party took office in 2003. This is 
also true for other regressive characteristics of the Brazilian tax system such 
as the lack of a tax on dividends (in Western European countries this taxa-
tion varies from 25 per cent in Belgium to 42 per cent in Denmark) and the 
low taxation of high incomes (in Brazil the highest income taxation is 27.5 
per cent, whereas in Sweden, for instance, it amounts to 56.6 per cent).
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This tax collection structure is also unable to change the concentration 
of wealth encompassing properties and entitlements. Based on the analysis 
of more than 25 million tax declarations, Castro (2014) concludes that 
only 406,064 tax payers (0.2 per cent of the Brazilian population) possess 
about 47 per cent of Brazil’s wealth. Also, he calculates the Gini coeffi-
cient for wealth which has remained practically stable since 2006, namely, 
around the extraordinarily high value 0.85!
As far as income concentration is concerned, Castro simulates different 
changes in Brazilian taxation system and concludes that “merely” intro-
ducing a taxation of 15 per cent for capital and financial profits combined 
with tax rates of 35 and 40 per cent for high salaries could reduce the Gini 
coefficient by about 20 per cent. This would be more than what was 
achieved during the 12 years of PT administrations, the most successful 
period in terms of inequality reduction in Brazilian history. Before PT 
came to power, it was already aware of the impact of taxes on inequalities, 
as PT’s electoral programme of 2002 unequivocally demonstrates:
The first reform to be faced by the new administration, during its very first 
year, will be a tax reform whose aim is improving economic efficiency and 
reducing social inequalities. (PT 2002, 14, translated from Portuguese by 
the author)
Dilma Rousseff also largely emphasised, during the impeachment hearings 
in the Brazilian Federal Senate in August of 2016, how the Brazilian tax 
system prevents wealth redistribution. Now, if PT and even the former 
Brazilian president acknowledged the impact of taxes on redistribution, why 
did Rousseff and her predecessor Lula not conduct a single attempt to 
change—at least minimally—the regressive Brazilian tax structure? Although 
social scientists have not yet offered a definitive answer to this question, it 
seems reasonable that the explanation should be sought in power relations: 
because of its conservative allies in the Brazilian congress and the support it 
received from different sectors which profit from a regressive tax structure, 
such as agribusiness, big concerns from the mining, beverage and construc-
tion sectors, and banks, PT’s administrations did not feel strong enough to 
pass a tax reform contrary to the interests of the rich.
All in all, social policies recently implemented in Brazil have had a low 
impact on inequalities compared with the redistributive potential of the tax 
reforms outlined above. In order to assess the impacts of diverse strategies 
adopted by PT administrations, three policies will be discussed below: (1) 
the cash transfer programme Bolsa Família, (2) quotas at federal universities, 
and (3) a minimum wage.
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Cash Transfer Programme: Bolsa Família
As soon as the PT came into power, this programme of direct cash transfers 
to poor families with schoolchildren became the most outstanding feature 
of PT administrations. While a previous programme created during the 
former administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso provided benefits 
for 3.6 million families in 2002, the Bolsa Família benefited 14.1 million 
families with about R$ 142  in 2013 (see Bielschowsky 2014). Bolsa 
Família’s main recipients are women (93 per cent) and blacks (73 per cent).
Bolsa Família has played a pivotal role in reducing poverty in Brazil, 
although its costs are modest: Financed by public funding representing 
only 0.5 per cent of the Brazilian GDP, the programme reaches 25 per 
cent of the Brazilian population (see Pinto’s Chap. 6 in this book). 
Nevertheless, Bolsa Família has a negligible relevance for mitigating 
income inequality: Bolsa Família and other cash transfer measures merely 
respond to 1 per cent of the Gini coefficient composition (according to 
Medeiros and de Souza 2013; see also Lavinas 2007, 2013).
The new administration led by Michel Temer first kept the programme. 
However, it has adopted several administrative measures to reduce the 
number of programme beneficiaries (Carta Capital 2016).
Quotas at Federal Universities
Although some policies had been already introduced by previous govern-
ments, the Workers’ Party implemented a broad set of new policies to 
mitigate inequalities associated with gender and racial ascriptions. To 
accomplish this, two extraordinary agencies with ministerial status were 
also created in 2003: one for policies targeting women (SEPM) and 
another for policies promoting racial equality (SEPPIR). As shown else-
where (Costa 2015), most of the measures implemented concentrate on 
combating discrimination which is only one among several mechanisms at 
work in the reproduction of racial and gender asymmetries. Additionally, 
the measures adopted reach only a small fragment of black or female 
Brazilians. The quota programme introduced in Brazilian federal universi-
ties in 2012 is one such case.
According to the programme, 50 per cent of all study placements at 
federal higher education institutions are to be reserved for students grad-
uating from public schools and allocated according to the proportion of 
the black and indigenous populations living in the respective region. Yet, 
when taking into account that in 2013 only about 1.1 million of all 
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7.3 million undergraduate students in Brazil were enrolled at federal 
institutions (INEP 2014), and when also considering that blacks and 
indigenous represent about 51 and 0.5 per cent respectively of the whole 
Brazilian population, then it is clear that the federal quotas programme, 
if fully implemented, will only distribute approximately 283,000 univer-
sity places according to racial/ethnic criteria. Therefore, the programme, 
because of its design, benefits a small group among the more than 100 
million blacks und 800,000 indigenous living in Brazil, producing only 
minimal socio- economic aggregate effects. According to its opponents, 
the programme also contributes to racialising everyday relations since 
beneficiaries are forced to recognise themselves according to ethnoracial 
categories, this despite the fact that Brazilian society is characterised by 
the existence of a porous system of colour classification rather than a 
dichotomistic opposition between blacks and whites. Defenders of quota 
policies argue that, far beyond the still dominant self-representation of 
the Brazilian nation of a Mestizo country without sharp divisions between 
blacks and whites, lifeworlds of blacks and whites are to a large extent 
separated since they go to different schools, use different means of trans-
port, and live in distinct residential areas. In this context, policies such as 
quotas rather promote interracial coexistence in a racially segregated soci-
ety (for an overview of these arguments see Costa 2017).
That being said, critics do not delegitimise the programme because it 
has an obvious relevance for setting the imperative of overcoming racism 
in the core of Brazil’s political agenda, even if its impact on promoting 
socio-economic redistribution in favour of the black or indigenous popu-
lation as a whole is marginal.
Until February of 2017, when the present article was concluded, 
Temer’s administration has not abolished the system of quotas at federal 
universities. However, federal universities suffered a cut of about 45 per 
cent in their budget with serious consequences for their quality and for 
their capacity to provide an adequate academic environment for students 
admitted through the quotas (Vieira 2016).
Minimum Wage
In response to consistent political pressure articulated by national associa-
tions of trade unions, the Brazilian government has readjusted the 
 minimum wage in real terms consecutively since 2003. Since 2008, the 
adjustments have been coupled by law to inflation and the economic 
S. COSTA
 73
growth rate of 2 years prior to the increase. This policy has led to a real 
increase in the minimum wage by 75 per cent between 2002 and 2013 
and is seen as the most important driver of the recent decline of inequali-
ties in Brazil (Sabóia and Hallek Neto 2016; UNDP 2014). There are 
multiple factors explaining the redistributive effects of the minimum wage:
 (1) Since about 70 per cent of Brazilian workers have an income of less 
than double the minimum wage per month, a real increment of 
minimum wage automatically leads to an improvement of well-
being for a significant part of the population (DIEESE 2014).
 (2) The rise in minimum wage reinforces the bargaining power of 
workers whose salaries are not coupled with the minimum wage 
and even for informal workers the minimum wage serves “as a 
benchmark for individual wage negotiations” (Berg 2012, 8).
 (3) The automatic readjustment of lower pension values to the mini-
mum wage results in real income improvements for the elderly and 
their families in the lower classes.
 (4) Since women and blacks are overrepresented in low-wage labour 
sectors such as domestic work, which are directly governed by the 
minimum wage law, real increases of the minimum wage contrib-
ute to reduce inequalities in terms of gender and race (IPEA 2013).
This methodology for adjusting minimum wage had positive impacts 
for mitigating inequalities as long as the Brazilian economy presented high 
growth rates. However, since 2014, Brazilian GDP has dramatically con-
tracted which will lead to a reduction of minimum wage in real terms with 
adverse consequences for redistribution in both terms: class, as well as 
gender, and race.
conclusIon: EntanglEd InEqualItIEs and rEcEnt 
dEvElopmEnts In BrazIl
If the general framework of entangled inequalities is applied to assess the 
recent decline of inequality in Brazil, certain ambivalences in this process 
stand out. At the level of income differences, social distances were—at least 
until 2015—slightly reduced. However, this does not necessarily lead to a 
less unequal access to “socially-relevant goods” since wealth concentration 
remains virtually unaffected, and access to public and common goods such 
as a healthy environment and a well-functioning public transport system 
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may have become even more unequal.4 The missing sustainability of 
inequality reduction should be emphasised, too. As soon as the Brazilian 
economy started stagnating, less skilled workers were the first to lose their 
jobs, and with them, the better social position they had achieved during the 
Pink Tide cycle (Costa 2018).
The assessment of power asymmetries as a key aspect of the entangled 
inequalities approach is a complex endeavour since transparent indicators 
for measuring power asymmetries are not available. In general terms, it 
can be stated that the PT administrations have not represented a radical 
power shift in favour of the working and lower classes. Otherwise, these 
administrations would have reformed the regressive tax system targeting 
capital and financial profits. Notwithstanding, some particular groups—
especially women and Afro-descendants—have been empowered insofar as 
their claims have been inserted on a large scale into the political agenda, 
being addressed by compensatory policies. However, these political gains 
are tenuous, since they were institutionalised not as rights granted by solid 
welfare institutions but as benefits within transitory social programmes 
(Lavinas 2013). Drawing on the vocabulary Chatterjee (2004) applies to 
analyse Indian politics, we can state that in the framework of the social 
programmes introduced by PT administrations, beneficiaries represent 
target populations, which have entitlements, but not full citizens with 
unnegotiable rights. With this distinction, I am not negating the huge 
relevance of these programmes for reducing poverty and temporarily 
empower minorities. My intention is to emphasise some insufficiencies of 
these policies to produce a power shift in favour of the poor and minorities 
in Brazil both in everyday life and at the level of political institutions. 
These policies, by establishing conditions of access (such as regular 
 submission to certain medical exams, regular attendance of schools, etc.) 
and sanctions in the case that this conditionality is not observed represent 
rather a “dispositive to control the population” than an instrument to 
empower citizens (Bueno 2009, 44). Institutionally, most social policies 
adopted by PT administrations assumed the framework of social pro-
grammes and thus were not integrated into the Brazilian constitution as 
citizenship rights. As a consequence, there is only a very low institutional 
and political hurdle to abolish and remove them as witnessed in contem-
porary Brazilian politics. Indeed the fragility of gains for the poor and for 
less empowered groups such as the Afro-descendant population and 
women, obtained during the PT administrations, became evident when 
the former Vice President Temer assumed the government after Rousseff’s 
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impeachment. Using simple administrative measures, Temer’s government 
could cut important social and political benefits these groups had obtained 
in recent years.
The dynamic of inequality reduction in Brazil speaks in favour of an 
intersectional approach able to integrate the complex entanglements 
between the varieties of inequalities concerning class, racial, gender, and 
regional ascriptions. It has been shown above that since class, gender, and 
racial disadvantages interact, policies aimed to reduce class inequalities 
such as Bolsa Família or a minimum wage bring more improvements for 
much more blacks and women at the level of income than policies exclu-
sively designed to reduce gender and racial asymmetries accumulated 
throughout history. Nevertheless, affirmative action policies in favour of 
blacks, indigenous, or women remain crucial for reducing both power 
asymmetries as well as racism and sexism in everyday relations. Inasmuch 
as more blacks, women, and indigenous obtain an academic degree and 
occupy leading positions in hierarchically structured organisations and 
social spaces, they contribute to removing prejudices constructed over 
centuries of white and male supremacy and to transforming equality 
assured at the formal level into lived experience.
notEs
1. The use of the expression “entangled inequalities” is inspired by discussions 
on entangled modernity as developed by Conrad and Randeria (2002). A 
more detailed discussion on the concept entangled inequalities is developed 
in Costa (2011), Lillemets (2013), Braig et al. (2015) and Jelin et al. (2018).
2. Economists use the expression premature deindustrialisation (desindustrial-
ização precoce) to refer to the current process of abrupt declining participa-
tion of industrial production in Brazilian GDP, a phenomenon that appears 
before the industrial sector is fully consolidated. Accordingly, deindustriali-
sation is motivated by a combination of a persistent overvalued currency 
(this situation has only changed within the economic and political crisis of 
2015) leading to a stimulation of import of industrial products, high rates of 
interest which discourages industrial investments, and low level of foreign 
investment. “Reprimarisation” refers to an increasing participation of agrar-
ian and mining products in exports (Cano 2012; Costa et al. 2015).
3. The regressive character of taxes associated with consumption derives from 
the fact that underprivileged classes spend a much greater proportion of 
their income on consumption than rich families do. Using data from 2008, 
IPEA (2009) calculated that while families with an income of up to twice 
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the minimum wage spent 53.9 per cent of their income paying taxes, those 
receiving more than thirty times the minimum wage spent 29 per cent on 
their taxes. The minimum wage corresponds to about US$ 297 per month 
(according to the exchange rate of 31 January 2017).
4. Although this paper does not address access to public and common goods, 
the topic is mentioned here in order to illustrate some implications of using 
the entangled inequalities approach. Moreover, several studies indicate that 
access to public and common goods has become increasingly unequal in 
contemporary Brazil. The case of access to transportation and a well- 
functioning traffic system is a striking example: Between 2003 and 2013, 
the number of registered vehicles in Brazil jumped from about 37 million to 
about 82 million (DENATRAN 2015). This has triggered a rise in traffic 
accidents with fatal victims especially among pedestrians and motorcyclists, 
those road users with lower incomes (Bacchieri and Barros 2011).
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CHAPTER 4
#sosfavelas: Digital Representations 
of Violence and Inequality in Rio de Janeiro
Margit Ystanes
IntroductIon
…They said he was a criminal, but yet another innocent died, here we have 
workers and students, but for them, if you are up on the hill, you are a 
trafficker.1
The above quote was published on the Facebook page of Coletivo Papo 
Reto (the Straight Talk Collective), a Rio de Janeiro independent journal-
ism collective in February 2015. A few days earlier, Diego Algavez, a 
24-year-old motorbike taxi driver was killed by the military police in the 
Penha complex of favelas. The presence of the military police in Rio’s 
favelas is part of the policy introduced to secure the city before the 2014 
FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The aftermath of Algavez’ mur-
der was covered in real time by Coletivo Papo Reto and Jornal a Nova 
Democracia, a Rio-based independent newspaper. One of the photos 
Jornal a Nova Democracia published on their Facebook site shows Algavez’ 
dead body stretched out over his motorbike, on a busy street, in bright 
sunlight. He is face up, his hips and legs on top of his toppled motorbike. 
M. Ystanes (*) 
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
82 
His head and arms are extended behind him towards the ground, which is 
marked by the blood seeping from his mortal gun wound. Heavily armed 
policemen dressed in black guard the scene, while people crowd around.
Rio de Janeiro has a serious problem with police violence. In fact, the 
Rio de Janeiro Military Police has been identified as the force that most 
kill civilians worldwide (Gaffney 2014). The epigraph above refers to how 
victims of police violence are very often accused of being involved in drug 
trafficking—both by the police themselves and in media narratives. 
However, those killed by the police often turn out to be innocent bystand-
ers, hit by stray bullets, or simply wrongfully targeted. There have even 
been incidents of small children killed by stray bullets while inside their 
homes. Therefore, the narrative often promoted by the police and mass 
media, speculating about victims’ potential association with drug traffick-
ing, in many cases both holds little credibility and is inflammatory.
This is especially the case for those who live in self-built neighbour-
hoods, or favelas, where police violence is mostly located. This situation is 
reflected in the above reference to being “up on the hill” (no morro, in 
Portuguese); “for them, if you are up on the hill, you are a trafficker”. In Rio 
de Janeiro, morro, or hill, is often used as a synonym for favela, as many of 
the city’s numerous self-built neighbourhoods are established on the hill-
sides surrounding the centre and the famous beach areas. The idea that “if 
you are up on the hill, you are a trafficker” refers to the strong association 
between favela territories and organised crime in the social imaginary. The 
force of this imagery obscures the fact that most favela residents are ordi-
nary citizens, workers and students.
The epigraph to this chapter appeared as a caption to a drawing by the 
artist Carlos Latuff, illustrating the experience of state violence amongst 
Rio’s favela residents.2 It depicts a young boy in front of a favela rising on 
the hill in the background. A wall and barbed wire separate the favela from 
the formal neighbourhoods outside it. There, a paraglider flies above the 
famous Sugar Loaf mountain cable car and the skyscrapers of Rio’s finan-
cial centre—places of leisure and business where favela residents are 
“undesired”. In the version of the drawing that appeared in the Facebook 
post, a graffiti painted on the wall had been added that read #soscomplex-
odoalemao. This refers to the origins of Coletivo Papo Reto in the Alemão 
complex of favelas, which is near the Penha complex where Diego Algavez 
was killed. The young boy in the foreground is depicted as a stereotypical 
favela kid: dark skinned, curly dark hair, shirtless and clutching a football 
under his arm. The football, of course, connotes both the Brazilian  passion 
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for the game, as well as the relationship between the FIFA World Cup and 
experience of state violence. A white-skinned man holding a gun to the 
boy’s head from outside the wall has “state” written across the bottom 
of his suit’s jacket. His head is cut off from the image, and as such he is 
anonymised. Yet, the depiction of a fair complexion on the hands pointing 
the gun, as well as the suit, gives some cues about his class and “racial” 
identity. In the background, a helicopter surveils the favela territory. The 
overall message of this post is that Rio’s favelas and the people who live 
there are considered as external to the rest of Brazil, and a threat to, not 
included in, the narrative of Rio as an attractive “global city”. Deep-seated 
inequalities are inscribed in the city’s landscape, as illustrated by the physi-
cal barrier, the violent state and the surveillance helicopter. By incorporat-
ing all these elements, Coletivo Papo Reto’s Facebook post illustrates 
various processes of violence and inequality being played out in Rio de 
Janeiro at the time: mega-event preparations, the militarisation of informal 
neighbourhoods, state violence, the “racial” component of class inequal-
ity, spatial separation, the vulnerability of unprotected bodies in the face of 
heavy weaponry and the protest against and documentation of these pro-
cesses in social media.
Notably, these processes which reflect and grow out of deep-seated 
inequalities, happened at the height of Brazil’s engagement with the Pink 
Tide. At the time, Brazil had received considerable praise for its ability to 
combine massive economic growth with reduction in poverty and inequal-
ity. In 2012, the country overtook the UK’s former position as the world’s 
sixth largest economy (Inman 2012), and 67 per cent of Brazilians consid-
ered themselves to be better off than their parents (Olsen 2012). When 
Brazil was awarded the 2016 Olympics in 2009, the country’s middle class 
had grown by a population the size of California during the previous 
decade (Barbassa 2015, xiv). Awarding the games to Rio was considered 
“an unprecedented vote of confidence, a gold star to show that this 
forever- emerging nation had finally arrived” (Barbassa 2015, xv). However, 
the preparations for the Games, as well as the 2014 FIFA World Cup, 
would lay bare that inequality and old power structures continued to work 
in the Brazilian society (see also Costa (Chap. 3), Sørbøe (Chap. 5), this 
volume). In fact, the effort to use sporting mega-events to showcase the 
successes of the Pink Tide governments gave rise to numerous contradic-
tions and an intensification of neoliberal approaches to securitisation as 
well as the access to urban land.
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One of the traditional markers of inequality in Latin America is that of 
access to land. Struggles over different kinds of land, urban as well as rural, 
remain an aspect of contemporary struggles against inequality (Ystanes 
2014; Ystanes 2016b; see Brown (Chap. 11), Sørbøe (Chap. 5), this vol-
ume, as well as Ng’weno 2007; Sawyer 2003; Rolnik 2015). Indeed, it is 
an aspect of inequality that Pink Tide economic policies did not signifi-
cantly address. This chapter explores one particular configuration of this 
inequality; the struggle over access to, and militarisation of, urban spaces. 
In Rio de Janeiro, this struggle has profoundly marked its history. Urban 
development has to a large extent centred on removing the poor from 
attractive, centrally located areas, and making these areas available to the 
middle and upper classes (Pearlman 2010; de Magalhães 2013). After the 
introduction of democracy in Brazil in 1985, favela removals were rarer 
because of their association with military regimes of the past. However, 
policies intended to “reclaim” favela territories were reintroduced as the 
city prepared to host the recent mega-events (see e.g. Barbassa 2015; 
Larkins 2015; Ystanes 2016b; Rolnik 2015; Savell 2014; Salem 2016; de 
Magalhães 2013). This “reclaiming” consists  of multifaceted processes 
involving mechanisms such as forced removals, rent inflation, gentrification 
and militarisation. The anti-mega event activism analysed in this chapter, 
speaks to these processes of exclusion and socio-spatial segregation. 
Inspired by Nancy Fraser (1990), I argue that such contestation constitutes 
a subaltern counterpublic. This counterpublic is born out of,  challenges 
and testifies to the many shortcomings of the Pink Tide in terms of address-
ing entrenched inequalities in Brazil. In particular, it illustrates that such 
inequalities remain inscribed in Rio de Janeiro’s urban landscape, despite 
the strides made towards reducing them in the last couple of decades.
ProtestIng the 2014 FIFA World cuP: ActIvIsm-As- 
JournAlIsm ArIses In rIo’s FAvelAs
Many of the processes that reproduce inequality in Rio are tied in with a 
particular agenda for urban and economic development: the hosting of 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The preparations for 
these events complicated, and to some extent reversed, the overall project 
of reducing poverty and inequality. As this chapter illustrates, access to and 
the use of urban spaces became increasingly a privilege for better-off 
 residents. Furthermore, the public provision of health and education went 
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into crisis as funds were divested towards the events in the middle of a 
recession. This situation was the focus of critique and protests in the 
period between the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013 and the 2016 
Olympics. In Rio, cariocas, as locals call themselves, gathered regularly 
under the slogan Não vai ter Copa! (There will be no World Cup!) during 
the year leading up the 2014 event. These rallies were mostly made up by 
middle-class protesters who marched in the city centre and sometimes in 
the Copacabana beach neighbourhood, where the FIFA Fanfest was to be 
located.
At the same time, a number of alternative media outlets and activist 
collectives, such as the Coletivo Papo Reto, arose in Rio’s favelas. Most of 
these are based in specific local communities. This sense of belonging is 
reflected in their names, such as Ocupa Alemão, Jornal Alemão Noticias, 
Maré Vive, Rocinha em Foco and Voz da Comunidade.3 All of these collec-
tives and news services use social media as their main platform of commu-
nication, primarily Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Whatsapp, YouTube 
and blogs. The flow of communication goes both ways, with readers and 
followers alerting the collectives to news and sharing photos and updates 
that are distributed further. In addition, the activist collectives produce 
their own journalistic material, as well as short films that dramatise events 
and experiences. They also organise marches and events in their favela 
communities.
One of the main concerns of these activist collectives is to share infor-
mation related to experiences of inequality and violence. In particular, 
they speak of racism and the new forms of violence and exclusion that have 
arisen from the mega-event security policies introduced in 2008 to subdue 
drug trafficking organisations in Rio’s favelas. In an interview with one of 
the Coletivo Papo Reto members, he characterised the Não vai ter Copa 
approach as “a middle class discourse”, too radical and with potential for 
provoking violent clashes. Instead, he explained, the Coletivo protested by 
emphasising that in its current form, the World Cup was “not for them”. 
Facebook posts such as the one discussed above, and the coverage of 
events such as the murder of Diego Algavez by the military police, contain 
powerful, elaborate and painful messages about how, for favela residents, 
insecurity and exclusion is reinforced rather than reduced through the 
mega-event-related security policy.
This form of protest, which grows out of deep-felt experiences of exclu-
sion and inequality, has made a far more durable impact on Rio’s public 
spheres of deliberation than the street protest. Street protests are “one- off” 
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events, and the messages protesters intend to communicate (e.g. “we want 
FIFA standard hospitals and schools”) are often mixed up with facile slogans 
such as “Fuck FIFA” or interrupted by police violence against the demon-
strators. Furthermore, after the surge during the 2013 Confederations Cup, 
the protests attracted relatively low numbers of people, thus leaving the 
impression that discontent with the mega-events is a rather marginal phe-
nomenon. In addition, police violence against protesters and the pre-emp-
tive arrest of several activists prior to a planned march on the day of the 
World Cup final in 2014 (Deak 2014; Nunes 2014; Brito 2014; Tsavkko 
Garcia 2014), did much to deter street rallies. In contrast, the messages 
produced by favela residents and posted on social media, are numerous, 
constant, concrete and rich in their detail about the problems they experi-
ence due to Rio’s hosting of mega-events. Crucially, they cannot easily be 
stopped or censored by authorities. Of course, the long-term outcomes of 
these developments remain to be seen. Nevertheless, I argue that a method-
ology and an infrastructure for protest and activism based on social media 
and mobile technology is one of the most significant legacies of Rio’s sport-
ing mega-events. I will come back to this more in detail below.
ActIvIsm-As-JournAlIsm And subAltern 
counterPublIcs
Most of the groups participating in this effort refer to themselves as com-
munity news services; they represent a form of alternative journalism. This 
conception of activism-as-journalism builds upon a long tradition in Latin 
America, where in particular the radio has been put to subversive use dur-
ing times of oppression and civil wars, and as a corrective to mass media 
censorship. The Mexican Canal Seis de Julio, which started producing 
alternative video documentaries in 1989, first in VHS format and later 
digitally through their website and YouTube channel, is a case in point. 
Brazil may be a particularly fertile ground for the contemporary configu-
rations of such activism, as its residents are amongst the world’s most 
eager users of social media (Glenny 2016, 157).
The development of alternative, digital news services such as Coletivo 
Papo Reto contributes to diversifying the public sphere and challenging 
the state of affairs they critique. It is also testament to the persistent 
inequalities in Brazilian society. It is useful to explore the unfolding of 
these digital narratives in light of Nancy Fraser’s critique of Jürgen 
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Habermas’ notion of the bourgeois public sphere (Fraser 1990). While 
Habermas’ classic text (1991) favours a single public sphere of delibera-
tion,4 Fraser argues that this is unrealistic, as numerous subtle mechanisms 
of exclusions exist, even when formal exclusions are eliminated. People do 
not leave behind their social positions as they enter the public sphere of 
deliberation, and their unequal statuses profoundly impact on what is sup-
posed to be a debate between equals. This is of course particularly so in 
stratified societies. Fraser therefore argues that “in such societies, full 
parity of participation in public debate and deliberation is not within 
the reach of possibility” (1990, 66). This point is very much in line with 
the findings of anthropologists who have studied arenas of debate 
between unequally positioned participants (Caldeira 1988; Green 2003; 
Sawyer 2003; Ystanes 2011, 2014). Fraser maintains that “arrange-
ments that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing 
publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a sin-
gle, comprehensive, overarching public” (1990, 66).
The kind of digital community journalism Coletivo Papo Reto repre-
sents is a relatively new phenomenon and it is of course difficult to assess 
its significance with any kind of certainty as it unfolds. Indeed, Castells 
(2015, x) points out that networked social movements are often met with 
scepticism as to their tangible outcomes. Nevertheless, Castells goes on to 
suggest that the Internet is now such an integrated aspect of our existence 
that it does not make much sense to consider the virtual a segregated 
world. As such, it does not make sense either to distinguish between social 
media activism and real life activism. Activists I spoke to in Rio expressed 
similar views. Furthermore, social media activism has already contributed 
to producing tangible results with regards to forced evictions (Ystanes 
2016a) and in the launching of the Nós por Nós phone app, specifically 
designed to help citizens report police violence without risks to their safety 
(Coelho 2016) (Photo 4.1).
Furthermore, using the Internet to widen the arenas for deliberation 
and the sharing of information holds value in and of itself. In Brazil, the 
relevance of this is heightened as the public sphere is infamously dominated 
by the Globo Media Group. It is of course difficult to quantify the influ-
ence held by this corporation in defining the terms of public debate. What 
is clear, however, is that the market position of their outlets is unique, both 
in terms of broadcast media and print media. Through their numerous 
entertainment shows, soap operas, debate programmes and news broad-
casts, Globo has unmatched influence over what makes its way to the  public 
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via mass media outlets. Globo supported the military dictatorship from 
1964 to 1985, something that continues to fuel suspicion among its critics. 
Today, the tendency for both news and entertainment to portray the per-
spectives of elites and authorities means that many favela residents perceive 
there to be no mass media outlet that represent their reality (see also 
Sørbøe’s (Chap. 5), this volume). Social media based activism-as- journalism 
must be understood as a response to this situation, and as an attempt to 
create an alternative public sphere. As I will discuss below, the outcome of 
this effort is tangible, yet still not readily noticeable in the Brazilian mass 
media dominated public sphere.
megA-events, securIty And urbAn develoPment
As mentioned above, mega-events come with their own agenda for eco-
nomic and social development. Indeed, hosting mega-events involve 
some of the most expensive, complex and transformative processes that 
Photo 4.1 Interconnected worlds: as Rio prepared to host the 2016 Olympics, 
the hashtag #cidadeolympica, used by the city administration for propaganda pur-
poses, was inscribed onto the urban landscape as a physical manifestation of the 
interconnection between the virtual and “real life” (Photo: Margit Ystanes)
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cities and nations undertake (Gaffney 2010, 7–8). These events are so 
complex and large-scale, affecting so many aspects of social and political 
life, that they may provoke societal opposition on a broad range of issues 
(Cornelissen 2012, 333). It is expected that mega-events function as 
vehicles for “accelerated development”. This generally involves making 
public money available for private profit creation, suspending a number 
of democratic processes, militarising public space and restructuring urban 
space in the image of global capital (Gaffney 2010, 8). These features of 
mega- event hosting are often thought of as recent developments, but in 
fact have been part and parcel of Olympic events since their reinvention 
in the late nineteenth century (Boykoff 2016).
The preparation for mega-events thus impacts on a number of societal 
processes, as has also been the case in Rio. The city has hosted numerous 
big events in recent years; the 2007 Pan American Games, 2013 FIFA 
Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. 
This has led to further erosion of “already fragile democratic institutions, 
instituting a permanent state of exception” (Gaffney 2014). It is therefore 
not surprising that mega-events may become the focal points of struggles 
that extend far beyond the actual events themselves (Cornelissen 2012, 
330). In Rio de Janeiro, the adaptation of the city for investments and 
tourism has been met with opposition from a number of social movements 
and activist networks (see also Sørbøe (Chap. 5), this volume). The pro-
testers have criticised the insufficient investments in the public sector, the 
transfer of public funds towards event-related infrastructure, tax exemp-
tions for event sponsors, as well as the racism and exclusionary thinking 
underlying certain event-related policies. As indicated above, the security 
policy introduced to make the city secure for tourists and investors has 
been highly controversial.
This relates to Rio de Janeiro’s reputation for being a dangerous and 
violent city. An important aspect of Rio’s preparations for the 2014 World 
Cup and the 2016 Olympics has therefore been to increase public security. 
This security problem is most strongly associated with the drug trafficking 
gangs operating out of many of the city’s approximately 1000 favelas. 
According to the 2010 census, about 22 per cent of Rio’s inhabitants live 
in favelas. These informal neighbourhoods have been developing since the 
nineteenth century as veteran soldiers, freed slaves and migrants settled in 
Rio’s hillsides and outskirts. Today, favelas are expressions of continued 
socio-economic and “racial” inequality. The enduring impact of colonial 
slavery can be observed in the overrepresentation of Afro-Brazilians 
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amongst the poor, most of whom live in favelas (although far from all 
favela residents are poor). Because of a historically constituted conceptual 
link between poverty, dark skin colour, stigma and criminality (Stepan 
1991), these informal neighbourhoods have always been considered prob-
lematic by the city’s political elite. Throughout Rio’s history, urban devel-
opment efforts have therefore often aimed to clear out favelas in the city 
centre and the famous beach neighbourhoods, and to move the poor to 
other, less attractive sites (Pearlman 2010; de Magalhães 2013).
Since the early 1980s, rivalling drug trafficking gangs have taken con-
trol over several favelas, thus reinforcing their association with danger and 
violence. Although most people living in favelas are ordinary workers, in 
the minds of many, they are intrinsically associated with the criminal activ-
ity going on there. This association is so strong that the words pobre 
(poor), preto (black), favelado (favela resident) and bandido (criminal) 
sometimes function as synonyms. A recent expression of this stigmatising 
association is a study in which 47 per cent of the interviewees, from 150 
Brazilian cities, say they would not like to hire domestic workers who live 
in favelas. Sixty-nine per cent say they feel afraid when walking past a 
favela, and 51 per cent associate the word favela with drugs and violence 
(Brasil 2015). Hence, in the effort to enhance public security before the 
mega-events, expelling drug traffickers from favelas has been a priority. 
This is especially so in the favelas near the south zone beaches, near event 
infrastructure and near the airport. The policy, called pacificação (pacifica-
tion), centres on the reconquering of favela territories on behalf of the 
Brazilian state. The army has moved into Rio’s favelas one by one since 
2008, on preannounced dates. With tanks and heavily armed soldiers, 
remaining traffickers are forced out or arrested, before permanent military 
police units called Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) are 
established.
Many non-favela residents consider the “pacification” policy a success 
and feel that Rio has become safer because of it. In their experience, the 
violence that used to spill over from the favelas and onto the “asphalt”, as 
the formal neighbourhoods are nicknamed, has diminished. Nevertheless, 
the “pacification” policy is strongly contested by many favela residents 
who emphasise that it has not provided security for them, and that state 
presence in terms of public services and social programmes is still lacking. 
In some favelas in the south zone, “pacification” has opened up the 
area for the establishment of formal businesses and property speculation. 
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In other words, the residents of these territories have been “captured” as 
consumers in the formal economy (Larkins 2015), while gentrification 
processes have forced many of the original inhabitants to move to more 
affordable areas. The favelas have thus become increasingly available to 
non-residents of various kinds, yet “the asphalt” and the privileges it is 
associated with is not becoming equally available to favela residents. As the 
outcomes of gentrification processes are not being mitigated by social pro-
grammes or other state interventions, it has been suggested that the “paci-
fication” policy is not so much about including favela residents into formal 
society, as about making these territories available for outside investments 
(Sørbøe 2013).
Another problem with the “pacification” policy from the point of view 
of favela residents is that drug trafficking continues despite police pres-
ence, and that confrontations between traffickers and police inside favelas 
remain a problem. There have been numerous reports of police violence 
and people being killed by the police. While the police usually claim that 
such incidents are the outcome of confrontations with criminals, video 
evidence provided by witnesses has shown that often, the versions of 
events provided by the police are very misleading (Timerman 2014). 
Indeed, many of those killed by the police turn out to be cases of police 
aggression, torture, mistaken identity, stray bullets or being caught in the 
crossfire, yet the responsible officers are rarely charged.
The number of deaths at police hands has remained high throughout 
the “pacification” process. In 2011, 524 people were killed by the police 
in Rio de Janeiro State (Prado 2014), and in 2012 the number was 415 
(Duarte and Benevides 2013). In 2013, the police were considered 
responsible for 8.7 per cent of all murders (Benites 2014). Young, Afro- 
Brazilian men make up the majority of Brazilian murder victims (Puff 
2014). The fact that a substantial number of them die at police hands in 
favelas has made critics—citizens, activists, academics and politicians—
characterise this situation, and the public indifference to it, as a “genocide 
of the black youth” (Puff 2014; Ramos 2012; Duarte 2013) and as a 
“criminalisation of poverty” (Insurgencia 2014; Vaz 2014). Trust between 
favela residents and the police is thus frayed. So much so, that in the 
Alemão complex of favelas, many residents consider that the drug traffick-
ers did a better job at providing security for the community than the police 
have been doing since “pacification” (Savell 2014).
 #SOSFAVELAS: DIGITAL REPRESENTATIONS OF VIOLENCE... 
92 
megA-events And Access to urbAn sPAces
The hosting of mega-events has laid bare that unequal access to urban spaces 
and territories has not been mitigated, but actually exacerbated during the 
Pink Tide-era in Rio de Janeiro. Evictions from poor neighbourhoods to 
make space for event infrastructure, gentrification and property speculation 
in favelas, the exclusion of street vendors from event venues and a security 
policy that leave many people feel targeted rather than protected in their 
own neighbourhoods, all contribute to making life more difficult for Rio’s 
poor. The mega-events play a contradictory role in this scenario, with sig-
nificant inconsistencies between discourse and reality, projected and actual 
outcomes. The awarding of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de Janeiro was widely 
considered a feather in the cap for the Pink Tide president Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva and a chance to showcase the successes of his governments. At the 
same time, Rio’s Olympic bid document emphasised the adaption of the city 
for business and tourism as one of the main event legacies (Comité de 
Candidatura Rio 2016 2009). And indeed, the events were approached by 
local politicians and business owners as a chance to push through controver-
sial decisions that were highly profitable for them, while funding for pro-
jected social legacy projects dwindled (Barbassa 2015).
As part of an event-related urban revitalisation, spectacular infrastructure 
projects were initiated. These include gondolas in the Providência and 
Complexo do Alemão favelas and the upgrading of Rio’s historical port area 
(the Porto Maravilha project). The Maracanã stadium and the Galeão 
International Airport were reformed, and three bus rapid transit lines (BRT) 
connecting the Olympic Park, Deodoro (another Olympic venue) and the 
airport were constructed. All of these projects are critiqued for primarily 
adapting Rio for tourism and investment, and not alleviating problems of 
mobility for residents of the city. The projects are met with resistance from 
locals because people understand them to be realised at the expense of the 
provision of clean water, sewerage systems, waste disposal and electricity as 
well as quality education, health services and security for all residents in the 
city. The infrastructure projects have also brought with them a high number 
of forced evictions, and thus serve as an excuse for the city administration to 
clear attractive areas of poor residents. Indeed, while doing fieldwork in Vila 
Autódromo, a neighbourhood that was almost decimated during the con-
struction of the Olympic Park (Ystanes 2016a, b), I was constantly reminded 
of this problematic. Here, there was no need for residents to leave the area 
in order for the Olympic Park project to be completed, yet, almost all of 
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them were evicted with varying degree of force and pressure—most likely to 
make the area available for future property development. The people in Vila 
Autódromo considered the Transoeste BRT line, which connects the 
Olympic venues with Campo Grande, part of this plan. This new connec-
tion did little to improve their need for public transport in the area, yet 
made it more feasible to clear this attractive land of poor people without 
compromising the middle and upper classes’ access to cheap service labour. 
Campo Grande is located almost 70 kilometres from the centre of Rio de 
Janeiro, and is a stronghold for paramilitary militias. Many of those forcibly 
evicted from central areas are re-located there. The new BRT line makes it 
easier to live in Campo Grande and retain work in the more centrally located 
areas they were forced to leave. At the same time, local bus lines that made 
movement within the area surrounding Vila Autódromo possible, were 
closed down as the BRT lines were introduced. This was phrased as an envi-
ronmental measure, but the reality for people near the Olympic Park was 
that it first and foremost made it difficult to operate locally without private 
cars. The residents of Vila Autódromo therefore saw the BRT Olympic 
infrastructure project as yet another measure introduced by Rio’s city 
administration to make it as difficult as possible for them to stay in the area.
This is part of a wider process of gentrification and exclusion in the 
city  that was exacerbated by the sporting mega-events. As an Amnesty 
International representative put it:
There is a process of gentrification taking place in the whole city that is con-
nected to the sports events and how the government sees the city: it is no 
longer a place for residents, but as a business to sell to foreign investors. 
That’s what the World Cup is about. (Gibson and Watts 2013)
In many ways, the developments brought about by hosting mega-events 
were counterproductive to the process of making Brazil a more equitable 
society, and harked back to an authoritarian past. Indeed, Marcelo Freixo 
(PSOL), state deputy and president of the Human Rights Commission of 
the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro sees the many deaths at police 
hands as a continuity with the military dictatorship:
The enemy of the dictatorship was the communist, the academic, the jour-
nalist, who were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Today, there is still this 
logic of confronting the enemy. Only that today, the enemy is the poor, the 
one who is superfluous in the market society. We continue to have a security 
policy based in the idea of war. (Prado 2014)
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Many Brazilians share this view, and are concerned about the direction 
their country has taken (see e.g. Ystanes 2015). As the digital representa-
tions of violence and inequality that arise out of the “pacification” policy 
illustrate, for many living in Rio’s informal neighbourhoods, the situation 
is indeed experienced as critical. As regards the reproduction of inequality 
and exclusion through these policies, Gaffney (2010, 27) points out that 
there are significant similarities between how situations of crisis, war and 
disaster have been used to push through unpopular neoliberal policies (see 
Klein 2007), and the suspension of ordinary democratic processes to pave 
the way for mega-events as vehicles for “accelerated development”. 
Spectacular displays of the security apparatus serve as powerful symbols of 
the degree to which militarisation of public space is integral to these pro-
cesses (see also Larkins 2015). The high numbers of Military Police in 
riot-gear at demonstrations, at times appearing to outnumber the protest-
ers, made it clear that opposition could be violently subdued at any 
moment—and at times it was. As the World Cup was under way, spectators 
entering and leaving the FIFA Fanfest metro station had to run the gaunt-
let of heavily armed soldiers and military vehicles, thus receiving a contra-
dictory message of safety blended with mortal danger. The fact that 
on-going developments are understood by so many as criminalising social 
movements and poverty—and even as a genocide of the black youth 
(Duarte 2013; Puff 2014)—further emphasises that mega-events 
approached as “accelerated development” do not create a fertile ground 
for enhancing equality and social cohesion. Rather, this approach builds 
on and reinforces already existing inequalities. An arena where this effect 
can be clearly observed is the digital representations of it produced by 
those affected, across different favela communities.
dIgItAl rePresentAtIons oF vIolence And InequAlIty: 
subAltern counterPublIcs
Before, during and after the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, activ-
ists and community journalists based in Rio’s favelas have criticised the high 
levels of violence since “pacification” through social media. Here, they warn 
residents of on-going gunfights and document events and their experiences 
of living with this situation. Social media has also been used to rally people to 
participate in street marches and other events in affected areas. One such 
event was a peace march in protest of the “pacification” policy, where police 
violence was thematised and performatively re-enacted. Another was a march 
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in favour of preserving the museum of the Maré complex of favelas, which 
was the outcome of a joint effort amongst collectives from several favelas as 
well as NGOs. Voz da Comunidade head a campaign distributing gifts and 
sweets to children in Complexo do Alemão for Christmas and Easter, and 
document its unfolding on social media. In November 2015, Coletivo Papo 
Reto organised a protest on the five-year anniversary for the “pacification” of 
Complexo do Alemão called 5 anos de paciFICÇÃO (5 years of paciFIC-
TION). These events were also  documented on social media. For example, 
the paciFICÇÃO event produced numerous posts and photos in social 
media, and was also followed up with a long blog post on the Coletivo Papo 
Reto website explaining the reasoning behind the protest. In the main photo 
accompanying the blog post, one of the Coletivo members is seen holding 
up a banner in front of a UPP police that reads: Pacificação sem oportunidade 
e educação é como apagar fogo com gasolina. #soscpx – 1 (Pacification without 
opportunities and education is like putting out fire with gasoline). The 
hashtag #soscpx (SOS Complexo do Alemão) appearing on a banner in a 
street protest, which later makes its way onto social media and blogs, where 
it emerged in the first place, exemplifies Castells’ (2015) point that social 
media activism and real life activism are inseparable. They feed each other 
rather than constitute different domains.
Running through the digital representations of violence and inequal-
ity are slogans and hashtags asking for peace and shouting SOS on 
behalf of their crisis-ridden communities (e.g #FavelaPedePaz (favela 
asks for peace), #sosfavela). The language applied in this activism 
emphasises the message that the pacification has thrown these commu-
nities into crisis rather than resolved their security problems. An exam-
ple of this is the #100diasSEMpaz (#100daysWITHOUTpeace) hashtag 
that arose in the Alemão complex of favelas in the beginning of 2015 
after 100 consecutive days of gunfire, in which residents, including a 
child, lost their lives.
Another social media campaign called “Eu não mereço morrer assassi-
nado” (I do not deserve to be assassinated), got considerable attention in 
April 2014. It arose after Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira, a 26-year-old 
dancer, was killed by the police in a “pacified” favela above Copacabana, 
and made explicit links between Afro-Brazilian ancestry and the risk of 
falling victim to police violence. The campaign thus denounced racism and 
the unequal value placed on human lives, both by the police and the wider 
public. It also emphasised their experience that the right to feel safe 
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remains a privilege reserved for the generally lighter skinned inhabitants of 
middle-class neighbourhoods.
Shootouts taking place within the “pacified” favelas are often docu-
mented in videos uploaded to Facebook. Normally, these videos are filmed 
with mobile phone cameras through a window or from a rooftop. The 
visual contents serve to locate the event in a favela; what we see is usually 
a dark, empty alleyway with the typical several-storey brick houses. The 
soundtrack is the main feature of the videos and consists of the sound of 
intense gunfire. The captions accompanying such videos sometimes 
express rage at the situation in which the community finds itself and at the 
“pacification” policy. The disadvantaged position of favela residents in 
Rio’s social landscape is sometimes also pointed out, either in the captions 
or in the comment sections. At other times, the caption simply warns: 
Muitos tiros hoje! (Much gunfire today!), and mentions the community or 
the specific location it takes place so that people can be informed and stay 
away.
The residents in Vila Autódromo, who fought forced evictions as the 
Olympic Park was built next to their neighbourhood, also used social 
media to organise events and protest, and to connect with an international 
public. Via Whatsapp groups for activists and journalists they swiftly man-
aged to get the attention of supporters and international correspondents 
whenever a house was in risk of being demolished. They also organised 
cultural protest events, using social media tools to disseminate informa-
tion about them both before and after. Showing a keen awareness of the 
power of image and alternative media, as they called it, the residents also 
wrote on the houses’ outer walls to present their analysis of what was hap-
pening to their neighbourhood. “Sometimes when journalists come here 
there is nobody available to talk to them, so we write on the walls so that they 
can do the talking”, one of them explained (Photo 4.2).
Following Fraser (Fraser 1990), I take the social media representations 
of violence and inequality arising out of affected communities to consti-
tute subaltern counterpublics. Subaltern counterpublics are defined as
parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to for-




An example of such a subaltern counterpublic, Fraser states, is the late- 
twentieth century US feminist discursive arena. Here, new terms for 
describing reality have been invented, such as “sexism”, “double shift”, 
“sexual harassment”, “date rape” and so on. Gradually, these terms have 
made their way into debates beyond feminist circles, where they are both 
accepted and critiqued. This illustrates the potential of subaltern counter-
publics to contribute to deliberations and contestations in other arenas. 
According to Fraser, subaltern counterpublics have a dual character in 
stratified societies. They function as spaces of withdrawal and regroup-
ment, and simultaneously, as bases and training grounds for agitational 
activities directed towards wider publics. In this dialectic lies their emanci-
patory potential; the ability to somewhat offset the unjust participatory 
privileges enjoyed by the members of dominant social groups (Fraser 
1990, 68).
It is of course an empirical question to be explored in each case to what 
extent subaltern counterpublics are separate from other publics. Fraser 
argues that insofar as these arenas are indeed publics, they are by definition 
Photo 4.2 Graffiti in Vila Autódromo shows that the residents consider the con-
fiscation of their neighbourhood as a transfer of public land to private actors: 
“When there are no more public areas to sell, they will sell the favelas. Who will 
protest?” (Photo: Margit Ystanes)
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not enclaves, although they can be involuntarily enclaved (Fraser 1990, 67). 
The online resources used to distribute the representations of violence and 
inequality discussed here arguably constitute a public. Facebook’s “fan 
pages”, Twitter accounts, YouTube, blogs and other websites are open and 
available to anyone with an Internet connection. Even personal Facebook 
pages are considered public, as many politicians and other public figures 
have learned upon posting controversial updates and being taken to task for 
it “in real life”. Whatsapp, a messenger app that is hugely popular in Rio’s 
favelas, constitutes a semi-public arena. The app allows for making large 
groups of users who can quickly disseminate information to one another 
through a single message, which may include photos, video or sound record-
ings. Because of this,  activists I spoke to consider that Whatsapp plays a 
crucial role in creating consciousness and for mobilising around particular 
issues. For example, the establishment of a Whatsapp group including resi-
dents from all over Complexo do Alemão created awareness of the scale of 
shootouts in this vast area. As group members from different favelas within 
the complex shared information about their particular neighbourhood, this 
provided the impetus for the #100diasSEMpaz campaign discussed above.
A study from 2013 showed that 52 per cent of favela residents in Brazil 
has access to the Internet (Caldeiro 2013). A considerable number of 
those living in favelas, then, may potentially participate in the digital dis-
semination, consumption and debate about experiences of violence and 
inequality.
Perhaps because of the connection between the injustices they are pro-
testing and the mega-events, the activities of Coletivo Papo Reto and oth-
ers have caught the interest of international media. The Coletivo, for 
example, have been the subject of a New York Times article (Shaer 2015) 
and an Al Jazeera documentary. They cooperate with international activ-
ists, and in 2015 they received Brazil Foundation’s annual International 
Philanthropy Award in New York. The tribulations of residents in Vila 
Autódromo have been documented by numerous international media 
outlets, e.g. The Guardian, Time, The Nation, USA Today, ESPN, 
New  York Times, The Independent, LA Times, Al Jazeera, ROAR 
Magazine, to mention a few. The “Eu não mereço morrer assassinado” cam-
paign was reported about on brasilpost.com.br, a Huffington Post site 
dedicated to news from Brazil in Portuguese (Thanyá 2014). Coletivo 
Papo Reto’s Facebook page and others like it, are  sometimes used as 
sources in the reporting of other alternative media, e.g. Jornal a Nova 
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Democracia, which exist both as a printed newspaper, a YouTube chan-
nel, a website and a Facebook site.
The digital representations of violence and inequality in question here 
are nevertheless quite excluded from Brazilian mass media narratives. As 
mentioned above, mass media in Brazil constitutes a relatively homoge-
neous sphere dominated by the Globo Media Group and the representa-
tion of middle- and upper-class worldviews. A member of the Coletivo 
Papo Reto told me, “when the New  York Times did a story on us, the 
Brazilian media did a story on the story, but not on us”. Even so, some of 
these narratives do seep into other publics, and it is increasingly problem-
atic to claim that they are completely enclaved. If we follow Fraser (1990), 
the work of these community activists can therefore be considered an 
important expansion of the public sphere of deliberation and contestation 
in Brazil. While their transformative potential with regards to influencing 
mainstream public debate and media remains to be seen, it is clear that a 
subaltern counterpublic has been established. At the moment, this coun-
terpublic appears to function both as a community service providing cru-
cial information, but also as a laboratory where approaches to representation 
and empowerment are being tested and refined. Increasingly, this subal-
tern counterpublic is being recognised by an international public.
The mega-events that sparked this activism in Rio are now over, but the 
struggle over the access to and management of urban spaces and territo-
ries is not. As the current Brazilian government threatens to reverse many 
of the gains towards equality achieved during the Pink Tide, this struggle 
continues on the platforms established by journalists-as-activists in recent 
years. Indeed, the methodology and infrastructure for protest and activism 
based on social media and mobile technology is one of the most significant 
legacies of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.
concludIng thoughts
As the Brazilian Pink Tide now recedes, the country is in economic crisis 
and the Worker Party’s president Dilma Rousseff was removed by a ques-
tionable impeachment process in August 2016.5 The current right-wing 
government of Michel Temer has since introduced austerity politics that 
threaten to reverse many of the gains towards a more equal Brazil achieved 
during the last couple of decades. Nevertheless, prior to these develop-
ments Brazil made significant gains in the inclusion of the formerly 
excluded by raising the minimum wages, introducing the conditional cash 
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transfer programme Bolsa Familia (see de Lavra Pinta (Chap. 6), this vol-
ume), as well as quotas for Afro-Brazilians in prestigious public universi-
ties. All of this was helped along by impressive economic growth. 
Nevertheless, these policies have not been sufficient to eradicate poverty 
and erase the conceptual and social distinction between favela and “the 
asphalt”, the formal neighbourhoods.
As the reconfiguration of public spaces ushered in by the hosting of 
mega-events made clear, nor did the Pink Tide reduce historical inequali-
ties with regards to access to these spaces. If anything, the eviction and 
security policies of recent years did much to reverse any gains by clearing 
out poor people from attractive areas (Ystanes 2016a, b; de Magalhães 
2013; Rolnik 2015; Barbassa 2015). Militarising the spaces where poor 
people live either officially through “pacification” (Salem 2016; Larkins 
2015; Sørbøe 2013) or unofficially through paramilitary militias (Vieira 
2016; Martín 2016), was equally destructive for residents. It is interesting 
in this regard that when the army occupies a favela as part of the “pacifica-
tion” process they claim the territory by planting the Brazilian flag there. 
This symbolic gesture illustrates the extent to which favelas are considered 
external to the rest of Brazil. The high incidence of police violence and 
deaths at police hands in “pacified” favelas, as well as the apparent accep-
tance of this reality by the rest of the population, further emphasises the 
unequal value placed on human lives.
When the Olympics kicked off in August 2016, the city had been in 
mega-event preparation mode ever since it was awarded the Pan American 
Games in 2002. This was the same year the Labour Party candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president and the processes referred to as 
the Pink Tide were most actively set in motion in Brazil. These parallel and 
in many ways incompatible developments are informative. The deepening 
inequalities arising from the reconfigurations of urban spaces as prepara-
tions for the mega-events reveal the shallowness of the reforms of the Pink 
Tide. While significant gains were made with regard to identity politics as 
well as economic inequality, the clearing out of poor and Afro-descendant 
residents from attractive areas as the city prepared for the mega-events 
spoke volumes about the challenges still ahead for those who desire a 
more equal Brazil. Mass media’s lack of interest in the fate of those who 
are adversely affected by these developments, further emphasise that 
inequality is not just inscribed in the urban landscape, but also in the life-
worlds of those who inhabit this landscape.
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The rise of journalism-as-activism constitutes a challenge to these struc-
tures. By weaving together digital and “real life” events, this is not merely 
the production of a discourse where the most educationally privileged and 
politically conscious favela residents participate. It facilitates and informs 
about activities and events that are firmly located within local communi-
ties, and reaches and includes people who are not present on social media. 
Indeed, these practices, digital and “in real life”, contribute to widening 
the sphere of public contestation, and provide virtual and local spaces 
where stories about violence, inequality and exclusion can be told. As 
such, digital community journalism can potentially help erode the exclu-
sionary modes of public debate that currently dominate Brazilian mass 
media and challenge persistent inequality.
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notes
1. In Portuguese: “...falaram que era bandido mas morreu mais um inocente, 
aqui tem trabalhador e também tem estudante mas pra eles se tá no morro 
tu já é traficante”.
2. The drawing can be seen here: https://tinyurl.com/lwhpcqa.
3. Alemão and Maré are names of large favela complexes, whereas Rocinha is 
the name of Rio’s largest favela. Voz da Comunidade means “voice of the 
community”. Comunidade (community) is an often-used term for favela 
that was originally intended to escape the stigma associated with being a 
favela resident. In Rio, however, most social media activists use the term 
“favela”, and focus on challenging the injustices suffered by the residents of 
these places and cultivating a positive self-image through the use of music, 
art and other cultural expressions. The title Voz da Comunidade thus plays 
on the idea that the purpose of this news outlet is to give voice to favela 
residents.
 #SOSFAVELAS: DIGITAL REPRESENTATIONS OF VIOLENCE... 
102 
4. Although it must be added that later Habermas modified this view.
5. See the Introduction, as well as Costa’s (Chap. 3) and Sørbøe’s (Chap. 5) in 
this book, for more on the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.
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IntroductIon
A few weeks after the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
 residents from the upper middle-class neighbourhood São Conrado organ-
ised a protest. The combination of ‘Rio residents’, ‘sports events’ and ‘pro-
tests’ has appeared in countless headlines since June 2013, when millions 
of Brazilians took to the streets in mass demonstrations. A cacophony of 
demands, from broad citizenship issues to state inefficiency and corruption 
to protesting the disproportionate spending on the hosting of mega sports 
events, were fronted. Demonstrations have continued to bring Brazilians 
to the streets, but the agendas of protesters have radically changed 
character:
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Away with the bus stop! São Conrado does not accept a final stop/bus stop. 
Disorder for the residents of the neighbourhood. Noise, filthiness, occupied 
lanes, traffic. The municipality does not listen to us!!! We demand action.
The above message appeared on several banners that were draped on 
buildings in São Conrado in September 2016, demanding that the local 
bus stop would be removed. The City obliged to the demand, and accord-
ing to one of its users, the bus stop was moved to:
A dark, one-way street behind an old hotel that has been abandoned for 
decades. It is a deserted street, with no sidewalk, next to a forest (…) unlit, 
and without a shelter for people to sit and wait for the bus.
Anyone who has travelled on the over-crowded, under-air-conditioned 
buses in Rio’s blistering summer heat knows that they are not the priori-
tised means of transportation for those with alternatives. The majority of 
the users of the bus stop are not the residents of São Conrado, but those 
of neighbouring Rocinha, Rio and Brazil’s largest favela (urban informal 
settlement). While only metres away from each other, the two neighbour-
hoods seem worlds apart. In a 2016 Social Progress Index measuring 
human development, Rocinha scored 44.9 on a scale from 0 to 100. That 
ranked Rocinha in 29th place of 32 administrative regions in the city. São 
Conrado’s region ranked second with a score of 85.18 (IPS 2016). This 
contrast between São Conrado and Rocinha illustrates the prevalence of 
uneven urban development and socio-economic differences in the city. 
The recent protest in São Conrado also testifies to a deep-rooted class 
struggle that has resurfaced in later years.
With the 2002 election of the Worker’s Party’s (PT) Inácio ‘Lula’ da 
Silva as President, many hoped Brazil’s entrenched inequalities could be 
confronted. Lula placed Brazil at the forefront of the centre-left ‘Pink Tide’ 
in Latin America. The socially oriented policies introduced in Lula’s first 
term increased minimum wages and strengthened worker’s rights. Cash 
transfer programmes helped keep children from underprivileged families in 
school, while affirmative action granted their elder siblings access to univer-
sities. Lula’s second term operationalised an ambitious developmentalist 
agenda, implementing national development programmes in industries and 
infrastructure. In Rio, these programmes were connected with the city’s 
preparations for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The 
City pledged to use the unique opportunity of the mega sports events to 
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respond to the legacy of socio-spatial inequalities, and targeted favelas with 
investments in infrastructure, security and social housing. Rocinha was one 
of the favelas at the receiving end of investments.
The PT years did bring a profound change to the composition of the 
Brazilian society through the programmes of redistribution, social inclu-
sion and poverty reduction. As argued throughout this book, the ‘Pink 
Tide’ in Brazil was however marked by continuities as much as ruptures. 
The inequality-reducing measures introduced may have eased the lives of 
the poorest while there was economic and political will to uphold these 
policies. But they were less successful building a lasting foundation for 
inequality reductions beyond economic concerns. From 2013 onwards, 
PT became the scapegoat for the deepening political and economic crises 
enveloping the country, and the party’s reign ultimately came to a brutal 
end with Dilma’s impeachment in September 2016 (Jinkings et al. 2016). 
Advancements that did take place in terms of efforts at addressing social 
justice and constructing citizenship are currently being rolled back in what 
can be termed a revanchist (Smith 1996) counter-reaction to the gains 
made by the poorer segments of society. This chapter will reflect on these 
issues through the case of Rocinha.
Part 1: decades of change
The Divided City
The name Rocinha means ‘little farm’ and stems from the initial occupa-
tion of the territory in the 1930s by small-scale farmers. Rocinha’s growth 
accelerated from the 1950s, a period when rapid urbanisation brought 
millions of rural workers from the agricultural states in the northeast to 
the large industrial centres in the centre-south, such as Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo (Leitão 2009). Unable to find affordable housing, the migrants 
innovated and built their homes on the steep hillsides wedged between the 
middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods lining Rio’s shoreline. According 
to the latest census (IBGE 2010), one quarter of Rio’s population resides 
in favelas. Rocinha’s privileged location, between São Conrado and Gávea, 
two of the most affluent neighbourhoods of the city, has for good and for 
bad continually placed the spotlight on the community.
Urban informality is often associated with marginality, precariousness, 
socio-economic vulnerability and conflict in what Ananya Roy (2011, 
224) has termed an ‘apocalyptic and dystopian narrative of the slum’ 
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(see, e.g. Neuwirth 2005; Davis 2006). Urban informal settlements have 
often been presented as ‘diseases on the social body’, providing urban 
reformers justifications for razing them (Stepan 1991; Holston 2009). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the government initiated forced removals in 
many of the centrally located favelas in Rio, and Rocinha was no excep-
tion. The community suffered three partial removals in this period, but 
residents returned to Rocinha because of its location. The removals 
therefore did not stall the favela’s growth. Rather, it accelerated as the 
construction boom in Rio’s infrastructure and real estate sectors pro-
vided work opportunities, including in the construction of São Conrado. 
The latter expanded in the 1960s, and is today a high-end neighbour-
hood of gated communities and luxurious shopping centres.
In the decades that have passed, starch differences have consolidated 
between the two neighbourhoods. The favela’s narrow, winding pathways 
contrast with the formal city’s straight streets and avenues. The favela’s 
makeshift economy, where everything from basic services such as sewage, 
water and electricity to transportation, commerce and security has largely 
been arranged informally, differs from the urban economy of the formal 
city. There, business is mainly on the books and workers’ wages and work-
ing conditions conform to labour laws and standards. A 33-year-old man 
born and raised in Rocinha takes it so far as to claim that “there is a fron-
tier here, where all that is missing in order to prevent people from crossing 
is border customs”. Perhaps more important than material differences, he 
refers to symbolic, behavioural and cultural barriers that have excluded 
favela residents from mainstream society (see also Larkins 2015). A per-
ception of favela residents as a dangerous ‘other’ (Said 1979) representing 
a threat to ‘civilised society’ has prevailed since the favelas first appeared 
over a century ago (Valladares 2005; Leite 2012). This perception was 
reinforced when the international drug trade found a stronghold on the 
unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides of Rio’s favelas from the 1980s onwards. 
Drug traffickers often had the resources to maintain order and provide 
social assistance in areas where public services were limited at best. As 
armed drug gangs started filling the vacuum of the weak state presence, 
regular residents within these territories were seen as accomplices of the 
drug traffickers because of neighbourhood relations, kinship or economic 
and political ties. The police took a militarised approach to combating the 
drug trafficking in Rio’s favelas, and the social conflict in the city became 
formulated as a ‘war’ (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008). This war has 
legitimised illegalities in the state’s handling of the favelas.
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In his writings on what he terms a ‘state of exception’, Agamben (1998) 
describes a condition under which normal principles of law and order are 
superseded by exceptional acts or displays of force in the name of protect-
ing citizens. Judith Butler (2004, 98) points out that this can produce a 
state of ‘desubjectivation’ where “certain subjects undergo a suspension of 
their ontological status as subjects”. Drug traffickers were envisioned not 
merely as common criminals but as enemy combatants at war with the 
state. Due to their perceived connection with drug trafficking, regular 
favela residents also became a kind of nonperson stripped of citizenship, a 
condition Agamben calls ‘bare life’ (1998, 11). An illustrative occurrence 
is a large police operation in Rocinha on May 20, 2016. Around 3:30 pm 
on that Friday afternoon, the BOPE special police force entered Rocinha 
with military helicopters and trucks in an intense shoot-out with local 
drug traffickers. Rio’s largest newspaper O Globo reported on the event 
under the headline “shoot-out in Rocinha scares students at PUC ”, the 
catholic university in the nearby upper-class neighbourhood Gávea (see 
Papo Reto 2016). The angle of the article, focusing on the fear of upper 
middle-class students in an adjacent neighbourhood rather than the fate of 
Rocinha residents caught in the crossfire, is telling of how favela residents 
have been rendered as ‘bare life’.
Politics of Citizenship
There are still stark socio-spatial differences in Rio and Brazil, entrenched 
inequalities do not erase easily. But since the 1980s, Brazil has come a long 
way in establishing a legal framework and institutions that work to pro-
mote a more inclusive society. Citizenship has been a key concept.
With the end of the military dictatorship in the mid-1980s, social 
movements of all sorts, including favela, workers’, landless’, urban, health, 
feminist, black and student movements, emerged as protagonists of a new 
kind of politics. The reference to citizenship was not only a tool in their 
specific struggles but also a powerful link among them. The notion of citi-
zenship in terms of ‘cultural’ inclusion, political representation and espe-
cially social rights (see Stokke forthcoming), became the mean through 
which the traditionally excluded masses gained a voice in the public sphere. 
The fruits of their struggle were manifest in the 1988 Constitution, often 
referred to as the ‘Citizen Constitution’ (Dagnino 2010). It recognised 
social and economic rights such as housing, employment, education and 
health. In terms of specifically urban challenges, it also incorporated new 
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ideas about the ‘social function’ of cities and urban property. The 2001 
City Statute further recognised the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1968; 
Harvey 2008; Júnior 2005), the right of all urban dwellers to appropriate 
urban space and to participate centrally in its production (Purcell 2003). 
As a result, the 1990s and 2000s saw important advancements in policies 
and politics towards the favelas. Favela residents called for public invest-
ments with the Constitution in hand, and removal policies were put to an 
end. The public debate shifted to concentrating on the necessity of inte-
grating the favelas in the city (Burgos 1998). When Inácio Lula da Silva 
from the Worker’s Party (PT) won the presidency on a pro-poor platform 
in 2002, many were optimistic that the old divides between the favela and 
the formal city could slowly be erased.
PT Under Lula: Combining Social Concerns for the Poor 
with Economic Concerns for Growth
The election of Lula represented an historic opportunity for significant 
change in Brazil. The worker’s union leader, who was illiterate until the 
age of ten and did not receive much in terms of formal education, repre-
sented something radically new in Brazil and in Latin America. At the 
same time, there were powerful forces of continuity. As Strønen and 
Ystanes point out in the introduction to this volume, the scope of possibil-
ity the Pink Tide governments operated within was largely defined by tra-
ditional elites. The re-democratisation of Brazil was a gradual opening 
(abertura in Portuguese) rather than a rupture, and the country preserved 
the historic structures of an oligarchic-bourgeois political society (see 
Teles and Safatle 2010). Lula had previously run for president three times 
without success. In order to win in 2002, he modified his once radical 
socialist orientation and reached out to the conservative political and 
financial elites. In an open letter addressed to the Brazilian people, but 
whose intended audience was rather these elites, Lula promised to adhere 
to fiscal responsibility, make low inflation a priority, and generally play by 
the rules of the market (Singer 2012). A pragmatic dealmaker, Lula 
accepted the neoliberal reality but sought to address the downsides of 
those policies through redistributing to the poorer segments of society. 
The elimination of the previous radicalism of PT and the search for a 
broad government coalition mark a transition from petismo to lulismo—
‘the Lula way of governing’ (Sampaio jr., 2012; Singer 2012).
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Mega Sports Events and Entrepreneurial Governance
In Rio de Janeiro, both the governor from 2007 and the mayor from 
2009 were from PMDB, the business-oriented party within Lula’s broad 
governing alliance. The three levels of government were thereby aligned 
for the first time in decades and would converge around a common proj-
ect: the hosting of mega sports events. Brazil and Rio de Janeiro bid suc-
cessfully on both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, the 
largest sports spectacles in the world. This would present a unique window 
of opportunity for investments in Rio’s favelas.
Lula’s great ambition was to take Brazil out of the shadow of being the 
eternal ‘land of the future’ (Zweig 2017) to becoming an economic and 
political power to be reckoned with. His hope was that the 2016 Olympics 
would become a stamp of approval on the South American giant’s coming 
of age, just as the Beijing Olympics of 2008 marked China’s revival as a 
world power (Broudehoux 2007). Rio’s local level government, on the 
other hand, had its own interests in hosting these events. Compelled to 
compete on the global arena over increasingly mobile capital, cities have 
adapted entrepreneurial styles of action and communication (Harvey 
1989). The summer Olympics is the ‘holy grail’ of the entrepreneurial city 
competition, and Rio has bid on the event since the 1990s as part of its 
entrepreneurial governance (Vainer 2011).
The marketing of Rio as a potential host city depended on constructing 
an image of an exotic but tame city. This required that Rio confronted the 
statistics where it exhibited poor rankings, such as indicators on crime, 
violence and inequality. These were all issues that to a large degree were 
associated with the favelas, which had become an ‘anti-postcard’ (Ventura 
1994) for Rio de Janeiro and for Brazil. Public policies in the favelas had 
to be revised. Interventions in the favelas became a central part of the 
Olympic development plans. Rio’s Olympic bid pledged to use the 
Olympics both to improve living conditions for the poor and improve 
security in the city, leaving the city with a ‘social legacy’ after the Games 
(Braathen et al. 2013). Programmes were developed at all three levels of 
government targeting the favelas in particular, the main references being 
the federal Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC), the state Police 
Pacification Program (UPP) and the municipal Morar Carioca (Rolnik 
2011). An additional ‘legacy’ from these interventions would hopefully 
come in the form of ‘branding’ Rio within the entrepreneurial city compe-
tition. In the next section, we will look at how the PAC and UPP pro-
grammes have materialised in Rocinha.
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Part 2: towards urban IntegratIon?
Rocinha: From Favela to Formality?
With his long white beard and never-faulting khaki shorts and sandals, 
70-year-old José Martíns de Oliveira is an easily recognisable resident of 
Rocinha. A member of the community for nearly half a century, Martíns 
has accompanied Rocinha’s growth from a once-small community to a 
densely populated neighbourhood of nearly 200,000 residents. Rocinha 
today is a far shot from the ramshackle wooden houses Martíns encoun-
tered when he migrated to Rio from north-eastern Ceará in 1968, when 
he tells me “there was no water, no transportation, no banks, commerce 
or supermarkets”. Today Rocinha offers all the services found in the for-
mal city. While today’s unfinished brick houses still may not look like 
much from the outside, appearances can deceive. Nearly all residents have 
access to electricity and running water. Inside, flat screen TVs, sound sys-
tems, and latest-model refrigerators and other domestic goods are com-
mon. The latter items are a visual confirmation of the improved material 
living standards brought on by PT’s socially oriented policies. The family 
allowance Bolsa Familia, higher minimum wages and facilitated access to 
credit has allowed low-income families to purchase once unattainable 
goods. According to Meirelles and Athayde (2016), the average income of 
favela residents rose by 54.7 per cent between 2003 and 2013.
Different urbanisation programmes have provided improvements in 
Rocinha since the 1980s, but the largest one by far to reach the commu-
nity is the federal Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC), initiated by Lula 
in the very beginning of his second term in 2007. PAC’s main investments 
were large-scale projects within the areas of construction, energy, trans-
port and logistics, but it also had a subprogramme called PAC-Favela that 
provided urban upgrading in some of Rio’s favelas. Rocinha was promised 
investments for US$ 400 million through two phases of PAC. PAC’s 
stated aim in Rocinha was to “transform physical interventions of urban 
upgrading (…) into processes of sustainable development” (EMOP 2007). 
PAC was to build on grassroots-driven struggles for urban developments 
in Rocinha that date back to the mid-2000s, when a ‘Socio-Spatial Master 
Plan for the Sustainable Development of Rocinha’ was produced. The 
architect behind the Master Plan, Carlos Luis Toledo, is well-known for 
his strong belief in participatory planning, and the Master Plan was the 
result of nearly 2 years of discussing Rocinha’s needs with residents in a 
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bottom-up manner. According to a community leader, “[Toledo] did 
something that rarely happens, which was to hold assemblies, here in the 
community, discussing with the residents. It was democratic, there was 
participation”. The process thus marked a step away from clientelist prac-
tices that have tended to steer interventions in Rio’s favelas, where politi-
cians have exchanged upgrading projects or other services for votes 
(Maricato 2000). The Master Plan’s main proposals included completing 
infrastructure and facilities of basic sanitation, ensuring better accessibility, 
establishing limits on Rocinha’s horizontal and vertical growth, and con-
structing a series of urban facilities, all while ‘valuing Rocinha’s culture 
and identity’ (see Toledo 2011).
In the same period the PAC programme was being implemented in 
Rocinha, another initiative to intervene in Rio’s favelas was developed at 
the state level: the Police ‘Pacification’ Program (UPP). UPP was designed 
as a combination of proximity policing with a social component, the 
municipal programme UPP Social (later re-named Rio+Social) that would 
provide social services like job training and cultural activities. The stated 
goal was to take back state control over territories controlled by drug traf-
fickers to provide the local population “peace and public safety”, seen as 
“necessary for the full exercise and development of citizenship” (Henriques 
and Ramos 2011, 243). It thus aspired to break with the logic of ‘war’ 
that had steered police interventions in favelas. The BOPE special police 
force occupied Rocinha in November 2011 to prepare for the implemen-
tation of the UPP, which was inaugurated in September 2012.
The combination of the improved security through UPP, the PAC 
investments in infrastructure, and policies that aimed at reducing income 
inequalities, presented a promise of significant changes in Rocinha. 
Together they constituted a politics of citizenship; that is, a pursuit of 
redistribution, representation and recognition as three interrelated dimen-
sions of injustice and citizenship politics (Stokke forthcoming). How and 
to what degree did these programmes and policies live up to their 
expectations?
PAC and Participatory Development
PAC started as a prolongation of the Master Plan, and Toledo was hired to 
oversee the process. However, as the process went from the planning stage 
to the implementation of PAC works, it changed considerably. Toledo 
claimed “the government chose what was not our priority”, and Martíns 
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lamented that “the PAC works were implemented from the top- down”. 
While the Master Plan explicitly listed basic sanitation as the community’s 
most urgent need, the State Company of Public Works (EMOP) cherry-
picked for execution prestigious infrastructure projects such as a large 
sports complex and a footpath designed by the internationally renowned 
architect Oscar Niemeyer, which connects Rocinha and São Conrado. It is 
an ‘architectonical masterpiece symbolically and physically bridging the 
formal and the informal city’ according Ruth Jurberg, responsible for PAC-
Rocinha at EMOP, while Martíns regards it an expensive ‘white elephant’ 
replacing an already existing, fully functioning bridge that had strong his-
toric and cultural value for the community. Many residents have denounced 
the PAC projects of being ‘for tourists to see’: architectonical masterpieces 
that are doing a specific symbolical work with impacts that reach beyond 
the immediate locality. As one resident puts it,
They are works that you can see, basic sanitation on the other hand you can-
not. If you show off a cable car in a favela, the foreigners taking photos, it is 
something that calls attention. It is just that it is not what the resident needs.
The cable car he refers to was a proposal from the federal government 
when a second round of PAC investments were promised Rocinha in 
2012. Local civil society groups rejected the idea of the cable car in several 
preliminary hearings, asking for the completion of works that had been 
contracted through PAC but stalled in 2011 when 70 per cent of the work 
had been completed yet the initial budget was overrun by about 35 per 
cent (Daflon and Berta 2011). They also asked for PAC 2 to prioritise 
basic sanitation. Nevertheless, when Dilma officially launched PAC 2 in 
Rocinha in June 2013, half of the budget was earmarked for the construc-
tion of a cable car.
UPP: ‘Opening Up’ the Favela
As for the UPP ‘pacifying’ police, it pledged to pacify police and drug 
traffickers. Of equal importance for the Olympic city, it also pacified the 
anxieties of the middle classes and tourists in adjacent formal neighbour-
hoods, who reported feeling safer as the drug-related violence was dis-
placed out of centrally located pacified favelas into the peripheries of the 
city (Cavalcanti 2013, 205). Real estate prices in São Conrado increased 
by nearly 200 per cent after the pacification of Rocinha (Ibid., 2014). 
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The UPP police was however less successful in making residents of 
Rocinha experience increased safety. According to data from the Institute 
of Public Safety, the rates of crime increased significantly in Rocinha from 
2011 to 2012 (Rousso 2012). The pacification also increased insecurity 
for residents in a different sense, through ‘opening up’ the favela for a 
range of outside actors.
While the hills and mountainsides of the favelas were seen as wasteland 
a century ago when the favelas first emerged, they are today considered 
prime pieces of real estate in central areas of the city (see Rolnik 2016). As 
areas to a large degree outside of the formal economy, they also represent 
areas of capitalist interest. As Governor Cabral bluntly put it in 2011, 
when commenting on the public interventions in Rocinha, “we have to 
keep doing construction projects, but capitalism has to enter more and 
more” (Schmitt 2011). On the heels of the BOPE special police force that 
occupied Rocinha in 2011 came another invading force, the so-called for-
malisation task forces that were to formalise businesses and real estate 
(Urani et  al. 2011), along with corporate actors eager to tap into the 
lucrative favela market. Services like the gato networks providing afford-
able electricity, internet, cable TV and motorcycle taxi services were for-
malised with a resulting multiplication of costs. This is what Harvey 
(2003) has termed an ‘enclosing the commons’, a privatisation of services 
that used to be informally taken care of. Local business owners struggle to 
compete with national and international franchises that have established a 
local presence, offering 24-month down payments on credit-bought elec-
tronics. A resident interviewed in 2012 remarked the following:
The big companies that enter ruin the local economy. A product in Casa 
Bahia [electronics store] might be 900 Reais [250 USD], while it is 500 
Reais [130 USD] in a local store. But because you can pay in instalments 
there, a lot of people prefer it. Local business is not surviving…it is not bet-
ter for the community, but people are short sighted.
Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Favela’s Place in the City
The public interventions in Rocinha formed a three-part strategy focusing 
on urban infrastructure, security and formalisation of the informal econ-
omy. This package of interventions has provided security and the neces-
sary infrastructure to attract market forces and investments into the favela. 
Rocinha today is among the top tourist attractions in Rio, and a range of 
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(mostly non-resident run) agencies provide ‘favela tours’ to give foreign-
ers an exotic taste of the ‘authentic’ Rio (Larkins 2015). The UPPs have 
also made the city of Rio as a whole, and in particular areas of the city close 
to pacified favelas, safer (at least for a while). As a consequence, these 
interventions have helped with the rebranding of Rio as an Olympic city 
in order to attract international capital, tourists and investments. Along 
the way, the promise of enhanced citizenship for local residents seems to 
have lost focus in favour of other interests guiding the interventions.
In spite of the legal framework guaranteeing the ‘right to the city’ and 
popular participation in governance, the grassroots-driven struggles for 
urban development in Rocinha that led to the Master Plan in 2004–2006 
were all but co-opted by elite interests. The visual prestige projects that 
have been completed, along with the proposed cable car, provide a brand-
ing factor far more favourable to the entrepreneurial city governance than 
invisible sewage improvements. Another likely reason for the large-scale 
projects is that they have good conditions for graft and super profits. The 
massive Lava Jato corruption investigation that exploded in 2014 has 
exposed the corrupt connections between politicians and domestic firms 
who gained lucrative contracts through state development programmes, 
and the PAC works in Rocinha have been connected to this scandal 
(Agência Brasil 2017).
As for the UPP, it constitutes a police practice that is exercised accord-
ing to the spatial configuration of the city. While promoted as a pro-
gramme to spur an approximation process between different parts and 
populations of the city, one can ask to what degree a differentiated polic-
ing of space can counter the differentiated citizenship in the city. Rather, 
it can be argued that such location-specific policing reinforces divides 
(Samara 2011). The logic steering the pacification programme can also be 
connected with Rio’s entrepreneurial mode of governance. Rather than 
abandoning the logic of ‘war’, it installed a militarised state of exception 
in pacified favelas (Freeman 2014). It can thus be argued that the pro-
gramme serves to protect the rest of the city, tourists and capital rather 
than ensuring increased security for favela residents. A 33-year-old jour-
nalist born and raised in Rocinha describes residents’ disillusionment with 
the recent government interventions as follows:
PAC entered with an absurd force, and the hope was that there would be a 
great change (…). Afterwards the pacification came, and we started believ-
ing in it (…) but we saw that everything that was being done was for the 
sake of the World Cup and the Olympics. We saw that if there were  structural 
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changes in Rocinha, it was for the sake of tourism. If security was to be 
improved, it wouldn’t be for the favela but for the ‘asphalt’,1 it is about 
securing the criminals within the favelas so they don’t go to the asphalt. 
Everything was because of the World Cup and the Olympics. We always 
thought so (…) [and] we saw that it was exactly what happened, everything 
was very superficial. PAC didn’t do half of what should have been done, 
UPP came in saying it would guarantee security and we did not get security, 
and the other services that were promised never came.
To summarise, the recent public interventions for enhanced citizenship in 
Rocinha have addressed economic inequalities through policies of redistri-
bution. This has led to a degree of social inclusion through lifting people 
out of poverty and providing them entry into middle-class consumer mar-
kets. The interventions have however been less successful in building a 
foundation for addressing inequalities beyond economic concerns. While 
some residents have experienced material enfranchisement and heightened 
access to goods and services, one can ask, following Larkins (2015, 157), 
to what degree their new consumptive habits has bestowed them accep-
tance into the middle or upper classes or whether their skin colour and 
place of residence trump their increased purchasing power as a marker of 
class status (see Bourdieu 1984).
Part 3: challengIng entrenched InequalItIes
‘Not Far Enough’: The June Uprisings
On June 25, 2013, thousands of Rocinha residents marched roughly 5 kilo-
metres to the upscale neighbourhood Leblon where they occupied Governor 
Cabral’s home. The theme of the demonstration was ‘Basic Sanitation, Yes! 
White Elephants, No!’, a clear rejection of PAC’s prioritisation of large-
scale, visual projects over basic sanitation improvements. The demonstra-
tion happened in the midst of the massive ‘June uprisings’, an unprecedented 
wave of mass protest that rocked Brazil. When a small protest against the 
increase to the bus fare in São Paulo in early June was met with massive 
police repression, it became the ‘last drop’ of Brazilians’ increasing frustra-
tions with a deepening ‘urban crisis’ (Rolnik 2011), government ineffi-
ciency, corruption and overspending on mega sports events. By the end of 
the month, millions of Brazilians from across the socio- economic scale took 
to the streets in hundreds of cities all over the country.
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Both the shape and demands of the ‘June uprisings’, as well as the 
responses to and consequences of them, varied across the cities in Brazil. 
In Rio, the demonstrations synthesised the increasing discontentment 
with the mega event-driven urban governance and a deep disjunction 
between the politicians and their vision for the city and the interests of the 
population they were supposed to represent. The prospect of the benefits 
of the interventions that would come with turning Rio into an ‘Olympic 
city’ allowed for stepping outside the institutional framework (Vainer 
2011), and as seen through the case of Rocinha there was little or no dia-
logue with the population when it came to the selection of investments 
and projects. While the Bolsa Familia increased minimum wages and other 
federal programmes improved the living conditions of the poorest of the 
poor, this increased income, which enabled the growth of consumption, 
did not solve the precarious nature of public education, health care, secu-
rity or public transport, nor did it address the fragmentation that charac-
terises the duality of the urban landscape in Rio.
In addition to the demonstration on June 25, Rocinha had another 
large demonstration in July 2013, this time against the UPP police. On 
July 14 the UPP had taken local resident Amarildo da Souza Silva in for 
questioning, and he never returned home. It was later revealed that he was 
tortured, murdered and his body disappeared by the UPP police. His 
 disappearance would mark a watershed for the UPP programme’s legiti-
macy. Young favela men of Afro-Brazilian heritage, mainly those living in 
favelas and other marginalised communities, continue to be associated 
with violent crimes and are disproportionally targeted by extra-judicial 
executions and other human rights violations committed by the police in 
Rio’s favelas (Amnesty International 2015). While it was far from the first 
case of its kind, the timing—in the midst of a city in revolt—spurred mas-
sive mobilisations that would gain international repercussion. People from 
around the world posted pictures on social media holding up signs 
demanding to know: ‘Where is Amarildo?’
The two demonstrations in Rocinha, as part of the wider ‘June upris-
ings’, expressed frustrations with the limitations of the inequality-reducing 
measures introduced under lulismo and its alliance with urban entrepre-
neurialism in Rio. At the same time, they show some of the strides forward 
that had been made. As outlined in the introduction of this volume, the 
protests reflect how popular movements—building on decades of struggles 
for the citizenship rights people are granted in the legal framework but do 
not see reflected in their everyday lives (see Dagnino 2010)—managed to 
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take advantage of the political space opened up by socially progressive gov-
ernments. The PT governments did have an important impact in terms of 
placing citizenship on the agenda and challenging entrenched inequalities. 
They did introduce policies and politics to contest the privileges of occupa-
tional status, of masculinity, of whiteness and of heterosexuality. The sym-
bolism of having an uneducated ironworker and a woman as presidents can 
also not be ignored in a country where the majority of the people have not 
seen themselves reflected in the traditional class of white, middle-aged, 
male politicians. As a result, the traditional upper and middle classes have 
found themselves sharing universities, airports, shopping centres and other 
venues with the ‘new’ middle class (the so-called class C, see Ricci 2013) 
that grew from lulismo politics. As long as the PT governments answered 
also to the upper classes’ interests through maintaining a strong economy 
and low rates of unemployment, they remained silent. With the deepening 
economic and political crises from 2014 onwards, elaborated on in the 
chapter of Costa (this volume), this would change.
‘Too Far’: Revanchism
According to Chaui (2016, 21), the traditional middle class in Brazil has 
always had a weak position, and has therefore substituted their lack of 
economic and political power for the search of symbols of prestige within 
the consumerist society. With the economic crisis, it became increasingly 
problematic to maintain this lifestyle. People who had accumulated debts 
with high interest rates in the consumption-led, credit-fuelled economy 
found themselves in a difficult position. This can result in frustrations 
pointing in different directions. In June 2013 it was expressed as an anger 
directed ‘upwards’, against the economic and political elites. Gradually, 
however, this has been replaced by an anger directed ‘downwards’. Their 
position threatened, the middle class ‘waged a war’ (Ibid.) on people they 
perceived to have encroached on their privileges. The conflict has a clear 
class distinction and can be read in light of what Neil Smith (1996) terms 
revanchism; a discourse of revenge on behalf of the bourgeois political 
elite and their supporters against those who benefited the most from the 
redistributive policies, affirmative action and antipoverty legislation intro-
duced under PT.
From 2014, an unremitting rejection of the PT governments took cen-
tre stage in street demonstrations. There is a clear class distinction between 
those who participated in the June 2013 protests and the anti-PT protests 
 URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN RIO DE JANEIRO DURING THE ‘PINK TIDE’... 
122 
from 2014 onwards. The grand majority were white with levels of income 
and education high above the average (Mello and da Costa 2017). In 
September 2016, after months of anti-PT demonstrations, Dilma was 
impeached (on highly questionable grounds, see Jinkings et  al. 2016). 
Dilma’s successor, former Vice President Michel Temer (PMDB), wasted 
little time before scaling back many of the social policies put in place by PT 
and unveiling an agenda of liberal economic reforms. These austerity mea-
sures were presented as necessary to tackle the budget deficit and restore 
market confidence in Brazil, arguing that PT and its extensive social wel-
fare policies had drained the Brazilian economy. I will however argue they 
are best understood within a framework of revanchism, where the object 
is to reverse the victories and safeguards of the working class and the poor 
that were achieved during the 13 years of PT governments and to pre- 
empt further redistributive reforms.
As a result, those who rose to the ‘new’ middle class during the PT 
years now find their new class position to be quite uncertain. For the case of 
Rocinha, this chapter started with outlining a recent request to (re)move 
a bus stop in São Conrado. The protest is an illustration of how the strides 
forward of the poorer segments of society have been met with a revanchist 
counter-reaction on behalf of the middle and upper classes. The protest 
against the bus stop is just one among many situations where residents of 
Rocinha feel their rights violated or less respected than those of their 
neighbours. It is neither the most serious nor offensive one in a context of 
deep structural inequalities, rampant police violence and profound social 
and racial discrimination. Residents of Rocinha however explicitly place 
the protest against the bus stop within a context of class relations. “They 
want to take our buses. They treat us like crap, in fact, if they could put up 
a high wall so that they could not see us, it would be perfect [to them],” 
a 30-year-old man tells me. A 29-year-old female resident sees it as a 
“classic case of class struggles, not accepting the poor dividing the same 
territory”. She also argues this protest would not have happened five years 
ago. The climate of protest that has characterised Brazil since June 2013 
has given revanchist segments of society a newfound confidence in the 
streets as a place to raise their demands.
As to the other public interventions in Rocinha, PAC 2 is unlikely to 
materialise as the Temer government has abandoned state investment pro-
grammes in favour of privatisations. While this puts an end to the con-
tested cable car, urgent needs for basic sanitation investments are also not 
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being responded to. The UPP police, on the other hand, have largely lost 
legitimacy and their presence has been scaled back due to the severe eco-
nomic crisis of the State of Rio. The weakened police presence has opened 
up for drug traffickers from different factions reclaiming control over paci-
fied favelas, and violence is resurging. Residents of Rocinha thus experi-
ence a sense of increased insecurity both in the literal sense and in terms of 
uncertainty as to what their future beholds.
fInal remarks
This chapter has taken the community of Rocinha and its relation to neigh-
bouring São Conrado as the starting point for reflecting on the inequality-
reducing measures introduced since Lula became president in 2003. Public 
interventions in Rocinha during the PT years came with the promise of 
reducing social and spatial divides between the favela and the surrounding 
city and enhancing citizenship rights. The generation of 20-something in 
Rocinha that became adults during the PT years has seen important changes 
in their lifetime, and many are better off than their parents and grandpar-
ents. At the same time, many are disillusioned with the PAC and UPP 
programmes’ failure in living up to their expectations and frustrated with 
the limits of their own social mobility. The advancements that did take 
place in terms of a (limited) upward mobility of poorer segments of society 
is currently being rolled back, while ‘cultural’ discrimination is coming to 
the forefront through a revanchist counter-reaction.
To conclude, it must however be remarked that the last years have seen 
important advancements in terms of creating a climate of debate on the 
historical, structural foundations of inequality. When Dilma was impeached 
and her successor appointed a cabinet consisting of only elder, white men 
from the traditional political class, it spurred harsh criticism and clearly 
showed an elite that is out of touch with the strides forward Brazil has 
indeed seen these last decades. What we are left with is an increasingly 
polarised and politicised social landscape, with hard lines of debate, soci-
etal unrest and protests. This is unlikely to decrease in the years to come.
note
1. The formal city is often referred to as the ‘asphalt’ because of the paved 
streets, as opposed to the narrow pathways in the favelas.
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IntroductIon
The so-called Pink Tide that swept across the Latin American continent at 
the turn of the millennium took on different facets in different countries, 
although certain basic ideals remained as a common thread. The impera-
tive of poverty reduction was one of them. In Brazil, the Bolsa Familia 
programme (hereafter, BFP) completed 14 years of existence in 2017. Its 
expansion to reaching over 13 million households in 2016 is an indication 
of the program’s success in numerical terms. Yet so, the relative success of 
the program also testifies to the numerous obstacles and difficulties that 
remain with regards to overcoming the impacts of poverty in a country of 
such vast proportions and with such deep-rooted inequalities as Brazil. 
Indeed, the BFP also highlights that poverty is a complex and historical 
social phenomenon with multiple dimensions that cannot be measured by 
material benchmarks alone.
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This chapter presents the results of ethnographic research  carried 
out between 2012 and 2015 with several families living in a favela (low- 
income, informal neighbourhood)1 in the southern zone (Zona Sul) of the 
city of Rio de Janeiro. The aim is to first describe key aspects related to the 
BFP (types of benefits paid and inclusion criteria in the programme) in order 
to subsequently unveil the meanings of “being poor” and “poverty” through 
the eyes of the beneficiaries, residents of the favela and the social workers 
managing the programme. Therefore, the study will show the kind of vision 
“the poor” have of themselves, their economic conditions and the social dif-
ferences in their daily life in the favela. As is also illustrated by Costa’s chapter 
(this volume), the BFP has not contributed to a radical redistribution of 
resources during Brazil’s engagement with the Pink Tide. Now, as the Pink 
Tide unravels, Brazil remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. 
However, the ethnographic material presented here shows that  BFP has 
made a significant difference in improving life conditions for the poorest seg-
ments of society. Even so, this study of how recipients conceptualise their 
situation and their identity is illustrative of the manners in which economic 
and social stratification, as well as multifaceted precariousness, remain funda-
mental features of life in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.
the hIstory of Welfare Programmes In BrazIl
There is an increasing number of studies in Brazil that discuss and anal-
yse the effects of public policies, including conditional cash transfer pro-
grammes in education, health, work, and their impacts in eradicating 
poverty and/or reducing inequality in Brazil (see, e.g. Jaccoud 2006; Reis 
2005; Sprandel 2004; Hoffman 2006). The studies are frequently based 
on quantitative data generated by the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios Contínua (Brazilian National Household Survey Continuos).
This interest is justified, since the issue of poverty is pointed out as a 
problem to be overcome by governments, especially in developing coun-
tries. Regarding the cash transfer programmes in Brazil, these policies have 
historically been presented as forms of social protection. The first discussion 
of a cash transfer programme in Brazil began in 1975, when the economist 
Antônio Maria da Silveira published the paper “Redistribution of income” 
with the objective of gradually eradicating poverty through government 
intervention (Silva et al. 2008, 93). The idea was based on a study of 
“negative income tax” by the North-American author Milton Friedman; a 
proposal that he endorsed in his book Capitalism and Freedom (1962).
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The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 states that “Social assistance shall 
be provided to those who need it, regardless of contributions to social 
security” (Brazilian Constitution of 1988, art. 203). Hence, the right to 
such policies and their benefits was formally assured to whomever may 
require them, regardless of any prior contribution. Under the new consti-
tutional provisions, the social assistance policy began to organise its imple-
mentation under two pillars: the provision of services and the granting of 
monetary benefits” (IPEA 2010, 78). According to Silva et al. (2008), the 
context of widening social rights for social policies was instituted at an 
unfavourable moment from the point of view of the fiscal crisis of the 
State, which began in the 1980s and grew in the 1990s; when the imple-
mentation of neoliberal policies gained pace in Brazil.2 The neoliberal era 
in Brazil began in earnest with the election of Fernando Collor de Mello 
in 1989 (who was impeached on corruption charges and briefly replaced 
by Vice President Itamar Franco), and continued through Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s two successive governments, from 1995 to 2002.
In 1995, the first year of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency, the 
priority was to maintain economic stability and the Plan to Combat 
Hunger and Misery (Plano de Combate à Fome e a Miséria) from the previ-
ous government. This programme was then substituted by the Solidar-
ity Community Programme (Comunidade Solidária) (Lahóz 2002). The 
Solidarity Community Programme aimed at articulating and linking the 
State with civil society, as well as implementing social programmes in the 
poorest municipalities of the country by integrating municipal-, state-, 
and federal governments. In 2001, during the second term of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, federal programmes with decentralised implementa-
tion in the municipalities were created (Silva et al. 2008, 98). According 
to Peres, “the Solidarity Community Programme survived to the end of 
the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (2002). In January 2003 it 
became linked to the Ministry of Food Safety” (Peres 2005, 1). During 
2003, the programme was gradually disarticulated and substituted by the 
Lula administration’s Zero Hunger Programme (Programa Fome Zero).
Amongst the programmes developed under the umbrella of the Zero 
Hunger Programme, was a school allowance programme called School 
Stipend (Bolsa Escola). In order for each child or adolescent to be granted 
this fund, the parents or legal guardians of the child were required to present 
proof of the child’s school attendance (at least 85 per cent), and to earn the 
minimum salary (established by the government) or less. The Gas Help 
(Auxílio Gás or Vale Gás) programme provided financial aids for purchasing 
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cooking gas every two months to families that had a maximum income of 
half the minimum salary. This policy helped families that were already assisted 
by the Bolsa Escola and other programmes that integrated the Social 
Protection Network (Sistema de Proteção Social, integrating all the social pro-
grams). Additionally, it is also worth noting the Programa Bolsa Alimentação 
(Food Grant Programme), which was coordinated by the Ministry of 
Health  (Ministério da Saúde) and carried out through the municipalities. 
The Bolsa Alimentação programme had a duration of six months, which 
could be prolonged for subsequent periods, provided that the beneficiary 
fulfilled health conditionalities (weighing and measuring small children in 
the household every month, following the vaccination calendar, pregnant 
women undergoing prenatal screening, etc.). The money from these pro-
grammes had a predetermined end (i.e. purchasing gas, food, and school 
material) and directing such funds to different products was prohibited. 
Therefore, in addition to the conditionalities, there was also a “control” of 
the expenditures of the benefit.
In 2003, in the early days of the government of then-President Luiz 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the unification process of national cash transfer pro-
grammes began to spread across several ministries. The unification process 
took place until 2007, when the transfer of the main programmes to the 
BFP was completed (Silva and Lima 2010). However, until the complete 
merger of the programmes, other social assistance processes were impor-
tant for the unification and implantation of the BFP, among them the cre-
ation of the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger 
(Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome) in 2004. According 
to Silva et al. (2008), starting in 2003 the federal government established 
qualitative and quantitative changes in the construction of a national 
policy of cash transfer. During four successive Workers’ Party governments 
(President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva [2003–2010]; President Dilma 
Rousseff [2011–2016 until the impeachment]), the BFP was not the most 
important in terms of the volume of resources invested, but it is said to have 
had the greatest impact on the lives of the poorest families (Weissheimer 
2006). In political discourse, the programme became cast as an antithesis 
to the social policies and neoliberal matrix developed during the Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso government. When Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva was re-
elected for a second term in 2006,3 his re-election was widely attributed to 
the success of these programs, as the majority of his voters came from the 
poorest part of the population.  Nevertheless, and reflecting class based 
social cleavages in Brazil, the BFP  was criticised by certain sectors of 
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Brazilian society as something negative that encouraged the poor to not 
work and/or have more children.
Indeed,  since its introduction, BFP has been the subject of extensive 
debate and controversy in the Brazilian media. Pires and Dias (2015) ana-
lysed how the BFP was represented in a large national newspaper (O Estado 
de São Paulo) in the period between 2003 and 2013. According to the 
authors, in 2003, the newspaper focused on the “escape mechanism” of the 
BFP and called it the “handout programme”, since one of its characteristics 
was not setting a maximum time limit  for receiving benefits. Such criti-
cisms, over the years, cooled to the point where, in 2013, the main candi-
date of the opposition to the presidency proposed the constitutionalisation 
of the benefit, which was seen as a positive factor for the re- election cam-
paign of then-president Dilma Rousseff (Pires and Dias 2015).
At the current political and economic moment in Brazil, characterised 
by budget cuts and political instability arising from the impeachment pro-
cess against President Dilma Rousseff, the BFP is back on centre stage of 
public debate. Some advocate for its maintenance, while others regard it as 
a “handout programme” and “unemployment programme”, and/or they 
support cuts in the programme budget, which in 2016 was around R$ 28 
billion. However, it should be noted that my research was conducted at a 
time when this attention, although existent, was not as much in evidence.
Bolsa Familia Programme: BenefIts  
and elIgIBIlIty crIterIa
The BFP has been modified since its creation, although without losing the 
principle of cash transfer with conditionalities and autonomy of beneficia-
ries regarding the expenditure of money. Who then can request the benefit 
and which are the inclusion criteria? And what is the central measure of 
poverty deployed by the programme?
The main criterion established by the programme is per capita income. 
That is, a poverty line was established in which families with a monthly 
income per person between BRL 85.01 (EUR 25.24) and BRL 170.00 
(EUR 50.48)4 may apply for the BFP. By establishing per capita income as 
the main criterion of inclusion and exclusion, the BFP seeks to reach the 
population that it considers to be poor and, therefore, in the most dire 
need of the benefit. This way, the programme anchors itself on a one- 
dimensional poverty criterion, determining that the poor and extremely 
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poor are included in the income range established by the programme. The 
programme registers other information about families such as the location 
of their residence, housing conditions, levels of education, and employ-
ment, but these features are not taken into account for assessing eligibility 
for the programme.
According to the Ministry of Social Development (Ministério de 
Desenvolvimento Social),5 the city of Rio de Janeiro, with a population of 
6,476,631 inhabitants (IBGE 2015), had a total of 479,693 families reg-
istered in the BFP in 2016. In February 2017, 233,766 families received 
the benefit, which represents a coverage of 79.7 per cent of the estimate of 
poor families in the municipality, with an average benefit in the amount of 
BRL 162.40 (EUR 48.22) (MDS 2017).6 In Copacabana and Ipanema, 
where the Pavão-Pavãozinho favelas are located, 3589 families were 
enrolled in 2015 and 1814 received the benefit.7 Here, data from the 
Reference Center for Social Assistance (Centro de Referência de Assistência 
Social, or CRAS) obtained by the researcher, lists approximately 265 fami-
lies to be beneficiaries in 2016, of which 122 are in a situation of extreme 
poverty. According to CRAS’s estimates, the most common profile for a 
beneficiary is a female between 30 and 39 years of age with an incomplete 
basic education, who has between two and four children, and who make a 
living through informal work.
The amount that each family recieves through the BFP varies, and is based 
on the profile registered in the Single Registration System (Cadastro Único) 
used by the programme. Among the information used for the calculus is the 
monthly income per person, the number of family members, household 
composition—the total number of children and adolescents up to the age of 
17—, and the number of pregnant women. Although the financial aid 
received is not extensive, the families interviewed for this study consider it a 
“fixed” income that help them in numerous situations, for example to pay for 
electricity, public transport, food and rent, among other expenses.
The regulation of the programme establishes the following types of ben-
efits: the Basic Benefit is granted only to extremely poor families (monthly 
income per person below or up to EUR 25.24). The Variable Benefit from 
0 to 15 years amounts to EUR 11.58 and is granted to families with chil-
dren or adolescents from 0 to 15 years of age. The Variable Benefit for 
Pregnant Women amounts to EUR 11.58 and is granted to families with 
pregnant women. Payment is made in nine consecutive instalments, pro-
vided that the pregnancy has been identified before the ninth month.8 
Furthermore, the Nutritional Variable Benefit consists of EUR 11.58, and 




These benefits are limited to five per household. There is a variable 
grant for families with adolescents aged 16–17 consisting of EUR 11.36 
(limited to two per household), and a special benefit for overcoming 
extreme poverty. The calculations differs from case to case, and is granted 
to households that are enrolled in the programme but remain in extreme 
poverty despite other benefits. This benefit is intended to boost families’ 
income in order to overcome the extreme poverty threshold. As this out-
line of the programme’s main features indicates, the amount of cash ben-
efits recieved by individual households vary, but we should also add that in 
addition to the Bolsa Familia programme, the Unified Registry provides 
access to other governmental programmes and social policies at federal, 
state, and local levels. Such benefits are paid on monthly basis.
In order to receive the Bolsa Familia allowance, each recipient is given a 
debit magnetic-stripe card issued by the Federal Bank, Caixa Econômica 
Federal. It has the name of the recipient and the Social Identification 
Number (NIS) printed on it. For registration, it is necessary to present 
identity documents, proof or declaration of address, and proof of income. 
The NIS is a number assigned to every citizen seeking some kind of state 
assistance. Once the NIS is generated, the citizen, according to their 
income, is able to register for social programmes or make requests such as 
exemption from fees in civil service examinations, social tariffs for electric-
ity bills, and so on. For the head of the household, it is necessary to present 
a social security number (CPF) or voter’s registration card. For the other 
members of the family, any identification document, such as identity card, 
voter’s registration card, birth or marriage certificate, CPF,10 or employ-
ment record card can be presented. The documentation must be submitted 
in one of the CRAS in the municipality where the applicant resides, 
which are responsible for identifying and registering families (MDS 2015).
In Rio de Janeiro, the CRAS are under the direction of the Municipal 
Social Welfare and Development Office (Secretaria Municipal de Desen­
volvimento e Assistência Social, MSWDO). They are responsible for, among 
other things, directing families to town hall social services, which include 
several social programmes, such as Bolsa Familia. The CRAS are also under the 
direction of the Social Development Coordination  (Coordenadoria de 
Desenvolvimento Social), whose competence includes participating in the plan-
ning of programmes and projects in their local area, implementing local 
social policy actions, conducting research, and coordinating, supervising, and 
evaluating the implementation of all the social development programmes 
and projects. The methods used to identify eligible households involve obtain-
ing information from local people, schools, residents’ association, trade unions, 
or from the families who apply for registration at the MSWDO themselves.
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concePtualIsatIons of Poverty:  
crIterIa and defInItIons
“Poverty” and “extreme poverty” are not new terms; however, they have 
been mentioned many times since the creation of the BFP. Both in research 
and in conditional cash transfer programmes in other context, “poverty” 
and “extreme poverty” are defined as conditions that need to be overcome. 
Thus, there is a significant generation of statistical data that attempt to iden-
tify and measure poverty rates (Neder 2006; Neri 2011). This reality based 
on figures is important and necessary; however, it also represents power 
because they may legitimise access and assistance in the area of public poli-
cies (Desrosieres 2010). Therefore, it is important to have in mind that no 
perspective on “the problem of poverty” is neutral. Rather, it remains an 
issue open to conflicts, struggles and disputes over how to define it, which 
terms to use, and how solutions are defined and implemented.
This is evident when we examine what the literature has to say about 
the indices used to measure poverty. Neri (2010) emphasises that there are 
some poverty measures taking several dimensions into regard, for example 
“sanitation” and “electricity”, while other more simple measures focus on 
a single dimension—usually the income. In Latin American literature, for 
example, the concepts of Basic Needs Index and Human Poverty 
Index  have frequently been used (Neri 2010). The Ministry of Social 
Development uses a synthetic indicator called the Family Development 
Index as a means of approaching the families that have—based on their 
income level—become enrolled in Bolsa Familia. The index is compiled 
from six aspects: vulnerability, access to knowledge and work, availability 
of resources, child development, and housing conditions.
For some authors, such as Rocha (2007), there is no “unambiguous” 
definition of poverty. The starting point for discussion on the issue should 
be a conceptual explanation, which depends on the standard of living and 
how basic human needs are met. According to Rocha, “to determine who 
is poor in a defined social group is to establish a common list of a minimum 
set of public services and goods necessary for survival” (Rocha 2007, 23). 
In the social science literatures, different forms of qualitative analysis have 
been employed to analyse poverty. DaMatta (1995) emphasises the impor-
tance of culture and history in the definition of poverty in Brazil. Studies of 
poverty elsewhere support this point; poverty is always conceptualised in 
particular ways depending on the social, cultural, and historical context 
(see, e.g. Anderson and Broch-Due 1999; Broch-Due and Schroeder 
2000; Milton 2007; O’Connor 2002; Lautier 2002).
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On a global basis, the United Nations and the World Bank define a 
“poor” country based on income levels. On individual levels, the World 
Bank’s international poverty line is currently USD 1.90 per day. Despite 
the advantage of simplicity, it is argued that, by focusing solely on income, 
we are also implicity framing the discussion about poverty to a question of 
purchasing power. Certainly, the level of income is relevant as it deter-
mines the purchasing power of consumers and whether they have enough 
to feed themselves. However, increases in income does not automatically 
translate into better access to basic services such as health and education, 
among others. Rego and Pinzani (2013, 149) emphasise that the problem 
of analysing poverty only based on income is that this criterion does not 
account for the level of well-being of individuals, making their definition 
and criteria inaccurate. There is ample scope for determining poverty cri-
teria, thus creating the need for a multidimensional view of poverty and 
deprivation, as stated by Sen (2000).
Based on this perspective, a team of researchers of The Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development Initiative, with the support of the United 
Nations, created an indicator called “Multidimensional Poverty Index”. 
This indicator, according to Rattner (2010), seeks to build a picture of 
poverty based on the fraction of households that lack basic goods and ser-
vices (whether the house has a cement floor, a bathroom and electricity). 
Other questions seek to assess issues regarding education and health. 
Rattner (2010) also highlights that there is no unanimity as to results and 
how to determine poverty. A simple definition would be, “people who do 
not have enough to lead a dignified life” (Rattner 2010, 76). But what is 
“enough”, which goods and services characterise it, and who should decide 
these questions—researchers, governments, or international agencies? My 
contention is that these are far more complex issues than what can be mea-
sured by numbers, and that the poor themselves should have the final word 
on their conditions and expectations on poverty.
“BeIng Poor”: meanIngs and PercePtIons 
In the Favela
The implementation of public policies in the favelas is not something new 
in the history of Rio de Janeiro (see, e.g. Magalhães 2013). Valladares 
(2000, 2005) explains how favelas were introduced and treated in the 
political and social debate in the city. The author also discusses how knowl-
edge about the favelas has been perceived and constructed throughout the 
twentieth century, and how a negative image of these communities, 
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associating the place and its people with poverty, dirt and trickery, has 
been forged. Silva stresses that favelas are often studied under two differ-
ent approaches: “one that intends to formulate ‘solutions’ to the ‘social 
problems’ in the communities and another that seeks to generate political 
and ideological lines of action” (Silva 2011, 699). However, favela dwell-
ers are not a homogeneous population (see, e.g. Larkins 2015; Pearlman 
2010). Nevertheless, the association between the favela and poverty in 
Brazil is constructed automatically by most of the Brazilian population, 
including those who are agents in social assistance programmes.
Residents of the Pavão-Pavãozinho favelas interviewed for this study 
did not always hold the perception that being a resident of the favela was 
synonymous with being poor, nor that it denoted eligibility for the 
BFP. This shows a plurality of perceptions and criteria related to the term 
poverty across and within social groups. Some of these differences can be 
discerned in the meanings that favela residents attribute to poverty and to 
being poor.
In the favela, accounts of being poor and of poverty are related to 
income, but they go beyond it as well. According to one resident, not hav-
ing a decent bathroom in your house is a sign of extreme poverty. When 
being invited into private homes in the favela, you often find that the 
bathrooms only have a toilet and no shower, or that the toilet is broken. 
Often there is a lack of water. Other homes have bathrooms constructed 
as outhouses, and many have water containers on the outside of the house. 
In one of the houses I visited, the woman gave her children baths using a 
large water container outside the front door. Utilisation of water contain-
ers was also reported by Cunha: “these containers are used to store water, 
as a way for residents to work around the many days that they did not have 
water in their houses”  (Cunha 2011, 16). In some areas, a turn-taking 
system of water collection known as a “maneuver” is used, consisting of a 
“local system in which residents redirect the course of water each day to a 
certain area of the favela, since the public system does not reach all houses” 
(Cunha 2011, 16, see also Cunha 2014).
By assessing levels of poverty in a concrete fashion by people’s relative 
access to basic services and needs, people in the favelas deploy categorisa-
tions of poverty that resembles that of Gutíerrez, who considers poverty 
as a descriptive category based on comparative indicators vis-à-vis other 
individuals (Gutíerrez 2007). In that regard, housing issues need to be 
emphasised as an emic indicator of poverty for residents. For residents of 
Pavão-Pavãozinho (beneficiaries of BFP or not), the characteristics of 
houses and their location in the favela indicate who the poor people are. 
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Based on observations and the accounts of local residents, it was evident 
that the poorest families possessed wood houses in the areas with most 
difficult access and at the highest elevations, known as “Caranguejo” and 
“Vietnã”. In addition to precarious constructions, the access by narrow 
and steep stairs impeded delivery of purchases and mail. According to 
Maria, a resident who lived adjacent to “Caranguejo” and who was a ben-
eficiary of the BFP, the closer one lived to “the asphalt”, as the formal 
neighbourhoods are referred to as,11 the more expensive the house was:
Poor people like me can’t get down; I’m waiting to be called to get a PAC 
apartment [Programa de Aceleramento do Crescimento, PAC—Program for 
Growth Acceleration]. Here is an area of risk, so I should go live in the apart­
ments. For now, I’m staying here.
The PAC was created in 2007 during the second term of President Luis 
Inácio Lula da Silva (see also Sørbøe, this volume, for more on this pro-
gramme). It aims to resume the planning and execution of social, urban, 
logistical, and energy infrastructure projects. The housing program My 
House, My Life (Minha Casa, Minha Vida) is part of the PAC (www.pac.
gov.br)  and the programme was also present in  Pavão-Pavãozinho. 
However, since there were not enough new housing units available for all 
residents living in risk areas, people continued to live in residents that had 
been marked as dangerous by the Civil Defense.
Another possibility for people living in areas of risk was to be contem-
plated for a PAC unit in neighbourhoods further away from the south 
zone (Zona Sul). However, most of the residents preferred to stay in their 
residences in the south zone. This part of the city was associated with 
easier access to services (water, electricity, and trash collection), social pro-
grammes, proximity to the beach and recreation and sometimes to work 
and income, in addition to emotional ties. And a resident recounts: “[…] 
my life is here. I work nearby and I get to the beach easily. I grew up here, 
how will I get a job if I live far away? I prefer to pay rent and stay here as 
long as possible”. However, residents reported that there has been an 
increase in the value of housing in recent years—some have already left 
due to this. A resident, whose family receives the benefit of the BFP, 
reports that she remains in Pavãozinho because her husband performs odd 
jobs in the favela, she receives food donations, and the money from BFP 
helps them to pay the rent (BRL 350.00; EUR 105.46). Their house con-
sists of a single room with bathroom, providing shelter for two adults and 
five children. The family is extremely poor and also receives help from 
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neighbours who donate clothes and milk powder for the children, among 
other items.
Some people living in the PAC apartements already built by the gov-
ernment in the Cantagalo favela complained about the condominium fee 
that they need to pay, as this comes at the top of their already heavily 
strained budgets. Other residents agree with the fee, but they complain 
that in addition to the buildings there should be parking garage and play-
ground space. According to José, who lives in a government-subsidised 
apartment, the building lacks automobile parking space for those who 
own a car as he does.
I lived on the X Street in Pavão; my house was torn down to widen the street. 
My car is on the other side because I cannot park here. The authorities do not 
know our reality. There is everything here [in the favela]: poor people and the 
new middle class (C class) like me. Aren’t they talking about the Class C on 
television? Well, I purchased my used car with a lot of sacrifice, but I have no 
parking space for it. In the government’s opinion, everybody is poor and has no 
money to buy a car in the favela. Those who live in the favela must ride a bus or 
walk.
The difference between the poor and those who are a little better off also 
involves the ownership of certain assets, such as a car. However, household 
size—and more specifically the number of people in the household—is a 
strong indicator of poverty. Added to this, there is the difficulty of continuing 
living in the favela since there has been a steep increase in the value of hous-
ing and rents in Rio de Janeiro, mostly due to the hosting of the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup and 2016 Olympics (see Sørbøe (Chap. 5) and Ystanes (Chap. 4), 
this volume, for more on the effects of mega- event hosting in Rio). It is evi-
dent from the reports (of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) that the poor-
est have more difficulty in continuing to live in the south zone because of 
these processes. Thus, two parallel processes have been taking place: on the 
one hand, the poorest residents have seen their situation improved by the 
Bolsa Familia cash transfers, and on the other hand, life in south-zone 
favelas has become increasingly expensive as gentrification takes hold, 
forcing many of the poorest to leave for less attractive locations.  The 
hosting of mega-events therefore highlights the fragility of the gains in 
social welfare achieved by the Workers’ Party governments, putting the 
structural and political dimensions of the favela residents housing situa-
tions into sharp relief. Harvey (2004), in his analyses of Baltimore, the 
United States, reports on similar processes in relation to large-scale urban 
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development processes, generating a “fever of construction” “no matter 
what”, a shift from the centre to the suburbs, and unordered growth, 
inequality, and poverty (Harvey 2004, 9–10). This in turn led to an urban 
crisis. Harvey (2004) illustrates how space comes to be perceived of as 
capital’s material resource, and he highlights the dispersal of manufactur-
ing from centres to suburbs, multinationals’ interests, and fiscal austerity 
as some of the causes of the urban crisis in Baltimore.
In contrast to this perception of space as an asset to be exploited by 
capital, Lefebvre (2001) points out that space is something that people 
creates. He emphasises man as the subject of history, who not only repro-
duces but also produces his and her surroundings. As previously men-
tioned, local protection network makes it difficult for people to move to a 
new home distant from the present one (whether or not beneficiaries of 
Bolsa Familia), even when they live in dangerous circumstances. According 
to Lefebvre (2001), social relationships are not uniform in time and space; 
they depend on the reality to which they are subjected. In this sense, the 
author suggests that space contains the social relations and is a product of 
them; therefore, reality is historically constructed, which involves having a 
mental representation of the city and the urban as their material expres-
sion. He also points out that a locality is a set of differences, that is, the 
point of coexistence of plurality and simultaneity of patterns and the dif-
ferent ways of living the urban life. However, space is also a place of con-
flict, in which exploitation is not particular to the “working class but is 
found among all social categories” (Lefebvre 2001, 138).
In the Pavão-Pavãozinho favelas, families are distinguished by income 
level, assets, and the level of education (participation in higher education 
is considered a milestone). These differences are evidently also found in 
other communities and populations, favelas or not. However, it is impor-
tant to highlight these dimensions of favela realities in order to counter-
act reifying and simplistic perceptions of the favela as a homogenous 
space of uniform (poor) material and human conditions. Silva (2011) 
describes the existence of a “favela bourgeoisie”, when referring to access 
to local resources, both economic, political and material. This heterogen-
ity amongst residents creates different viewpoints, assessment and needs; 
an issue that became evident in my research as I attended meetings of the 
residents’ association. For example, the demand for a parking space in the 
favela was a recurrent topic at those meeting. Residents who owned a car 
complained that spaces used to park cars became prohibited since the 
Pacifying Police Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora—UPP) was set up 
in Pavão-Pavãozinho.
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The residents justify this claim by saying that the favela has changed and 
that its residents now have cars. Jussara, a nurse who works at two different 
hospitals, said that after purchasing her car, for which she is still paying, it is 
possible to meet her tight schedule at both hospitals. However, the favela does 
not have a parking space where she could leave her car. Jussara added that they 
“could leave their cars on the ‘X’ street before, but it is not allowed now and we have 
no other option. The available space at the entrance must be used to build a parking 
space. Many people have a car here. They [referring to the Municipality of Rio de 
Janeiro] think that everyone is poor and that no one has a car here; we have to have 
the same rights as those who own a house on the ‘asphalt’”.
At another meeting of the residents’ association, waste disposal was dis-
cussed as the highest ranking priority. Waste and rubbish is found spread on 
the slopes across the favela and many people tend to blame “the others” for 
this situation, especially the poorest who are living in the high part of the 
favela. However, evidently, the most fundamental cause for the waste situation 
is the deficiencies in basic public services for garbage disposal in the favela.
Another demand was the expansion and improvement of the local family 
care clinic (a health centre serving the communities of Pavão- Pavãozinho, 
Cantagalo and adjacent places). According to residents who attended the 
meeting, the attendance at the family clinic should include sex education, as 
the number of pregnant adolescents in the community was noticeable. One 
of the residents agreed with the initiative; however, she emphasised that there 
is a lot of information about contraceptive methods nowadays, and that preg-
nancy is in fact a way to get more money from Bolsa Familia. “These girls do 
not want to study and work, the government pays the stipend. So they get 
pregnant in order to receive more money. This is poor people’s behaviour; 
they are used to get everything for free”, she claimed. Her statement, in spite 
of being from a favela herself, echoes that of the middle- and upper classes’ 
view on the poor as being lazy, cunning and feeding off the state, illustrating 
how deeply rooted these imageries are in the Brazilian public.
The per capita income in favelas in the south zone of Rio is higher than 
the maximum income elegibility criteria established by the BFP. As a con-
sequence, the number of families receiving the benefit is lower that in other 
favelas in the north and west zone. This led many favela residents to believe 
that only the poorest people of the favela recieve the benefit of the 
BFP. Consequently, this perception fuelled a certain stigma of poverty asso-
ciated with being a BFP beneficiary, as local residents attributed it to being 
very poor to the extent of struggling to afford food and being dependent 
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upon food donations. “Only very poor people have difficulties satisfying 
their basic needs”, said Jonas, a resident of Pavão-Pavãozinho. This view 
was shared by many of the social workers who work for Bolsa Familia; that 
is, that access to conditional cash transfer programmes should primarily be 
destined to those facing difficulties in obtaining food.12 However, this per-
ception did not imply that the social workers did not recognise that other 
households benefiting from the programme also needed the money. Indeed, 
the also displayed “solidarity” with the beneficiaries that exceeded the stipu-
lated maximum income of BRL 170.00. During the research, cases arose 
when the family had an increase in income exceeding the maximum level, 
prompting the social worker to suggest that the beneficiaries should provide 
that information at a later point in order to be able to continue receiving the 
stipend until the deadline for the re-registration process. This reflects that in 
the social workers’ opinion, who became well aware of the everyday life 
realities of living in poverty, the meanings of poverty are not based solely on 
per capita income established by the programme. These meanings are also 
based on the story of each family in a detailed case report. Thus, sometimes 
learning about people’s family histories made it possible for social workers 
to take a multidimensional approach to the concept of poverty beyond 
the strictly monetary criteria established by the programme.
Another variable described by residents and beneficiaries as poverty 
indicator relates to not having at least one stable source of income in the 
family, because “guaranteed money helps a lot, it is financial security” in 
difficult times (see, e.g. Lavra Pinto 2013). According to Maria Claudia, 
life was different when her husband had a permanent job. “The  Bolsa 
Familia benefit is our only income, but it is not enough. I pray he will soon 
find a formal job because depending on the BFP is much humiliation.” 
Aparecida, another beneficiary also reports on the precariousness in which 
the family lives and the lack of formal work:
I do not like to receive BF: It’s humiliating. Our lives are being watched, no one 
likes that. If I had studied I would be a public servant [...]. Money in the bank, 
monthly salary to buy what my kids ask for [...]. Wow, it would be awesome! 
Even with these differences in income and access to goods and services, the 
fact of being a favela resident qualifies the “applicant” to access the BFP 
registration. For example, the information that a person resides in a favela 
allows him/her to see the social workers working for the programme, and 
if the income is within the criteria established by law, this person will even-
tually be registered in the programme. The relationship between poverty 
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and favela is generated almost automatically by those who work for the 
BFP. In many ways, their conceptualisation of the favelas they work in has 
not caught up with the profound changes in standard of living that many 
favela residents have seen during the Pink Tide. Interestingly, favela resi-
dents sometimes question the notion of poverty based on income, as 
applied by the programme.13 For example, there are stories circulating 
about people who request the benefit although they are not in need of it. 
According to a beneficiary of Pavão-Pavãozinho, her neighbour draw 
monthly benefits from the BFP, but she does not need it because “she owns 
her home, her husband works and she is retired”. About her own situation, 
however, she notes:
I do deserve it, because I have no formal job and I pay rent, I am poor, but not 
miserable; food is not missing, but without the benefit it would be difficult to pay 
the electricity bill [now that the ‘cat’­ illegal electricity connection—is over], 
and other bills.
Thus, she does not question low income as a criterion, but invokes 
dimensions she also thinks should be included in the evaluation of a per-
son’s poverty; homeownership, the income of others in the household, 
access to informal solutions and age. Another beneficiary reports the same 
as her neighbour: a woman she knows does not need the money because 
she “has money in the bank and pays health insurance […]”. About her 
own situation, she notes: “I am so poor, I have only the BF benefit and if 
I get sick, I use the public health system”. These statements are recurrent. 
In some cases, social workers visit the homes of beneficiaries to check the 
“actual” family conditions.
In many ways, the concept of assistance that beneficiaries are suggesting, 
and that social workers are sometimes providing, is similar to the socialist-
era Hungarian system described by Haney (2000). Here, beneficiaries 
could appeal to a whole range of issues that social workers could help them 
address, and a lack of money was just one of them. Domestic violence, 
strained kinship or marital relations, neglect and work-related problems 
were all issues for which people could receive the assistance of social work-
ers. Later, as neoliberal reforms were introduced and welfare became based 
on a strict assessment of economic need, the concept of poverty, and of 
need, narrowed. Similarly, the ethnographic material presented here shows 
that while access to the BFP is granted based on an assessment of economic 
need, beneficiaries as well as social workers often have a more multidimen-
sional understanding of poverty. They might agree with Simmel (1998), 
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who argues that in sociological terms, poverty refers less to people with low 
income and more to individuals who are dependent on assistance. For him, 
poor people are not those who have specific needs or privations, but those 
who receive assistance or should receive it.
For residents in Pavão-Pavãozinho, the lack of a formal source of 
income, difficulty to buy food, the receipt of BF (or other federal, state, or 
municipal benefit), and the type and location of the house in the favela are 
indicators of whether families and individuals are considered as “poor”. 
These representations and definitions are multidimensional,  and it is 
important to point out that the comparisons are made between the resi-
dents themselves (whether they are beneficiaries or not). Surely, if the 
comparison were made with the inhabitants of the “asphalt” (middle-class 
residents of nearby neighbourhoods), all the favela residents would be 
considered “poor”.
fInal consIderatIons: Bolsa Familia 
and the PInk tIde
The insights about the dynamics guiding the BFP offered in this chapter, 
provides a glimpse of its role in reducing poverty and inequality in 
Brazil during the Pink Tide period. It is estimated that the programme has 
contributed to  bringing 36 million people out of the extreme poverty. 
According to the Human Development Index (HDI), it points to the 
growth of the Brazilian HDI, from 0.683 in 2000 to 0.755 in 2014, a rise 
of more than 10.5 per cent  (Human Development Report 2014). The 
contributions of BFP in achieving these improvements is evident in guar-
anteeing a minimum income to families in poverty, and in strengthening 
the capacity of people to invest in schooling and in the healthcare of chil-
dren through conditionalities.
Although the research period (2012–2015) has not covered the current 
political moment, it is worth mentioning that the future of the BFP is 
uncertain. The neoliberal orientation of the government of President 
Michel Temer, indicates that the programme will be revised. However it is 
not yet known what exactly will be changed. However, beneficiaries are 
currently reporting increasing difficulties in accessing the benefits and that 
families have also stopped receiving it. At the current moment in Brazil, 
the Bolsa Familia programme is on the threshold between the achieve-
ments of the Pink Tide period and the return to power of a party that tries 
to implement neoliberal measures.
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notes
1. The Favelas of Pavão-Pavãozinho are located in the neighbourhood of 
Copacabana. They have a population of 5567 inhabitants distributed in 
1840 households.
2. According to Naomi Klein (2007), neoliberal ideas started to be imple-
mented in Brazil as early as after the coup in 1964, and much of the eco-
nomic policy of the military regime was designed by economists educated 
under Milton Friedman in Chicago.
3. In the 2006 presidential election between Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) and 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT), Lula was elected in the runoff with 60.83 
per cent of the votes (TSE 2006). For an analysis of the electoral result, see 
for example Holzhacker and Balbachevsky (2007).
4. The Bolsa Familia allowances are updated for 2016, following the increase 
in July 2016.
5. Under the Michel Temer government, after June 2016 the Ministério de 
Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development 
and Fight Against Hunger) became the Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social 
e Agrário (Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development), and then renamed 
to Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social (Ministry of Social Development).
6. The numbers referring to the BFP change every month, since families enter 
and leave the programme for various reasons. However, the total amount of 
beneficiary families has remained around 13 million (MDS 2016).
7. Data from CRAS São Sebastião, 2015.
8. It should be noted that pregnant women are identified by the local health 
service they belong to and sent to the BFP.
9. Payment is made in six consecutive monthly instalments, provided that the 
child has been identified in the Cadastro Único (Single Registration) up to 
the sixth month of life.
10. The CPF has 11 numbers and serves as a credit identifier, through which it 
is possible to check debts (if any) of the user with any company, in addition 
to being requested in numerous places where it is necessary to prove 
identity.
11. The term “asphalt” is used as favela residents use it, to denote Zona Sul 
residents who do not live in the favela, even if they live in close proximity.
12. According to a report from the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic 
Analysis (IBASE 2008), beneficiary households of the BFP have consumed 
more animal and dairy products, cookies, oil, sugar, and processed foods 
(see, e.g. Lavra Pinto and Pacheco 2009).
13. The applicant who does not have a proof of earned income must fill in and 
sign a declaration that informs about the number of people in the house-
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IntroductIon
The Bolivarian process in Venezuela opened up a political space for the 
contestation of historically informed socio-cultural hierarchies articulated 
through notions of class, ethnicity, gender and “race.” At the same time, 
socio-economic hierarchies were challenged through reduced levels of 
poverty1 and increased access to social welfare. Concurrently, political 
polarisation in the course of the Bolivarian process accentuated the colo-
nial legacy of class-based and racial hierarchies. This gained particular vis-
ibility through opposition supporters’ portrayal of Chávez’ predominantly 
poor and coloured followers in highly contentious and contemptuous 
terms. Reversely, Chávez’ followers frequently deployed an “upwards” 
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class-contemptuous discourse, revering the country’s whiter and wealthier 
for being stupid, superficial, unpatriotic and lacking of character and mor-
als (Strønen 2017). However, whilst the tit-for-tat pejorative descriptions 
between different political camps were out there in the open for everyone 
to see, it is paramount to go beyond these surface expressions of conflict 
in order to understand their origins and deeper implications and mean-
ings. In order to do so, we need to take into account the historical forma-
tion of Venezuelan society since its colonial inception as well as its 
subsequent development trajectories up to and into the Pink Tide.
This is precisely what this chapter aims to do, through a discussion that 
is structured around two main axes of analysis. The first axis of analysis is, 
in alignment with the overall focus in this edited volume, a contextual 
analysis of the historical formations of racial- and class-based inequalities 
in Venezuela, followed by a discussion of how these formations were 
remoulded and re-accentuated during the socio-economic crisis and neo-
liberalisation of Venezuelan society in the 1980s and 1990s. The second 
axis of analysis is concerned with exploring how the historical formations 
of different life worlds in Venezuela—undercut by economic, spatial and 
socio-cultural inequalities—translated into the formation of radically 
opposite interpretations of the meaning of the Bolivarian process and an 
accentuated polarisation of Venezuelan society.
Seen from within—that is, the emic view, as it was conceptualised by its 
believers and followers—the Bolivarian process gained its strength from 
simultaneously addressing the politics of recognition as well as the politics 
of redistribution (de Sousa Santos 2001; Fraser and Honneth 2003). 
Through a political ideology affirming that socio-cultural discrimination 
and socio-economic exclusion constitute and re-enforce one another, 
Council through the research project “Flammable Societies: The Role of the Oil 
and Gas Industry in the Promotion of Poverty Reduction and Social Volatility” 
and by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of the research project 
“Everyday Maneuvers: Military-Civilian Relations in Latin-America and the 
Middle East.” I am deeply grateful to the project leaders, John Andrew McNeish 
and Nefissa Naguib, respectively, for their generosity and support. I also want to 
extend my gratitude to CMI and its director Ottar Mæstad for generous 
fieldwork funding in 2012–2013. Additional funding for field research has been 




 supporters of the Bolivarian process positioned themselves as historical 
subjects that had been systematically marginalised within a local-global 
matrix shaped by colonial- and neocolonial structures of domination. The 
historical and global framing of the contemporary struggle that the 
Bolivarian process represented provided for an emerging structure of feel-
ing (Williams 1989) that weaved individual suffering and hardships into a 
collective political story about the past, present and future.
However, whilst this paradigmatic change was experienced as emanci-
patory for the popular classes, the Bolivarian process was experienced as 
threatening by those sectors of the population whose socio-cultural and 
political dominance was challenged and undermined. Evidently, there is 
clearly a crude political-economy component to this, in the sense that the 
Chávez government challenged entrenched capitalist and class interests in 
the country. An understanding of political opposition to the Chávez gov-
ernment is inseparable from the struggle for control over the country’s oil 
sector (see Tinker Salas 2009), and inseparable from the nexus between 
Venezuelan capitalist interests, their transnational networks and allies, and 
their ideological and interest-based adherence to free-market politics. It is 
also inseparable from middle-class resentments against weakened control 
over access to the state apparatus and public institutions (which, reflecting 
the accentuated levels of corruption in Venezuelan society since the 1970s, 
are widely seen as a honey jar2), and their resentment against state money 
being channeled in the direction of the “underserving poor” (Katz 1989).
However, interest-based opposition alone cannot count for explaining 
the aggravated hostility and fear-mongering that characterised opposition 
to the Chávez government and its supporters. Moreover, opposition to 
the government was evidently also informed by heterogeneous sets of rea-
sons by different actors and groups, many of them expressing legitimate 
concerns about the problematic aspects of the Chávez era. However, in 
the context of the focus of this edited volume, the main argument that I 
want to develop is that racialised and class-contemptuous expressions of 
political opposition were constitutive of the hierarchical formation of the 
Venezuelan post-colonial state, whilst simultaneously shaped by the pre-
ceding political trajectories and the particular political ideology and aes-
thetics framing the Bolivarian process itself. Simultaneously, I contend 
that there is another dimension that needs to be addressed in order to 
understand the deeper meaning behind political divisions in Venezuela; 
namely the crisis of modernity as it is unfolding in Latin America at large. 
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Indeed, as I will argue towards the end of the chapter, the formation of 
radically different political realities in Venezuela reflects a growing global 
schism between those who “live inside” the imagery of a globalised, cos-
mopolitan capitalist modernity, and those who feel excluded by it. In 
Venezuela, and elsewhere at the continent before and during the Pink 
Tide, accumulated local/global differentiation translated into attempts to 
carve out new political and social models and imaginaries that also man-
aged to incorporate subaltern life worlds, histories and aspirations. As the 
Pink Tide now by most accounts is ebbing, and Venezuela is finding itself 
in the largest crisis amongst all the former Pink Tide countries, it is neces-
sary to take a broader and historically informed look on the underlying 
structures and processes that undergirded the divisive nature of the 
Bolivarian process. However, before I reach that point in the discussion, I 
will lay out the broader contextual framework for understanding 
Venezuela’s particular socio-political formations during the Pink Tide, 
starting with a broad overview over key political trajectories in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.
the neolIberal era and Its context
In some significant respects, Venezuela followed a different political and 
economic development trajectory during the latter part of the twentieth 
century than other South-American nations. For one, the country did not 
have any authoritarian regimes coming to power by violent means as most 
of its neighbours. For long, the country appeared, at least on the surface, 
as a relatively socially stable and harmonious society, leading scholars to 
coin the expression the “Venezuelan exceptionalism” (Ellner 2010:2). 
Following the authoritarian Marcos Pérez Jimenez’s fall in 1958, political 
stability was maintained by a political pact between the two dominant par-
ties, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI. This pact, entered in 1958, 
was created to exclude political competition from the right and the left. 
Notably, this involved excluding the communist party and leftist currents 
who had participated in bringing down Pérez Jiménez. For the next 40 
years, AD and COPEI alternated in government offices until Chávez’ 
arrival to power in 1998. During the 1960s and 1970s, the country was 
characterised by a strong state-interventionist approach and a populist- 
nationalist ideological vein, in particular articulated and channeled by 
Acción Democrática. The country’s growing abundance of oil wealth 
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provided post-1958 governments with significant economic leeway, at the 
same time as a growing petroleum economy led to the abandonment of 
the countryside and booming urban informal growth. To a certain extent, 
social conflict was smoothed out through extensive clientelism and patron-
age systems and the co-optation or oppression of oppositional or radical 
currents. A brief period of guerilla warfare was crushed by the state by the 
end of the 1960s (Ciccariello-Maher 2013), and social struggle did not 
really gain public momentum again until the 1980s.
Venezuela implemented structural adjustment reforms dictated by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) later than its neighbouring countries. 
The first round came in 1989 during the second Carlos Andrés Pérez 
administration (AD) (1989–1992) in the form of a “shock treatment”, 
whilst additional reforms came during the Caldera government (COPEI) 
(1994–1998) in the 1990s (Ellner 2010:90). Carlos Andrés Pérez had 
presided over the golden years in Venezuelan history as president in the 
period 1974–1979. The price hikes on oil due to the Arab oil embargo 
filled the state’s coffins, at the same time as Pérez mortgaged the country’s 
future oil rents in exchange for foreign loans in order to develop his ambi-
tious development plans.
Thus, ironically, the debt burden that would later propel Carlos Andrés 
Pérez into an uneasy (and to him personally, disastrous3) marriage with 
the IMF was originally principally accumulated by himself. When global 
oil prices slumped in the early 1980s, the country found itself in an eco-
nomic quagmire. A run on the country’s currency, the bolívar, and mas-
sive capital flight eventually forced the subsequent Herrera government 
(1979–1984) to devaluate on February 18, 1983, known as the Black 
Friday. In the immediate following years, the Herrera and later the 
Lusinchi government (1984–1989) resisted the adaption of IMF prescrip-
tions. However, the economy continued to deteriorate. Both govern-
ments prioritised paying off foreign debt (some of it considered illegal) 
bleeding dry public coffers, and the exchange system set up to protect the 
bolívar was subject to rampant corruption and mismanagement. Public 
firms were run into the ground to the extent that some argued that it was 
done deliberately in order to pave the way for subsequent privatisation 
(Ellner 2010:79–81). At the same time, corruption and mismanagement 
escalated (Ellner 2010:82). During these years, poverty and inequality 
rates escalated quickly, and even parts of the middle classes found 
themselves slumping into poverty.
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In the 1989 presidential elections, Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected to 
a second term, echoing popular sentiments opposing further austerity 
policies and promising that he would restore the prosperity of his first 
presidential époque. However, in the backroom, he had brokered a secret 
structural adjustment deal with the IMF. Key aspects of the plan included 
the lifting of price controls on basic goods, “flexibilisation” of the labour 
system, the elimination of subsidies on gasoline, the privatisation of state 
enterprises and the social security system and the removal of restrictions 
on foreign investments (Ellner 2010: 91–94).
On the morning of February 28, the price of bus tickets rose steeply 
due to the sudden increase in the price of gasoline. This was a few days 
before the end-of-month paycheck, and most people were both broke and 
exhausted by years of escalating struggles and hardships. A riot started on 
the bus station of the satellite town of Guarenas outside of Caracas and 
quickly spread to Caracas and other urban centres across Venezuela. 
People were used to government clamp-down on popular protests, but 
this time, they were met with unprecedented state violence. El Caracazo, 
as the riot came to be known, claimed between 1000 and 3000 lives by 
unofficial accounts (the official accounts were highly unreliable). 
Subjecting parts of shantytowns (barrios) to a military siege for several 
days, el Caracazo has been called “the largest and most violently repressed 
revolt against austerity measures in Latin American history” (Coronil 
1997: 376). In following years, social protest and disenchantment with 
the political system at large translated into increasing repudiation of the 
Puntofijo model, at the same time as the effects of the neoliberal policies 
set in, resulting in accentuated levels of inequality and social insecurity 
(Lander 2005).
After the Caracazo, many soldiers, who themselves came from lower 
socio-economic strata, became disgruntled with the government for hav-
ing been sent out “to kill their own.” In 1992, Hugo Chávez, then a mili-
tary officer who had led a secret dissident group within the military for ten 
years, led an aborted civil-military revolt against the government of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez (see Strønen 2016). The rebels were citing the massive 
onslaught on the civilian population during the Caracazo as part of the 
reason for why, in their view, the government had lost its constitutional 
legitimacy. Chávez was imprisoned, and immediately converted into a 
popular hero. Upon being released from prison in 1994, he formed a 
political party, Movimiento Quinta República (MVR), and won the presi-




Chávez did not run for president on an explicitly anti-neoliberal programme. 
Rather, he initially signalised interest in Tony Blair’s “Third Way” and was 
in the beginning also supported by parts of the country’s middle classes and 
business community (Tinker Salas 2015:172). However, this quickly 
changed as he made it clear that he was not interested in making a pact with 
the “old establishment.” The decisive split eventually came with the passing 
of 49 laws by decrees in the fall of 2001. Significantly, the decrees extended 
the state’s regulatory control over the agricultural and fishery sector, as well 
as Venezuela’s principal economic asset: the hydrocarbon sector. In effect, 
this meant the reversal of a gradual privatisation process that had been tak-
ing place throughout the 1990s, putting the government at a definitive 
collisions course with some of the most powerful sectors in the country, as 
well as foreign interests and capital tied to the oil sector.
The aborted coup in 2002 and the oil strike/sabotage in 2002–2003 
(Tinker Salas 2015:158–162) prompted a radicalisation both in the gov-
ernment and amongst Chávez’ supporters. In 2005, Chávez declared 
himself a socialist at a mass meeting at Mar de Plata, Argentina. During 
Chávez’ tenure, several reforms from the neoliberal era were reversed, 
including the renationalisation of the pension system, the ports and key 
companies in telecommunications, electricity and heavy industry. Several 
banks were taken over by the state, and land reforms distributing land and 
credits to peasants were enacted on the countryside. Renegotiated deals 
and agreements with foreign oil companies provided the Venezuelan state 
with majority stakes in all joint ventures, and taxes and royalties were 
raised. New policies within health and education, the so-called social mis-
sions (D’Elia and Cabezas 2008; Muntaner et  al. 2011), were pursued 
through building up new programmes and policies outside established 
institutional frameworks. The argument for doing so—and not without 
merit—was that existing state institutions were too rigid, inefficient and 
governed by staff from the Puntofijo era who in effect were in opposition 
to the government. However, the lack of institutionalisation of social pro-
grammes and policies would also later emerge as one of the Achilles heels 
of the Bolivarian process. Nevertheless, at the time, the extensive state- 
community cooperation in the course of the development of the social 
programmes was vital for forging a new sense of socio-political inclusion 
in the popular sectors. Concurrently, the social missions also represented 
unprecedented access to social welfare and services in the popular sectors, 
having real and substantive impact on many people’s lives (Strønen 2017).
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craftInG a bolIvarIan space
Chávez’ arrival to power generated a new era of popular mobilisation and 
organisation in Venezuela. Social movements had relatively limited 
manoeuvring space during the Puntofijo era and were frequently subjected 
to political repression and censorship (Lopez-Maya et al. 2002; Ciccariello- 
Maher 2013). After 1999, a broad and diverse grassroots movement, 
comprising urban dwellers, peasants, indigenous groups, and diverse cul-
tural and political movement with roots in the popular sectors became 
vested with a new form of legitimacy and public visibility in the country. 
Indeed, “Bolivarianism” offered previously marginalised sectors a new his-
torical narrative and new moral grounding for asserting themselves as a 
historical subject, el pueblo, whose time had come to claim rectification for 
accumulated injustice.
In the same period, successive left-leaning governments were brought 
to power on the backbone of popular mobilisation in neighbouring coun-
tries, creating the sensation that a continental shift was taking place. The 
Bolivarian process was at its height in the years following the defeat of the 
2002 coup, the 2002/2003 oil strike/sabotage and the 2004 recall refer-
endum against Chávez. In the fall and winter of 2005/2006, I did field-
work amongst popular movements in western Caracas on a day-to-day 
basis (Strønen 2006). Caracas’ barrios and the city’s political centre west 
of Sabana Grande were teeming with revolutionary fervour, and marches, 
popular assemblies, mobilisations and events were taking place at a grand 
scale. The social missions were in the process of being developed, both in 
health, education, sports, culture and alimentation, and many people were 
deeply involved in housing and infrastructural projects through the so- 
called Urban Housing Committees (Comités de Tierra Urbana, CTU) 
and Participative Committees for the Transformation of Habitat (Comité 
de Participación de Transformación de Habitat, CPTH). As one woman 
worded it:
The most special thing with this process is that people, like my mother aged 
70, who never before in her life and gone out [to do work in the commu-
nity]…with this process she got motivated, and in some form or another, in 
her own manner, is doing social work…people participate from their homes, 
people participate in the assemblies, and people participate both in their 
homes and in their assemblies (Strønen 2006:67).
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Innumerable times I was told by enthusiastic activists that Venezuela was 
the epicentre for a global historical shift, proving wrong Francis Fukuyama’s 
famous postulate about “the end of history.” The political aesthetics of the 
revolution was crafted through revolutionary music and jingles, political 
wall paintings, public concerts draped in revolutionary symbolism, the 
revival of popular revolutionary singers (Alí Primera, Silvio Rodríguez), 
political programming on state TV, political discourse from above and 
political discourse from below. In barrio streets and barrio houses, and at 
street corners, bars and restaurants in the western city centre, political 
discussions were the order of the day. Intense political manoeuvring and 
strategising was taking place amongst popular sector activists as they were 
discussing how to further their causes within the political space that had 
been opened up by the Chávez government. In no way was this a harmo-
nious and straightforward process; rather, conflicts and intense negotia-
tions were the order of the day both horizontally and vertically. However, 
what characterised these processes was the sensation of living in a critical 
moment in history, whereby historical power structures had been seriously 
destabilised. What was at stake was to steer the process in such a way that 
it would lead to long-lasting socio-political change, and to seize the 
moment to rectify historical injustices.
I have previously coined the concept “a Bolivarian space” in order to 
capture the symbolic, political, cultural and social space of interaction that 
was carved out in the interface between the Chávez government and its 
principally popular constituency. More precisely, I have described the 
Bolivarian space as:
the complex conundrum of political discourses, practices, policies, historical 
narratives and ideological templates shaping the interaction between the 
state and the popular grassroot in Venezuela under the Chávez government. 
This is not a top–down process whereby Chávez imposed a political idea 
from above. Rather, it is a flow of multi-directional processes that are shaped 
by popular efforts to appropriate the political space opened up by the 
Chávez government’s pro-poor political alignment (Strønen 2017:5).
Within that space, the templates of neoliberalism and global capitalism 
were framed in explicitly negative terms, both as political systems of 
 domination and subordination in an orthodox left-wing, anti-imperialism 
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sense, but also through articulating the lived experiences of its localised 
outcomes. The popular sectors in Venezuela were deeply traumatised by 
the social havoc they experienced during the 1980s and 1990s (Lander 
2005). Personal stories of hardships, hunger, violence, death, vulnerability 
and desperation were interwoven with a collective historical narrative 
about having been under siege by hostile and callous politicians and a 
brutal economic system. To them, “neoliberalism” and “capitalism” were 
not descriptive terms for particular economic and political regimes of gov-
ernance. Rather, these concepts epitomised a lived experience within a 
particular social order that was experienced as detrimental to their life 
projects and dignity. Significantly, the years leading up to el Caracazo in 
1989, and the experience of living through el Caracazo, were conceptual-
ised not only as a brutal state clampdown on a spontaneous reaction to 
extended suffering. It was also conceptualised as a demonstration of the 
brutal callousness of the system itself, which by default designated poor 
people to suffer whilst protecting the interests of the rich. As Rosa, a 
Chávez supporter from one of Caracas’ western barrios worded it:
So the second government of Carlos Andrés Pérez was the final thrust…the 
poor got even poorer, because they didn’t raise the wages, the businesses did 
whatever they wanted with their workers, they came and told you a story 
that “look, there isn’t any money to pay you with, we cannot pay you the 
Christmas bonus”…The poor have always waited for Christmas bonus so 
that you can buy the things that you are going to need for the rest of the 
year…the poor went without buying a new pair of shoes the whole year, not 
a shirt, do you understand? Because you couldn’t, we were like the Indians, 
we worked in order to be able to eat, and that was it. But in December the 
workplace paid out our four bucks [of Christmas bonus] and you went out 
and bought two shirts, two jeans, stacked the cupboards with food so that it 
would last longer, things like that. Do you understand?
And then, well…the final thrust came when Carlos Andrés Pérez appeared 
on national television and delivered that bomb about the measures that had 
to be taken, what we had to do with the loan that the International Monetary 
Fund had given us…. The loans that they had asked the International 
Monetary Fund for…so we had to obey the normative [structural adjust-
ment plans] that they implemented, and it was so outrageous, because it was 
the poor who had to do the sacrifice, right? We would have to pay for their 
riches, we will have to pay their taxes, we will have to pay all their expenses…
and the next week the prices on the bus tickets went up, and then [el 
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Caracazo] exploded…it was like ten years where more and more things 
came up combined, do you understand? People were already like a pressure 
cooker that was about to explode any minute.
Rosa’s narrative brings out how many people conceptualised the structural 
and political underpinnings of poor people’s suffering. Concurrently, the 
association between the politicians of the past, and their continuous pres-
ence in opposition ranks, was epitomised in the slogan that was coined 
after the 2002 coup: no volverán—“they will not come back.” To many 
people in the barrios, the Bolivarian process was (and is) a class war, 
because if the opposition ever returned to power, they were bound to 
reinstall a self-serving neoliberal regime and oppress popular protest with 
violence if necessary as they had done in the past.
alterInG the “natural order”
The account above is quite unidimensional in the sense that it says nothing 
about the multiple conflicts, struggles and contradictions that character-
ised both “the Bolivarian space” as well as the unfolding of the Bolivarian 
process and the actions of the Chávez government as such. However, this 
is a subject that I have treated extensively elsewhere (Strønen 2016, 2017). 
In the context of this chapter, the purpose of the section above is to tease 
out a broad panorama of the qualitative shifts in the texture of relations 
(Gupta 1995:215 in Sharma and Gupta 2001) between formal power and 
the formerly marginalised segments of the populations.
By way of contrast, the former political and economic elites, and many 
from the middle and upper classes, felt threatened and alienated not only 
by Chávez per se but also by the alteration of what they had historically 
perceived as the “natural social order.” This had always been a hierarchical 
social order defined and controlled by the whiter and wealthier, circum-
scribed by a long colonial and post-colonial legacy that naturalised socio- 
cultural and socio-economic inequalities. The white and economically 
privileged did not only dis-recognise the legitimacy of Chávez—being of 
afro-indigenous heritage and a poor socio-economic background—but 
they also felt deeply uncomfortable with the new role that Venezuela’s 
poor and coloured held in Venezuelan society. This, in turn, translated 
into accentuated political polarisation in the country with profoundly 
 classist and racialised overtones (Fernandes 2010, Duno-Gottberg 2009, 
2011). Expression such as negros, monkeys and savages were commonplace, 
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accentuating Cannon’s observation that “race, or rather racism, is an 
essential but extremely subtle, ingredient in opposition discourse rejecting 
Chávez and those who follow him” (Cannon 2008:732). However, in 
order to understand the historical context for these racialised expressions 
of conflict, it is necessary to explore how they reverberate with historical 
templates informed by the country’s historical legacy.
class and race In venezuela
Historically, the Venezuelan myth of national racial heritage was that of 
café con leche (coffee with milk) (Tinker Salas 2009:133), allegedly a prod-
uct of centuries of slow racial mixing (Wright 1990:1). Racial origins in 
Venezuela overlap to a large degree with people’s class. The majority of 
poor inhabitants are black or mestizo (of a mixed race), whilst the higher 
classes are for the most part whiter and more European-looking.
In the post-emancipation period, Venezuelan elites regarded blacks as 
inferiors because they were associated with their status as slaves, perceived 
of as a separate cast designed to work for the whites (Wright 1990:5). 
Hence, the elites did not consider themselves racist, but rather attributed 
their contempt for blacks to the fact that they were poor—a just socio- 
economic classification in the elites’ eyes, rather than a racial categorisa-
tion (Wright 1990:5). This perception of race and status coincides with 
what has come to be the dominant racial interpretative scheme in Latin 
America. As Mullings writes, “the Latin American model [has] generally 
‘privileged culture over race,’ in which extensive racial discrimination 
coexists with the absence of formal laws enforcing racism and an official 
ideology denying racism” (Mullings 2005:678) (Photo 7.1).
By the mid-twentieth century, Venezuelan elites had accepted a fluid 
concept of racial distinctions that allowed a socio-racial flexibility on the 
scale of the status hierarchy (Wright 1990:5). Processes of miscegenation 
served as a racial transitional buffer between white elites and black masses, 
preventing people from “getting stuck” in endogenous racial categorisa-
tions (Wright 1990:5). This also impeded the enforcement of racial segre-
gation (Wright 1990:5).
According to Wright, blacks and non-whites have played a larger role in 
political and social institutions in Venezuela than elsewhere in the Latin 
American continent (Wright 1990:9). Black and coloured people held 
important positions amongst regional and national elites after Venezuela’s 
independence in 1830. The lack of a strong central state allowed black and 
coloured individuals to establish themselves as regional caudillos deriving 
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Photo 7.1 Statue of Simón Bolívar in Paseo de los Próceres in Caracas. Note the 
wall carvings behind him. Bolívar liberated Venezuela and several of the surround-
ing countries from the Spanish Crown. He was from a wealthy creole family, and, 
driven by his political ambitions and his (for the time) progressive, egalitarian 
views, he split off from his class background. This is also what has given him such 
mythical qualities in the context of the Bolivarian process (Photo by the author)
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their power from military might (Wright 1990:10). Moreover, pardos (the 
racial amalgam of Europeans, blacks and Indians) were also found in the 
federal agencies and military organizations (Wright 1990:10).
However, starting in the 1890s, leading intellectuals talked about the 
need to “whiten the race” by encouraging the immigration of white 
Europeans whilst blocking the immigration of non-whites (Wright 1990:2; 
Tinker Salas 2009:133; Derham 2010:69). They were influenced by a 
Spencerian positivism and by related European racial theories, and openly 
stated that they perceived Venezuela’s political instability and economic 
stagnations as a consequence of the predominance of a mixed population 
(Wright 1990:10). Attributing racial dispositions to genetic deficiencies 
(Derham 2010:69), they didn’t perceive blacks and pardos as compatible 
with democratic self-rule, and advocated for a strong centralist govern-
ment that they eventually found in Juan Vicente Gómez’s regime (Wright 
1990:10). Following Gómez’s death in 1935, the subsequent heads of 
state took a more “open-minded” stance on the correlations between race 
and democratic inclinations, allowing Acción Democrática to form its 
party with a leadership drawing from mixed-race and middle-class groups. 
Moreover, Acción Democrática soon found alliances with pardos and black 
masses (Wright 1990:10), turning the notion of racial democracy into 
their official party ideology (Wright 1990:11). Within Acción Democrática 
there were central figures that favoured the “whitening” strategy, such as 
Arturo Uslar Pietri, Alberto Adriani and Andrés Eloy Blanco (Wright 
1990:12; Derham 2010:69). However, the focus nevertheless shifted 
from differences based on race to those based on class, forming the basis 
for a “colour-blind” cultural nationalism (Wright 1990:11).
These changes were seen as threatening by the white elites, not necessar-
ily because of the threat of colour but rather because of the threat of the 
mobilisation and rise of the lower classes (Wright 1990:11). During Acción 
Democrática’s short governmental interlude between 1945 and 1948, the 
party tried to carry out reforms that impacted immigration laws and those 
public facilities that were designed to cater to North American oil workers, 
thus improving conditions for the non-whites (Wright 1990:11). The state 
bureaucracy was opened to non-whites, and the economic expansion cre-
ated job opportunities for these groups (Wright 1990:11–12). As Acción 
Democrática and COPEI consolidated their  governance following 1959, 
racial democracy became the dominant official ideology.
The Venezuelan lower classes occupied a legitimate position in the 
social landscape until the social breakdown in the 1980s. They were por-
trayed as el pueblo, “as virtuous, albeit ignorant, and therefore in need of 
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guidance” (Coronil and Skurski 2006:199). The masses were contained 
and controlled with a carrot or stick approach, that is, either through 
populist discourse and clientelistic paternalism, or with violence. However, 
as social unrest increased from the early 1980s, the poor and coloured 
were increasingly blamed for the country’s ills (Cannon 2008:736). 
Concurrently, the founding myths of the modern Venezuelan nation 
state—cross-class harmony and racial democracy—started to crack.
savaGery and cIvIlIsatIon
Coronil and Skurski (2006:123) quote Sofia, a Harvard-trained lawyer, on 
uttering after el Caracazo: “I would have killed all those savages, as I am 
sure that they would have killed us if they had a chance. They hate us.” 
The “savagery” and “civilisation” tropes hold deep roots in the construc-
tion of a Venezuelan national cosmology, as in the rest of Latin America. 
In political discourse, and particular at critical political conjunctures where 
class conflicts are surfacing, these tropes have been used to evoke notions 
of the poor masses as representing savagery in contrast to the civilised 
nature of the middle and upper classes.
The dual imageries of savagery and civilization are a legacy of the colo-
nial reality established in the New World after the Spanish conquest, 
whereby “the Indian and African irracionales became compliant to the 
reason of small number of white Christians” (Taussig 1987:5, cursive in 
original). As Quijano (2000) has noted, Latin America was never fully 
really decolonised after independence. Rather, preceding over the con-
struction of emerging nation states, white Creoles selectively imported the 
Enlightenment ideas that fit best their needs and local realities. Equality 
was not part of this imaginative or interest-based horizon, since the ruling 
elites thrived on subordination and economic exploitation of those con-
sidered ethno-racially and socially inferior (Grosfoguel 2000:368). This 
translated into the crafting of political, economic and cultural, as well legal 
structures that favoured white (male) elites (Grosfoguel 2000:368; Wiarda 
1971), and the continuation of classificatory schemes that placed colonial 
subjects outside the imagined political community of the nascent nation 
states (Grosfoguel 2000:368).
Serving as an interpretative scheme for classifying and attributing sup-
posedly inherent qualities, capacities and ideas to different social groups, 
the savagery/civilisation juxtaposition has run as an (sometimes explicit) 
undercurrent in Venezuelan political discourse. More precisely, this dichot-
omy has been articulated by the powerful to question the civilisational 
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potential and hence the social legitimacy of the supposedly more savage 
and less civilised masses. As Coronil and Skurski (2006) have demonstrated, 
the most sublime expression of the civilisation/barbary tropes in Venezuelan 
national cosmology is found in the novel Doña Bárbara (1929) by Rómulo 
Gallegos, considered the greatest expression of Venezuelan identity 
(Coronil and Skurski 2006:91). The novel depicts the struggle for the 
“domestication of unconquered nature and uncivilized humans” (Coronil 
and Skurski 2006:92), transcended into a struggle for the nation’s soul. 
Indeed, as Coronil has argued in “The Magical State” (1997), the very idea 
of the modern Venezuelan nation state after 1959 was based on the rejec-
tion of the barbarous past represented by the caudillos of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. The new era, as represented by Acción 
Democrática and COPEI, was cast as a civilisatory mission designed to 
bring the country out of its backwardness and on the road to prosperity, 
modernity and development. However, as the myth of social harmony lost 
grip in the 1980s, the increasing tensions between the elites and the poor 
transformed el pueblo from a noble mass, as they had become depicted 
within the nationalist-populist discourse, to an unruly mass that threatened 
the civilisational harmony of the nation. As Coronil and Skurski demon-
strate through a minute analysis of the public reactions to the so-called 
Amparo massacre in 1988 and el Caracazo in 1989, both instances “made 
salient suppressed conceptions of the poor as disposable savages” (Coronil 
and Skurski 2006:123). The trope of “uncivilised savages” continued to be 
expressed in the Chávez era, but then in the context of a political turning 
of tables whereby the dominant classes no longer found themselves in a 
position of social hegemony. Yet so, even if the poor were in a position to 
vocally express their contempt against the underlying schemes and assump-
tions articulated through these tropes, that does not imply that the domi-
nant classes adapted a self-reflective stance on the founding premises of 
their social models. Rather, the opposite happened. Popular political agency 
in the context of the Bolivarian process was labeled as politically illegitimate 
and irrational, advanced by socio- culturally inferior groups—a tautological 
relation that reinforced its/theirs illegitimacy.
the denIal of polItIcal leGItImacy
Oppositional labeling of Chávez’ supporters commonly included the usual 
usage of expressions such as “negros” and monkeys (monos). Other com-
mon expressions were hordas (hordes), chusma (lowlife, scum), turba 
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(mob), marginales (marginals), ordinarios (simple) and lumpen (poor, 
vulgar, brute). Yet another expression, tierruos (from tierra/soil), refers to 
when barrio inhabitants could be identified by their soiled feet (because 
barrio streets were not asphalted) upon entering the city centres. Yet 
another idiosyncratic expression is pata en el suelo (hoof on the ground), 
referring to a person who cannot afford to buy shoes and thus walks 
barefoot.
The racial dimension of political opposition was also evident in the fre-
quent portrayal of Hugo Chávez, and other coloured political leaders, as 
monkeys in cartoons (Fernandes 2010:118–119). A few years after Chávez 
took office, the US embassy in Caracas hosted a party where the guests 
were entertained with a puppet show portraying Chávez as a gorilla. Colin 
Powell, the United States foreign minister at the time, was not amused—
perhaps for obvious reasons—and publicly reprimanded the embassy (Ali 
2013). Furthermore, Hugo Chávez was frequently referred to as “mico 
mandante” by government opponents. The expression was derived from 
mi comandante (my commander)—an expression Chávez’ followers often 
used when referring to him, whilst mico is a small monkey. The pun there-
fore translates to “monkey-in-charge.”
Behind the obvious racist as well as class-contemptuous slant of these 
characteristics is a deeper meaning that harks back to the incomplete 
decolonisation process inscribed in the Latin American polity. Scholars 
have drawn attention to how both oppositional groups and affiliated pri-
vate media consistently have portrayed themselves as “civil society groups,” 
whereas government supporters have been described as hordes, mobs and 
scum. As Fernandes notes, the exclusionary notion of civil society deployed 
by elite groups “has various race, class, and gender associations that mark 
out certain social groups and classes as unfit for participation in the public 
sphere” (2010:121). The exclusionary usage of the civil society concept is 
also symptomatic of its broader application in the neoliberal era; it is asso-
ciated with certain social groups exercising “civil freedom,” but within the 
confines of class-defined symbolic markers and liberal values. This appro-
priation of the right to exercise “civic agency” was also remarked upon by 
Chávez’ supporters. To them, it illustrates the global dimension of 
Venezuelan class conflicts; they interpreted “civil society” as an ideological 
concept embracing a particular group of global citizens (see also Chatterjee 
2004 for an analysis of its historical origins and its colonial adaption). 
From the point of view of many popular sector activists I spoke to, the 
opposition’s active and exclusionary branding of themselves as civil society 
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was used as a worldwide marketing strategy in order to gain international 
support for their cause; thereby legitimising and bolstering oppositional 
and middle-class political agency whilst simultaneously negating popular 
and pro-government agency.
The depiction of members of the popular classes as “hordes” was a 
recurrent feature in media representations of Chávez’ supporters, harking 
back to the old civilisation/barbary dichotomy. As Duno-Gottberg writes 
about how the private Venezuelan media portrayed the popular mobilisa-
tion during the 2002 coup: “As a mob, they were undifferentiated, face-
less” (Duno-Gottberg 2009:160). They were cast as barbaric, irrational 
and violent, and deprived of political rationale (Duno-Gottberg 2009:160). 
Whilst these recurring media representations reflected deep-seated histori-
cal templates, they also reinforced political polarisation in the country 
through playing up to deep-seated fears about “the others.” Before the 
coup in 2002, inhabitants in rich neighbourhoods organised themselves in 
armed self-defense groups, fearing the “hordes’” invasion and pillage of 
their residences (see Bartley and Ó Briain 2003). People were warned to 
keep an eye on their domestic servants in case they were collaborating in 
preparing an attack. Of a more recent date, a middle-class friend of mine 
told me of how residents in a gated condominium close to the city centre 
gathered during the riots referred to as “las guarimbas” in 2014. These 
protests started up as peaceful protests by oppositional student groups, 
but soon turned into violent riots. The riots caused massive destruction of 
public property and 43 casualties, most of them security personnel, gov-
ernment supporters and innocent passers-by. However, fearing that gov-
ernment supporters would descend on the city centre where most of the 
protests were taking place, the residents were discussing how they could 
strike back on an attack on their building. The suggestion gathering the 
most momentum was that they would stand on the roof and throw boiling 
cooking oil down on the “invaders.” As it turned out, the hordes never 
arrived.
deservInG and undeservInG poor
The denial of not only the political legitimacy of the popular classes but 
also of their social legitimacy also undergirded widespread resentments 
against government spending on the poor. Commonly, government sup-
porters were referred to as resentidos (resentful), implicating that they 
were “envious” towards the rich, and by extension, trying to get their 
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hands on wealth that they did not deserve nor had worked for. Oscar, a 
community activist in the popular parish of 23 de Enero, once spoke about 
a friend of his and her experience as a poor student attending what is tra-
ditionally a university for the privileged:
Look, a friend of mine who studies in la [Universidad] Católica, en la Andrés 
Bello, she is from a humble origin but she is there on a scholarship, she told 
me how they talk…she hears different expressions from mono (monkey) to 
esos pobres de mierda (those shitty poor) who want to take everything away 
from us, those lazy people, what they want is what we produce…
Similar sentiments, yet in a stronger language, can be discerned in a com-
mentary written by “Lara Lopez” under a YouTube video showing a dis-
cussion about the 2013 elections of Nicolás Maduro:
Chavistas take off to Cuba so you can continue to eat shit…CONFORMISTS 
you are thugs and whores who don’t want a better country because you live 
in misery and feel envy for those who have worked hard for everything they 
have achieved, and you have expropriated it!! Marginal thieves, just like your 
ex-president and mister potato face (Maduro). YOU ARE A FRAAAAAUD.4
Underlying these portrayals of the poor one can identify deep-seated 
notions echoing the idea of a culture of poverty (Lewis 1966), namely, 
that the Venezuelan poor were poor due to laziness, low morals and sloth. 
Within this interpretative scheme, government “hand-outs” only served 
to bolster these character traits. This view was expressed through referring 
to government supporters as having a bozal de arepa. Arepa, Venezuela’s 
prime staple food, is a flat, round bread baked on corn flour, and the sig-
nificance of this saying is that they were led haplessly like a horse or a 
donkey by an arepa-filled muzzle offered by the government.5 These ideas 
are not unique to Venezuela; as noted in the introduction to this volume, 
the Brazilian middle and upper classes also revolted against the idea the 
poor would get access to state benefits and consumer items that they did 
not “deserve.” Likewise, the Venezuelan poor were framed as undeserving 
recipients of state-supported material well-being, and by the same sleight 
of hand, the fundamental issue of the historical constitution of Venezuela 
as a fundamentally unequal society, and the question of how to challenge 
this legacy, was removed from view.
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dIfferentIated lIfe Worlds
One of the first days upon my arrival to Venezuela in 2005, I was told by 
Maria, a Chávez supporter in her mid-40s:
They [the opposition/middle and upper class] never knew anything about 
the living conditions in the rest of the society. They didn’t have to use public 
transport because they had their own cars. They didn’t need to use public 
hospitals because they were insured at private clinics. They didn’t have to 
care about pensions or social security because they had money. They didn’t 
have to worry about crime because they had their private security firms. 
They knew nothing about all this and they don’t understand what is hap-
pening here because they don’t understand the background for it. It is like 
Chávez once said: even if we placed the opposition on a pedestal covered 
with diamonds, they would still hate us.
Her words underlined the fundamental characteristics of Venezuelan soci-
ety; it is built upon a fundament of entrenched social, spatial and social- 
cultural inequalities. In turn, this translates into completely different life 
experiences and perspectives through which different social groups ground 
their identities and political subjectivities. To many in the middle and 
upper classes, popular sector neighbourhoods are perceived as dangerous 
and uncivilised spaces, occupied by uneducated, unsophisticated people. 
Most middle-class people that I met during my time in Venezuela were 
shocked to hear that I actually lived in a popular sector neighbourhood, 
and occasionally “lectured” me on the violent nature of these areas as well 
as its residents’ less-refined intellectual capacities (Photos 7.2 and 7.3).
However, most middle-class people had never set their foot in a barrio, 
and would never do so. A friend of mine once said that rich people, rushing 
by in their SUVs on their way home to eastern Caracas, probably just close 
their eyes when they pass the Western barrio communities, pretending they 
are not there. In Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, the spa-
tial and social divisions between different social groups frequently preclude 
middle and upper class contact with people on the other side of the social 
fence, except from encounters marked by defined status ascriptions such as 
labourers, waiters, shop clerks and domestic servants. As Maria alluded to 
above, the poor and the rich live their lives on widely divergent social and 
spatial arenas. Indeed, the secluded view from the predominantly prosper-
ous eastern valley of Caracas6 meant that many people would still, after two 
decades of social misery and unrest during the 1980s and 1990s, repeatedly 
state that “Chávez destroyed the harmonious society that we once had.”
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Photo 7.2 Typical barrio homes (Photo by the author)
the crIsIs of modernIty
Tinker Salas eloquently summarises a widely held explanatory model 
amongst opponents to the Chávez government:
Many opposed to Chávez expressed a view of society that created a false 
distinction between an educated and enlightened opposition fighting to save 
the country and defend democracy and an uneducated multitude led by a 
charismatic yet unscrupulous popular leader who retained support by squan-
dering government funds on his followers (Tinker Salas 2015:172).
Indeed, these views reflected that opposition supporters perceived of 
themselves as the gatekeepers and embodiment of the mythical model ver-
sion of the modern Venezuelan nation state; a state that was moulded 
upon a class-defined social hegemony and Venezuela’s compliance with 
the founding tenants of contemporary global modernity; liberal democ-
racy and free-market politics. The Bolivarian process was incomprehensi-
ble for many from the upper and middle classes, as well as for many of the 
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country’s intellectuals, who were oriented towards “consumption patterns, 
value orientations, and enjoyment of the ‘modern’ global good life” 
(Lander 2005:33). The new political orientation, away from Westernised 
imageries of modernity, Western political alliances as well as the allusions 
to nationalism, was interpreted as “an anachronism in a globalizing world, 
a return to unfeasible and historically Third World postures” (Lander 
2005:33). To them, Chávez represented an uncivilised, caudillistic politi-
cal order, and the socialist façade of the Bolivarian process represented a 
position on the wrong side of the global ideological fence.
However, in the final part of this chapter, I want to reflect upon the 
deeper implications of the dichotomised perception of local and global 
realities that were crystalising in the Chávez era. I suggest that, in essence, 
these also reflect the crisis of modernity in the Latin American continent. 
For the better part of the twentieth century, Venezuela was living the 
expectation of developmentalism and modernity; an expectation that harks 
Photo 7.3 Gated mansions in an affluent neighbourhood in the east of Caracas 
(Photo by the author)
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back to the very foundation of Latin American nation states. As Hellinger 
has written:
The model of political modernization bequeathed to political science by the 
French revolution and Enlightenment, suggests that Latin America will only 
progress once its traditional, personalist culture is replaced by civic culture 
populated with rational, educated citizens capable of completion in both the 
economic and political marketplace…secular modernist like Betancourt, 
Rómulo Gallegos, Luis Beltran Figueroa, and others sought to tame la bar-
barie and, aided by oil rents, build a modern, Western democratic society. 
(Hellinger 2001:9)
What is important to capture is the increasing divergence between the 
official, middle- and upper-class narrative about the emerging modern 
Venezuelan society at the time and the actual experiences of living in that 
society from a subaltern perspective. The foundational myth of Chavismo 
rests on the schism that developed as Puntofijismo, and the social sectors 
it represented, increasingly alienated the popular sectors from an illusory 
cross-class society. Acción Democrática initial paternalistic attempt to save 
the popular sectors from themselves turned into an alienation of those 
very same sectors, as the chosen political and economic model turned into 
a system of exclusion rather than inclusion. For the popular sectors, liberal 
democracy became a facade for elite accumulation by dispossession 
(Harvey 2005) that was blatantly intensified during the neoliberalisation 
of Venezuelan society. Moreover, the state’s predisposition to crush dis-
sent through violence and repression made it clear that it was not only 
unwilling to respond to popular sector needs, but it was also effectively 
outlawing them from the Venezuelan polity.
It was on this background that Chávez’ portrayal of the world as his-
torically and structurally unjust struck a deep chord amongst the popular 
sectors, because they never came to enjoy the fruits of global capitalism 
and liberal democracy as promised to them. From the popular sector’s 
perspective, this ideology rather served to disguise the oppressive eco-
nomic mechanisms that had relegated them to poverty, and to cover the 
violent oppression of subaltern dissent that was taking place across the 
world—a violence that had been deeply inscribed on their own social 
body. Thus, the espousal of a worldview aligned with the “Third World,” 
or what Hellinger has called tercermundismo (2001), rather than with 
western notions of modernity, allowed the popular sectors to create a 
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twenty-first century identity that incorporated them into a global narrative 
about subaltern struggle (Photo 7.4).
In the Introduction (this volume) Strønen and Ystanes refer to the 
proliferation of alternative political horizons and projects emerging as part 
of the Pink Tide. As Motta has argued, these heterogeneous proposals 
represent different ways of imagining and practising the relationship 
between the market, the state and society (Motta 2009:43). It constitutes 
an opposition to “the cultural logics, social relations, and institutions that 
underpin and sustain the ‘system’” (ibid.) altogether, because “the sys-
tem” (the state-capital nexus, as it has worked so far in Latin American 
history) is by default an oppressor to subaltern lives, needs and claims. On 
the other hand, the Latin American middle and upper classes have become 
progressively enmeshed in what may be epitomised through what de Sousa 
Santos calls “Americanization, as a hegemonic form of globalization” 
(de Sousa Santos 2001:185). In essence, this worldview hinges upon 
Euro- American notions of liberal democracy, market capitalism, consumer 
Photo 7.4 Labour Day in Western Caracas, May 1, 2011 (Photo by the author)
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society and the global media sphere. Through the lenses and normative 
frameworks of “Americanization,” subaltern struggles appear politically 
incomprehensible and illegitimate, advanced by socio-culturally unsophis-
ticated and inferior groups.
Note that it is not my intent here to suggest that it is possible to draw 
up clear-cut binaries between “inside and outside” modernity. The com-
plexities surrounding identity politics and symbolic representations of 
modernity in Venezuela are also extensively discussed in Strønen (2017). 
My aim is, however, to highlight how differentiated life worlds also shape 
different political, social, cultural and epistemological groundings for 
 orienting, assessing and positioning oneself in the world. This schism 
became utterly visible in Venezuela, where the two different political 
camps came to ground their political struggle—for or against the Bolivarian 
process—on the basis of different conceptualisations of their nation, soci-
ety and the world. This schism provides for a continuously unstable 
grounding for any future project of national building, implying that the 
contemporary crisis of governance and stand-off (as this chapter is written 
in April 2017) between the Maduro government and the opposition only 
serves to mask much deeper challenges for Venezuela’s political future.
conclusIon
This chapter has taken as a point of departure the socio-economic and 
socio-cultural hierarchies that characterised the formation of Venezuelan 
society since its inception. Through the ways in which race, racism and class 
became antagonistically articulated as part of the political polarisation fol-
lowing Chávez’ electoral victory, these hierarchical social matrixes gained 
renewed salience. Through the crafting of what I have termed a Bolivarian 
space, new collective consciousness and political subjectivities grounded in 
the counter-hegemonic identity politics and claims for redistribution gained 
political force and visibility. At the same time, this generated a counter-
reaction amongst the dominant classes who had previously enjoyed politi-
cal and cultural hegemony. However, I have also suggested that the 
cleavages that crystalised in the course of the Bolivarian process are reflect-
ing the crisis of modernity in Latin America at large. As the promised gains 
of developmentalism, and subsequently free-market politics and liberal 
democracy, failed to materialise, Latin American nation- building projects 
are founded upon highly unstable grounding. Indeed, there is a growing 
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schism between those who are progressively enmeshed in hegemonic forms 
of globalisation, and those who are searching for alternative social, political 
and epistemological social models. In conclusion, the Pink Tide époque in 
Venezuela during Chávez’ presidency represented a paradigmatic rupture 
in the nation’s history, at the same time as it made visible and accentuated 
the inherently unequal, hierarchical and differentiated life worlds that char-
acterise the Latin American polity.
notes
1. Poverty levels have now risen again after the onset of the economic crisis in 
the country. However, this is not the topic of this chapter as I am focusing 
on the particular dynamics characterising the Chávez era.
2. See Strønen (2017) for a discussion of the historical origins of and social 
meaning of corruption in Venezuela.
3. Pérez eventually stepped down facing a trial on corruption charges in 1993, 
but it has been suggested that he to a certain extent was designated as the 
scapegoat for the political and economic crisis at large.
4. YouTube. 2013. Ana Mercedes Díaz. Ex jueza electoral venezolana en Bayly. 
Video uploaded April 10. http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=rFfZ0HwSupk, accessed December 20, 2013.
5. I have discussed elsewhere both how to understand Chávez in relation to 
the concept of populism, as well as the historical legacy of clientelism in the 
Chávez government’s relationship to its constituency and vice versa (Strønen 
2017).
6. The city valley of Caracas is marked by an east-west divide, whereby the 
majority of the poor live in the west, and the east is predominantly affluent. 
The invisible, yet palpable line is drawn east of the pedestrian street of Sabana 
Grande.
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of the ‘Perfect Neoliberal Citizen’: 
Enactments of Gendered and Racialised 
Inequalities Among Peruvian Vendors
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University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Peru was not part of the so-called Pink Tide in Latin America, but opted 
for deepening its neoliberal orientation initiated with Alberto Fujimori’s 
policy reforms in the 1990s. Since then, governments have envisioned 
modernisation and progress through an emphasis on market liberalisation 
and implemented tax, royalty and policy regimes accommodating for pri-
vatisation and foreign investments. Social reforms initiated in the 1990s 
took the form of ‘liberal-informal’ regimes based on (partial or total) pri-
vatisation of the financing and provision of services, as well as state- 
financed social programmes targeting particular segments of the population 
(Rousseau 2007:97). Alongside these developments, small-scale busi-
nesses among the poor were increasingly encouraged by the state, NGOs 
and commercial enterprises through the provision of micro-credit arrange-
ments and training in marketing skills. Through this expansion of 
 neoliberal rationality, governments aimed to instigate ‘development’ 
184 
through the promotion of entrepreneurship and trade also among the poor. 
During the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), Peru signed sev-
eral free trade agreements facilitating overseas, bilateral trade by eliminating 
trade obstacles, consolidating access to goods and services, and fostering 
private investments between bilateral partners. From the turn of the millen-
nium and onwards, Peru experienced significant economic growth due to 
the boom of primary materials. Yet inequalities persisted, and during presi-
dential campaigns in 2006 and 2011, Ollanta Humala built his political 
platform by promising to create a more equitable framework for distributing 
wealth from the country’s natural resources. Before his presidency, Humala 
was thus closely affiliated with other Pink Tide leaders in Latin America, 
although his time in office (2011–2016) resulted in political continuity 
rather than change. Hence inequalities in Peru have persisted, and thou-
sands of Peruvians still struggle to find a way out of poverty, often by relying 
on precarious forms of work at the margins of the formal economy.
This chapter is an attempt to analyse economic processes in Peru from 
the perspective of women vendors. It examines how vendors manoeuvre 
between varying degrees of formality/informality, and how identity mark-
ers related to gender, ‘race’ and class are in different ways made relevant in 
their everyday manoeuvres. Focusing on enactments of identities at the 
crossroads between improvisation and formalisation, the chapter illustrates 
how women’s everyday economic tactics are shaped by Peru’s particular 
socio-economic configurations under neoliberal regimes. In this regard, 
and considering how economic operations are socially embedded and 
informed by social relations and institutions of various kinds (Polanyi 
1944), the chapter argues that the (in)formalisation of economic activities 
is informed by post-colonial legacies and existing social relations and insti-
tutions. Processes of (in)formalisation  hence play out in spaces that are 
created through, and often contributing to reinforce, relations and cate-
gorisations connected to gender, ‘race’ and class. Against this backdrop, 
the question of neoliberal policy and in(formalisation) in the Peruvian con-
text needs to be highlighted through an ethnography of the class, ethnic 
and gender relationships in which these processes are actualised. Indeed, 
the work of vendors, and especially the entrepreneurial chola, epitomises 
the development and effects of neoliberal politics in post- colonial Peruvian 
society, by actualising and reproducing class, ‘race’ and gender categories, 
stereotypes and relationships. The so-called chola can be seen both to resist 
and to convey the intersections between class, race and gender in Peruvian 
society, as she is ambiguously positioned and envisioned in-between 
racialised and class-based categories such as indigenous and mestizo, rural 
C.V. ØDEGAARD
 185
and urban. Living the life of the urban poor, the chola maintains her rural 
ways and relations, while making a living through trade and entrepreneur-
ship. In many ways, the chola may appear as the ‘perfect neoliberal citizen’, 
as hard-working and self-made, and accommodating her own quest for 
social mobility to growing demands of growth, flow and consumption. Yet 
the entrepreneurial chola seeks to develop her economic strategising and 
tactics on her own terms. The chapter therefore demonstrates how vendors 
rely on relational and symbolic resources in their economic endeavoirs.
The chapter builds upon several periods of fieldwork in Peru since 1997 
(with subsequent fieldworks in 2001, 2007, 2011 and 2016), when I con-
ducted research among vendors and contrabandistas associated with the mar-
ketplace La Feria Altiplano1 in the city of Arequipa. At the Feria in Arequipa, 
most vendors are bilingual Quechua- or Aymara- and Spanish- speakers, pri-
marily women. The goods offered at the Feria are agricultural products, tex-
tiles and artisan crafts, pirated CDs and computer software, as well as 
industrial and electronic articles. Many of these goods are smuggled from 
Bolivia or Chile, often produced in China. The Feria was established after 
several years during which a group of vendors had occupied land in different 
areas of the city for purposes of vending. Since they initiated these unauthor-
ised markets in the 1980s, the vendors were repeatedly fined or removed by 
the police. These difficulties resulted in the creation of an association of ven-
dors and finally their acquisition of an area that they formally bought in 
1999. While the association has thus acquired land titles—at least in part—
and most members pay for a license, the vendors do not pay taxes, and many 
of them also bring undocumented merchandise from across the border, 
referred to as contrabando. Those who bring goods like this, generally self-
identify as contrabandistas (smugglers), and proudly so. Leaders of the asso-
ciation take responsibility for paperwork and communication with the 
municipality, and these positions are often held by men. This is despite the 
fact that the majority of members are women, and is related to the expecta-
tion that leaders should be experienced with reading and writing.
Considering that many vendors have a background from the Andean 
highlands and limited economic and educational resources, their work in 
vending reflects the structural inequalities in Peruvian society and the 
intersections between class and a racialised hierarchy. For most, vending 
has been and continues to be a precarious means of making ends meet but, 
as one of my interlocutors said, ‘at least it makes some coins circulate 
through my hands’. Others—especially contrabandistas—may earn more 
than the minimum salary, and some have managed to expand and make 
new investments, for instance in land, trailers or buses.
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EmErging ‘CulturEs of informality’
The mid-century migration boost in Peru and the land occupations that 
followed aroused anxiety for delinquency and social breakdown among the 
urban elites. In the city, migrants from the Andes were considered ‘matter 
out of place’ in the perspective of the upper and middle class, and the 
migrants’ presence disturbed the racialised spatial dichotomies of rural-
urban, indigenous-mestizo. Women vendors came to occupy a particularly 
ambiguous position in relation to these racialised dichotomies and stereo-
types, as their ways of living disturbed dominant norms of gender- 
appropriate behaviour too. Not complying with the dominant norms that 
feminine realms should be hidden away from the eyes of strangers and that 
the public sphere is the domain of men (Weismantel 2001:47, Seligmann 
2004), women vendors and their activities were regarded as chaotic and 
unhygienic—and market places as incompatible with the desire to moder-
nise Peruvian cities. Seen from the perspective of social scientists in Peru as 
elsewhere in Latin America, in contrast, these informal economic ventures 
(including the land occupations) were seen to involve new claims for citi-
zenship among the urban poor (Roberts 1995), and to represent a form of 
‘insurgent citizenship’ with a potential to alter the poor’s terms and condi-
tions for citizenship (Holston 2008). Poor people’s initiatives at the mar-
gins of the formal economy were thus seen as heralding a new era of 
contestation against the legal institutional apparatus, which has given rise 
to what is often referred to as ‘cultures of informality’ (Matos Mar 1984).
With the economic down-turn in Peru during the 1980s, informal eco-
nomic ventures gained increased importance as a source of livelihood for 
rising numbers of urban poor. Migration to Peruvian cities continued dur-
ing the 1980s, also due to the war between the guerrilla movement Sendero 
Luminoso and the military, as thousands of people were forced to flee from 
rural areas to the cities. The existing labour surplus in the cities was aug-
mented with Fujimori’s austerity measures (the so-called  Fuji- shock) in the 
1990s, as structural adjustment programs, privatisation and dramatic cuts 
in public spending further exacerbated the need for alternatives to waged 
labour (see also Stensrud, (Chap. 10) this volume). The economic set-back 
was to affect Peruvian society severely, while other Latin American coun-
tries involved in similar processes tried to soften the negative effects of 
adjustments through the introduction of safety nets. Among people living 
in the shantytowns of Peruvian cities, many, both men and women, turned 
to different forms of self-employment—men sometimes combining taxi-
driving with short-term employment in construction, and women in 
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different kinds of informal work and vending. Among my women inter-
locutors, some first started working as domestic servants, in textiles facto-
ries or as day labourers at the farms surrounding Arequipa, but later many 
of them turned to vending due to low payment and a strict labour regime 
in other forms of low-skilled work.
As indicated in the introduction, the neoliberal promotion of entrepre-
neurship in Peru does not exist in a vacuum, nor does women’s predomi-
nance in the country’s—often informal—market places. There are indeed 
long traditions in the Andes for barter and trade, and for women’s involve-
ment therein, so vending is not necessarily something they first learn in the 
city, or by participating in micro-credit arrangements. Women’s involvement 
in vending can also be seen in light of historical traditions for women in the 
Southern Andes to be responsible for barter and vending, due to their tradi-
tional responsibilities for herding and commercialising the produce (Harris 
2000). The promotion of entrepreneurship from the part of recent govern-
ments, often directed at women in particular, have nonetheless contributed 
to reinforce the tendency that women occupy precarious and low-income 
forms of employment. The targeting of women also reflects how women 
have often been seen as tools for development because of their link to issues 
of reproduction and domestic space (Ewig 2010:7; Ødegaard 2010). 
According to one of my interlocutors, vending and contraband is a ‘plan for 
women. If a man gets involved, people will say he is doing women’s work’.
Policies for the formalisation of unauthorised economic activities and 
use of land have been introduced alongside the promotion of entrepre-
neurship. The government of Fujimori established specific institutions for 
this purpose, such as Commission for the Formalisation of Informal 
Property (COFOPRI), and succeeding governments followed up with this 
and similar land-titling projects aiming to promote ‘development’, security 
for owners and a more effective land market. These initiatives form part of 
a continuing expansion of a neoliberal rationality, by facilitating the com-
modification of land and contributing to fortify already existing fissures 
along class lines, due to the high cost of formalisation and rising prices of 
land (Larkins 2015:156). It indicates how an increasing significance 
ascribed to formality and the legal (Sieder et al. 2005) is central for the 
liberalisation of markets worldwide, entailing mechanisms through which 
contrasts between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ are both intensified and continually 
blurred (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). In Peru, policies of formalisation 
have been recommended by economists like de Soto (1989, 2001), who 
argued that formal ownership among the poor would promote development, 
 MARKET LIBERALISATION AND THE (UN-)MAKING... 
188 
by contributing to the integration of unauthorised economic activities into 
the economy at large. As noted by Scott (1998), formality is indeed part of 
making society legible (Scott 1998)—and may represent a prerequisite for 
increasing tax revenues and improved welfare services. De Soto’s concern 
with formalisation, however, appears to be related primarily to its ‘property 
effects’, i.e. that formalisation would promote economic activities and devel-
opment through the security of formal ownership. Despite the fact that for-
malisation may enable people to legally use and protect their resources, the 
terms and conditions can nonetheless create and fuel other processes that 
may lead to increased dispossession and marginalisation (Mitchell 2002). To 
think otherwise would be to overlook an important insight from economic 
anthropology; that the economy must be understood as instituted through 
societal relations and institutions of various kinds (Polanyi 1944).
In a study of Lima’s contraband markets, Gandolfo (2013) describes 
how vendors explicitly evade formality, and resist attempts by state bureau-
cracies to draw them into regimes of regulation. Although the vendors’ 
resistance carries costs and risks, she argues that they nonetheless value 
more highly the freedom and autonomy that informality affords. One of 
the key freedoms of informality, she notes, is to subsume profit to particu-
lar modes of sociality. By investing in market colleagues, kin, earth beings, 
and saints, wealthy vendors give time and money to ‘reciprocal relations 
and forms of consumption that limit the accumulation of wealth’ (ibid.: 
280). As I have illustrated elsewhere (2010, 2016), this intense cultivation 
of social relationships at the margins of the formal carries similar impor-
tance among vendors in Arequipa. This does not necessarily mean that 
vendors evade formality, since actors who operate informally may also seek 
formalisation (see also Holston 2008). It is therefore necessary that we 
analyse how people may also seek to mediate between informality and the 
demands of formalisation. A useful approach to this end may be found in 
Bear’s (2014a, b) emphasis that we explore ethnographically the divergent 
social rhythms of different institutions such as those of production, con-
sumption, finance, social reproduction and governance. In particular, she 
exhorts us to explore how the divergent social rhythms of different institu-
tions may create conflicts and uncertainty at the level of the human life- 
course, and how people seek to mediate between such divergent social 
rhythms through acts of labour. We must therefore include into our 
enquiries also the acts of labour that are not necessarily recognised as such, 
such as the issue of informal labour, in considering the social formation of 
capital and wealth. Bear’s concern is not to problematise the boundaries of 
formality and informality, or the many intersections between formalised 
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and unauthorised economic activities (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), 
but to explore the acts of labour that cross-cuts such distinctions. While 
informal labour represents aspects of inequality that are often invisible and 
unaccountable to state institutions, informality is nonetheless part of social 
relations that significantly contribute to the accumulation of wealth in 
society (2014a:643). Considering how key aspects of inequality are played 
out as well as reproduced through different kinds of informal or unrecog-
nised work, the following section examines how vendors draw upon key 
identity markers and relations in their economic tactics. It includes an 
exploration of how vendors deal with and mediate between official 
demands and other modes of sociality, and hence how economic processes 
are informed by existing social relations and institutions. These economic 
processes play out in spaces that are created through, and contributing to 
reinforce, relations and categorisations related to gender, ‘race’ and class.
thE soCial EmbEddEdnEss of tradE
With its location on the slopes of the Andes and as the second largest city 
in Peru, Arequipa is an important regional distribution point for trade 
between highland and coast, and a convenient location for importation 
and distribution of goods from Bolivia and Chile. The contrabandistas 
travel every week to bring merchandise in large quantities to the retailers 
at market places in Arequipa. Some contrabandistas also have their own 
market pitches, where they also run retailing businesses.
My interlocutor Rosaria (which is the pseudonym I have given her) is 
among the vendors who have been part of the Feria association in Arequipa 
since the beginning. Like many of the other  vendors, she is from a 
 community outside Puno, and came to Arequipa as a young girl. With 
only a couple of years of primary school, she first worked a few years as a 
domestic servant before she started selling sweets in the streets and later 
became part of the association. For a long time Rosaria lived with her fam-
ily in a shack on occupied land in Arequipa’s outskirts, and when her 
husband was laid-off from his job in 2000, she started to bring contraband 
from Bolivia in the hope of increasing her earnings.
Several scholars have noted how women are further marginalised and 
impoverished through their involvement in vending and informal work 
(e.g. Kabeer 2010). While informal work may indeed contribute to repro-
duce structural inequalities, the significance of earnings made from vend-
ing should not be underestimated. Like her mother, Rosaria’s daughter 
Dorothea also turned to trade and contraband, after having worked a few 
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years at a textile factory. While Dorothea used to be paid the minimum 
salary when working in the factories, she earns a lot more now, as a vendor. 
As a result, she has managed to construct a big house in one of Arequipa’s 
shanty towns and to send her son to a private school. Indeed, Dorothea’s 
earnings gradually resulted to be more predictable and sometimes even 
higher than her husband’s. He used to work in construction, and although 
earning a monthly salary, his earnings were unpredictable since job con-
tracts were only for three months. After a while her husband grew tired of 
this and decided to accompany Dorothea in business. The income earned 
from vending may thus represent the more steady income of a household, 
and upon realising this some men join their wives’ businesses. At the Feria, 
there are also vendors who have university education, but who, due to low 
pay, have decided to work in vending. This situation illustrates how weak 
regulation of labour conditions, combined with low pay in the public sec-
tor, makes vending the better alternative for many.
While Dorothea and her mother trade in groceries, many contrabandis-
tas prefer to work with clothes since the gain per unit is higher compared 
to other goods. Clothes are also easier to hide than many other goods. 
Contraband clothes are sold without tags; the contrabandistas remove 
them to make customs and fiscal authorities believe that the clothes are 
not meant for commercial sale. Victoria is one of my interlocutors who not 
only sells textiles from her own pitch at the Feria, but also travels to collect 
goods. Victoria’s husband is a teacher, and often comes to help his wife in 
her business. When she is travelling, he sells from her pitch. Their daugh-
ters sometimes assist, too. Victoria is originally from the department of 
Puno, from a community close to Desaguadero and the border with 
Bolivia. During her journeys to Desaguadero and on her way back to 
Arequipa, she always stops to visit with relatives in the area. This gives her 
a good opportunity to hide the garments without being disturbed. 
Desaguadero is an important town for the transport and distribution of 
contraband, as it is located just at the delineated border between Peru and 
Bolivia. Desaguadero is often referred to as tierra de nadie (no man’s 
land), referring to the absence of state control in areas where vending is 
already institutionalised. In and around Desaguadero, people bring their 
merchandise across the border without particular interference, or by pay-
ing bribes (coyma).
The fact that most of these enterprises are kinship-based and involve 
the labour input of partners, children and other kin helps vendors main-
tain the everyday operations of their businesses and accommodate for the 
risks. Vending demands long working hours and a lot of travel, so there is 
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a division of labour among household members as to who sells from the 
pitch and who travels. Many vendors have learned the skills of vending 
from their parents or older kin, and it may be difficult to enter these busi-
nesses without such connections. The contrabandistas often travel together 
in small groups, cooperating about where to buy goods, and how to avoid 
getting caught. Sometimes they make joint investments in particular com-
modities in order to benefit from the better prices given when buying por 
mayor. Like Victoria, many contrabandistas have kin living in the border 
areas. Kin and local farmers often help the contrabandistas, providing 
information and storage for goods. The economic strategising of vendors 
thus draws upon socially and spatially embedded relations and identities, 
and reinforcing the constitution of this kind of work as defined by key 
inequality markers (class, ‘race’, gender).
While often seeking to evade formality, as suggested by Gandolfo, ven-
dors may also attempt to strike a balance between formality and informal-
ity, in the sense that they seek to operate formally enough not to constantly 
get caught, and informally enough to actually earn money, as is illustrated 
in the case of Victoria. While Victoria sometimes goes to Lima to buy 
merchandise from the authorised importers operating in Gamarra, these 
legal clothes are more expensive. More often, when she has less capital to 
invest, Victoria travels to the border areas, instead, for contraband. Since 
transporting contraband can be difficult, she brings only a few garments at 
a time. To avoid confiscation at customs, she might wear the clothes (espe-
cially the bigger, heavier garments), hidden underneath her own clothes, 
or mixes them with other things in a big bag. She removes tags, so that 
customs officers do not notice that the clothes are new, but view them as 
personal items. From Lima, in contrast, it is possible to transport large 
quantities from a legal importer, with taxes paid and an RUC-number 
(shop registration number). Victoria’s different tactics for bringing mer-
chandise to Arequipa illustrates the considerations contrabandistas make 
regarding formality and informality and the different routes for obtaining 
contraband versus documented goods. Like Victoria, some contrabandis-
tas prefer to bring goods legally if they have sufficient capital, but turning 
to contraband in cases when they are in lack, and hence combining their 
trade in contraband goods with documented merchandise. It shows how 
vendors do not necessarily resist formality, but that formality requires 
more capital to invest and often gives vendors a lower income compared 
to the trading of undocumented goods. Official demands of formalisation 
thus contain the potential of exacerbating inequalities.
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ambiguous status as Work
Several scholars have observed how market women are seen as vulgar, 
indecent and somewhat dirty figures by the ‘educated’ classes, as ‘matter 
out of place’ within dominant gender ideologies, and evoking the dread of 
the indian, and especially of the indian woman who transgresses symbolic 
boundaries (Seligmann 2004; Weismantel 2001; Rivera Cusicanqui and 
Arnold 1996). The work of women vendors thus involves not only risk 
and uncertainty, but often humiliating and abusive treatment, also from 
public functionaries. Despite this, it seems as if public functionaries have 
also typically shown a certain degree of tolerance for these activities, an 
issue I return to.
What appears as the transgressive aspects of vendors’ practices is illus-
trated by the representation of these women as somewhat ‘men-like’ and 
‘out of proportions’, in a way that was captured in the program Paisana 
Jacinta, broadcasted by Latina Television. In the program, a male actor 
plays the role of Jacinta, depicting an indigenous woman trying to accom-
modate to urban ways in Lima. More than simply illustrating racial and 
gendered stereotypes connected to the chola, Paisana Jacinta embodies the 
social uneasiness spurred by the image of a woman who struggles to make 
ends meet. Now, while the presence of women vendors in urban market 
places is indeed considered disturbing by many, their market work is at the 
same time regarded as an extension of domestic and reproductive activi-
ties. Market work thus has an ambiguous status as work. During my first 
fieldwork, when I asked women in a shanty town in Arequipa about their 
work, many responded that they did not work since there were no jobs to 
get. Later I learned that the same women worked as vendors. In this man-
ner, they seemed to consent with the view that vending is not really ‘proper 
work’. I also learned that many women prefer to work in vending due to, 
among other things, the possibility to bring their children along to the 
market—something which is difficult in other forms of work. Market 
spaces are not regularised through norms or supervisors to the same extent 
as other workplaces, and especially small children can be looked after while 
working at a market pitch. Also contrabandistas who travel to bring goods 
from Bolivia or Chile often bring children along on their journeys. Indeed, 
vending represents an opportunity to both look after the children and earn 
money at the same time. These dimensions reinforce the perception of 
vending as not really ‘proper work’, despite the fact that women’s vending 
activities often represents an important contribution to their households’ 
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income. As argued by de la Cadena (1995), perceptions of vending in the 
Andes are informed also by the notion that women are regarded as more 
indian than their male counterparts. As women sell products from the 
highlands and often wearing Andean clothing and braids, women’s work 
in trade is often considered of less value than that of men. It indicates how 
vending is imagined and constituted through particular, key markers of 
inequality.
Several feminist scholars have demonstrated that the dichotomous asso-
ciation of women with the domestic and men with the public sphere serves 
as a way to mask structural features of employment, to undercommunicate 
and/or devalorise women’s labour (Leacock 1972; Sacks 1974; Yanagisako 
1987). Binaries like public/domestic and production/reproduction have 
thus come to be seen as a disguise for power mechanisms and cultural- 
specific gender ideologies. Babb (2001) has argued that vendors in the 
Andes do not operate within what can simply be considered a ‘reproduc-
tive’ sphere or by selling small-scale food products, by demonstrating how 
vending in the Andes may also involve mass-production. Thus criticising 
the widespread view of market women’s labour as strictly reproductive and 
distributive, Babb stressed how different kinds of food processing take 
place in the market that would have been interpreted as productive if done 
in a factory. Indeed, vendors add economic (as well as cultural) value to 
their work in a manner that not only resists the productive/reproductive 
binary, but throws such binaries into a critical light, as veiling the inter-
connectedness of these social processes and the significant role of vendors 
in the national economy (Babb 2001). It illustrates how the monetary 
significance of vending, both for individual households and for the national 
economy, is skewed due to its construction as a feminine realm. As I will 
return to, the image of vending as a feminine realm and extension of 
household activities may nonetheless represent a resource in vendors’ tac-
tics and encounters with public officials.
Several unauthorised markets have continued for years without particu-
lar interference, and many contrabandistas have brought goods across the 
borders throughout their often long working careers. On occasion their 
goods have been confiscated, but not frequently enough to prevent them 
from continuing their businesses. It is of course impossible, however, to 
generalise regarding the official interference in vending and contraband, 
since such interference has varied over time, and with the kind of activity 
and merchandise. While there have been periods when vendors have expe-
rienced significant persecution and abuse, my impression, since my first 
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fieldwork in 1997, is that there has also been a certain degree of toleration 
for vending and contraband, especially under the presidency of Fujimori. 
The frequency of official interference seems to have increased over the 
recent years though, although with significant variations across regions. 
During my fieldwork in 2011, interferences at marketplaces were becom-
ing more frequent in Lima than in Arequipa and Puno, although the con-
trols along the roads, especially before Arequipa, had become a lot stricter 
than before. Some public functionaries also seemed to find it difficult to 
intervene in these businesses, and explained their non-interference by 
stressing that ‘there are no jobs to get anyway’. As underlined by a legal 
advisor I interviewed in Arequipa: ‘it is difficult to do anything, because 
people get angry and will ask for an alternative’.
EnaCtmEnts of gEndErEd and raCialisEd idEntitiEs
In recent years, Rosaria’s daughter Dorothea has had her merchandise 
confiscated several times. On one such occasion, her husband criticised her 
for not being able to avoid such interference and for thus letting her goods 
be confiscated. As we met a few days later, Dorothea said that: ‘he thinks 
it is easy, but it is not easy at all, it is not as if you can just take some prod-
ucts and then you earn’. Many vendors similarly stressed the struggle, 
suffering and sacrifice that vending involves, but simultaneously emphasis-
ing that they just have to go on ‘with their eyes closed’, in order to sup-
port their children. In this and other ways, vendors evoke a notion of 
motherhood in terms of suffering and sacrifice, a notion that has been 
discussed in literature from Latin America as central for making political 
claims (Goddard 2000), as they plead that vending is their only way to 
earn a living and feed their children. By actualising these notions, more 
specifically the poor and marginalised mother, vendors try to make inter-
ference more difficult for the public functionaries.
Some contrabandistas bring second-hand clothes into Peru by travelling 
to Iquique in Chile for clothes shipped from the USA, Europe or Japan. 
These women are called cachineras (referring to discarded things), and sell 
from the streets close to the Feria. The commercialisation of second- hand 
clothes is a contested issue though. In 2005, the importation and sale of 
second-hand clothes was prohibited by law, in what was considered a half-
hearted attempt to protect the national textile industry. This commerciali-
sation nonetheless continues, as vendors move their pitches from place to 
place, or place themselves hidden in the middle of other vendors who sell 
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legally. At a huge let-out sale for second-hand clothes hidden in a parking 
lot, I encountered a group of vendors selling clothes from huge plastic bags 
to retailers from neighbouring markets. One of them explained that some 
women from Puno take care of the importation from Chile and that these 
women are the ones in charge of the whole business. ‘These women can 
earn money from anything’, she said. ‘They even fight the police. If they 
were men, they would have been put to jail. But not with the women. They 
[that is, the functionaries] have more respect for women. For this reason 
vending is easier for women’.
This notion, that functionaries have ‘more respect for women’, hinges 
upon an idea about woman as mother. It indicates the significance of par-
ticular constructions of womanhood for how vending and interferences in 
vending are negotiated. This notion, deliberately associating womanhood 
with domestic chores and disassociating them from commercial activities 
and regulation, may allow women to be involved in contraband or other 
businesses at the margins of the formal, perhaps even giving women a rela-
tive advantage over men. Such constructions of womanhood may even 
work to reinforce claims to local sovereignty in practices of vending and 
cross-border trade. While this notion of womanhood as motherhood may, 
in many cases, contribute to facilitate women’s involvement in vending, it 
is also related to the devalorisation of women’s work, that women’s work 
is not regarded as important enough for the authorities to interfere, due 
to a view that it is men who do the real work and women’s work is seen as 
‘extra’ (Lazar 2008). In a similar vein, Carsten (2004) has noted how 
most kinds of work are considered legitimate as long as it is related to 
household subsistence. This is not to say that women vendors are not 
exposed to abuse by public functionaries, but rather is to stress how con-
structions of womanhood may affect the ways in which official interfer-
ences are negotiated.
In encounters with fiscal, customs or police authorities, vendors may 
also represent themselves as ‘ignorant’, claiming that they did not know it 
was illegal, that they are humble and cannot read and write, and that the 
officials must understand and forgive them. When referring to what she 
regards as the sometimes bad ways in which vendors are treated by the 
customs and fiscal authorities, one vendor for instance said that ‘although 
we are humble and do not know, they [that is, the functionaries] ought to 
respect us’. In this and other ways, vendors and contrabandistas may con-
struct an image of themselves as humble and ‘not knowing’. This does not 
mean that they not also criticise, mock or manipulate public functionaries 
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though, and contrabandistas sometimes fight the custom officials in order 
to pass with their goods, or they destroy their goods by pouring petrol on 
so that the goods will be of no value for the officials either.
Racial categorisation too is made relevant in vendors’ encounters with 
public functionaries. Dorothea for instance said that ‘I have this look 
[referring to herself as a chola]. The customs know immediately when they 
see me’. Her colleague Juana suggested that she should start dyeing her 
hair, in order to look like a tourist. In this and other ways, appearances are 
made important in encounters with public functionaries—and identity 
markers may also be changed with such encounters in mind. Juana herself 
works as a cachinera. When she and her cachinera colleagues travel to 
bring merchandise they try to look like tourists, making sure to be nicely 
dressed with make-up and all, and travelling with huge, stylish suitcases—
in contrast to the more common bultos (bundles). In this manner, some 
contrabandistas try to mimic the looks of tourists or mestiza women. It is 
also not uncommon that contrabandistas manipulate their identity papers, 
and some even change their surnames to more Hispanic-sounding ones, in 
order to avoid the prejudice that a Quechua or Aymara surname may 
result in. There are other contrabandistas though, who refuse to show 
their papers when being stopped by police or customs agents. As we were 
discussing the dangers of getting caught when bringing contraband, Juana 
stressed that ‘you have to make an effort never to show them your docu-
ments, and never give your name’. Vendors may thus not only seek to hide 
their practices to avoid official interference, but also, once caught, try to 
make themselves ‘illegible’ to state institutions by refusing to provide 
documentation.
As illustrated in the case of the cahineras, vendors seek to make them-
selves ‘visible’ in very specific and deliberate ways, by making use of iden-
tity markers such as clothes, and hence drawing upon particular racialised 
and gendered stereotypes in their attempts to avoid interference. While 
some try to dress up as mestiza women, others wear the traditional many- 
layered skirts (polleras), braids and bowler-hats on their journeys, and in 
this manner emphasising an image of indigenous farmer-women, as a kind 
of strategic essentialism. For instance, when my interlocutor Justina travels 
to bring contraband, she always dresses in her pollera, and on top of her 
contraband goods, she places agricultural products from her land in the 
border village, Yapita. In this manner, public functionaries are more likely 
to consider her as a ‘humble farmer woman’. This strategic use of identity 
markers can be related to the ways in which women are ascribed a particular 
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symbolic significance in representations of the Andean, as ‘uncontami-
nated’ by colonisation, hybridisation and geographical displacement 
(Crain 1996). According to Crain, this image can be seen as part of a 
strategic essentialism in order for women to gain a voice in a post-colonial 
context, as well as extend their employment opportunities in urban con-
texts (1996:137). It reflects how projects of subjectification in this context 
entail a binary logic of classification, situating persons as either mestiza 
woman or indigenous woman, positions that may involve different claims 
for being ‘citizen’ or ‘legal’. The mestiza or tourist-looking woman may 
more easily be allowed to pass as ‘legal’, while the indigenous women may 
be allowed to pass for simply being situated ‘outside’. The chola in con-
trast, as located in-between these categories, does not fit either, and may, 
as illustrated in the case of Dorothea mentioned earlier, be more easily 
suspected to work illegally. Specific constructions of womanhood and 
racialised identities are thus actualised and enacted in vendors’ encounters 
with public officials, as categories of identity are made relevant in attempts 
to mediate between informality and official requirements. While they may 
appear as ‘perfect neoliberal citizens’ as noted in the introduction, they 
simultaneously oppose and circumvent the demands of the state’s neolib-
eral regime, by drawing on relational as well as symbolic resources. Hence, 
informal trade is constructed and reconstructed as a particular feminine 
and racialised realm. As we shall see in the next section, recent economic 
policies contribute to skew some of these symbolic multiplicities by 
 intensifying mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, and to ‘un-make’ 
women vendors as apparently ‘perfect neoliberal subjects’.
thE rEgimE of floW and rEgulation
During the last few years, Peruvian authorities have increased border con-
trols, and measures have been taken to formalise commodity flows and 
modernise the border control system. This has partly been in response to 
demands from the USA, with which Peru in 2006 signed a trade promo-
tion agreement (ratified in 2009). As part of this agreement the USA is to 
assist Peru in limiting exportation of narcotics, modernising the equipment 
and procedures of the National Police and Customs Agency, and strength-
ening the rule of law. These dimensions of trade agreements indicate how, 
as previously noted, the current liberalisation of the market worldwide is 
accompanied by an increasing significance ascribed to formality and the 
legal. In addition to strengthening and modernising checkpoints at the 
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borders, Peruvian authorities have also placed checkpoints along the high-
ways before entering the big cities, and, as previously noted, policies have 
been implemented to formalise economic activities. In addition, routines 
for the registration (and destruction) of confiscated goods have been intro-
duced to reduce the problem of functionaries who take confiscated goods 
for themselves.
With stricter control and regulation of commodity flows at the borders 
and beyond, the advantages of bringing contraband from Bolivia and 
Chile seem to be in gradual decline. In Arequipa, many people who ran 
relatively large contraband businesses, from a local point of view, told me 
that they were downsising or leaving their businesses. One of them is 
Camila, a woman regarded as a grand business woman among her col-
leagues at the Feria. She brings leather jackets from Bolivia, which she 
buys for 120 soles and sells for about 300 soles. She used to earn well, 
bringing 300 jackets at a time, but now that the border controls have 
increased she brings only 20 or 30. Other contrabandistas have decided to 
stop bringing contraband altogether, and formalise their businesses. For 
instance, Dorothea, after repeatedly having her goods confiscated, invested 
in a copy machine and started selling authorised office equipment. After 
formalising, however, her earnings declined and she decided to invest in 
an informal mining project to compensate. This investment proved to be 
more hazardous than any of her previous ventures, however. As in 
Dorothea’s case, many contrabandistas feel forced to formalise in response 
to increased border controls, but suffer a loss of income as a result. 
Formalisation may thus pose new and unforeseen challenges and 
dilemmas.
After Peru signed a free trade agreement with China in 2009, China 
was expected to replace the USA as Peru’s most important bilateral part-
ner, a prospect which might seem ever more likely now after Trump has 
been elected president. The agreement with China contributes to facilitate 
the exportation and importation of Chinese goods and has contributed to 
an increase of importation especially of textiles to Peru. The agreement 
involves reduced import taxes and specifies the possibility of refunding 
these taxes on a long-term basis. Some of the people I interviewed argued 
that the agreement would give Peruvians great opportunities to earn 
money through importation, and there was almost no end to their ideas 
for new business ventures. This optimism was especially widespread among 
the young and middle class in Lima, but less so in Arequipa.
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Seen from the perspective of contrabandistas in Arequipa, the free trade 
agreement with China has resulted in more competition from grand-scale 
actors whose activities depend less on chains of local intermediaries, and 
importing directly (and formally) from overseas. As a result, vending activ-
ities seem to become increasingly centred around Lima, as more goods are 
brought in directly and legally through the capital. So, while people used 
to come to Arequipa—even from Lima—in order to buy contraband 
goods, opportunities related to cross-border trade with Bolivia and Chile 
are in decline. The activities of contrabandistas are thus increasingly 
restricted, as their reliance on small-scale, informal and socially embedded 
forms of trade is complicated by a strengthening of controls as well as 
increased competition.
While there is an expectation that free trade agreements will break 
down the limitations on trade across borders, the situation of contra-
bandistas shows that such agreements may contribute to open up some 
borders while increasingly restricting others, and opening up trade chan-
nels for some, but restricting them for others. Hence, while accommo-
dating legal importation, the business opportunities offered through 
these agreements seem to be limited to the middle/upper-classes. Indeed, 
free trade agreements can be seen to produce specific sorts of ‘governable 
spaces’ (Watts 2004) where trade is allowed to happen only in specific, 
pre-defined ways, while excluding other forms of trade from the same 
spaces. In the Peruvian context, the mechanisms of inclusion and exclu-
sion that are thus created must be understood in terms of their gendered 
effects, as the agreements increasingly constrain the small-scale, unskilled 
and more localised forms of trade dominated by women. Overseas impor-
tation demands higher financial investments and greater knowledge of 
national regulations and procedures of importation. Legal imports thus 
contrast sharply to the localised and often small-scale modes of bringing 
contraband from neighbouring countries, which rely firstly on social net-
works. The greater importance of overseas importation may therefore 
serve to exclude actors who lack capital and knowledge. Indeed, free 
trade agreements may put particular constraints on regional cross-border 
trade in ways that are likely to affect, particularly, women reliant on this 
kind of economic activity. The regulation and formalisation of trade 
(through, for instance, free trade agreements) may thus marginalise many 
women further and render their market work even more ambiguous as 
work. In this regard, Peru’s signing of free trade agreements in recent 
years represents an accentuation of the country’s insertion into global 
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markets in a way that puts new demands on the ‘perfect neoliberal citi-
zen’, and with the potential of fortifying certain forms of inequality. It 
indicates how economic policies and processes are moulded by and 
through existing social relations and institutions, and hence play out in 
spaces that are created through, and contributing to reinforce, relations 
and categorisations connected to class, gender, and ‘race’.
ConClusions
Exploring how economic activities at the margins of the formal economy 
are socially embedded and informed by existing social relations and insti-
tutions of various kinds, this chapter has argued that policies for the pro-
motion of entrepreneurship and formalisation cannot be considered a 
historically and socio-culturally neutral or isolated process. The chapter 
has therefore sought to provide an ethnographic exploration of the class, 
ethnic and gender relationships in which these economic activities are 
actualised. These are important aspects to take into account if we are to 
understand the proliferation of Peru’s so-called culture of informality, and 
how it is constituted and affected by neoliberal reforms and ongoing poli-
cies for entrepreneurship, formalisation and regulation.
There are significant class, racialised and gendered dimensions to the 
ways in which vending and contraband in Peru are practised and negoti-
ated, illustrated not only by many people’s lack of other alternatives to 
earn an income, but also by how vendors draw upon relational and 
 symbolic resources in their economic strategising. The chapter has there-
fore demonstrated how vendors seek to mediate between official demands 
and informal dimensions of vending by relying on social relations and 
particular enactments of womanhood and racialised identities. While the 
view of vending as an extension of domestic activities may contribute to 
devalorise women’s work, I have illustrated how women may also seek to 
enact these particular constructions of womanhood in attempts to facili-
tate vending at the margins of the formal. By evoking a notion of woman-
hood as mother, and more specifically the poor mother’s suffering and 
sacrifice, vendors plead that vending is their only way to earn a living. In 
this and other ways, they seek to make it more difficult for public function-
aries to interfere, by actualising and enacting an image of womanhood 
that has long been considered central in Latin America for making political 
claims. Drawing on particular gendered and racialised identities and ste-
reotypes, vendors try to avoid and circumvent official interference. 
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Through their economic strategising and tactics, vendors both subscribe 
to—and oppose—the stereotypical expectation towards the chola as well as 
the demands to the ‘perfect neoliberal’ citizen, but increasingly so with a 
risk of being criminalised, as I demonstrated in the last part of the 
chapter.
While women’s activities in market work and contraband is ascribed an 
ambiguous status as work, there have been continual attempts in recent 
years to include such activities in state regimes of regulation and control. 
The stimulation of entrepreneurship and market liberalisation initiated by 
Fujimori in the 1990s has thus gradually been accompanied by measures 
to promote the formalisation of unauthorised businesses and border con-
trols. Aiming to promote ‘development’, security for owners and a more 
effective land market, such measures may, however, contribute to fortify 
existing fissures along class, ethnic and gender lines, and result in further 
exclusion, even criminalisation, of vendors. With the signing of free trade 
agreements in recent years, we see yet an example of how market liberali-
sation operates through an increased significance ascribed to formality and 
the legal. While such agreements are contributing to facilitate Peru’s 
access to global markets, several contrabandistas experience their busi-
nesses to be negatively affected, due to the strengthening of border con-
trols and increased competition from overseas importation. By this I do 
not intend to romanticise entrepreneurship at the margins of the legal, but 
rather to demonstrate how small-scale entrepreneurs from the working 
classes may be affected in very different ways than grand-scale  entrepreneurs. 
In particular, considering that vending activities in this context are actual-
ised through relations and categorisations connected also to gender and 
racialisation in specific ways, the promotion of formalised, overseas impor-
tation may have particular gendered and racialising effects. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge, in discussing Peru’s now long- standing pro-
motion of market liberalisation, how the production of specific sort of 
‘governable spaces’ may serve to exclude certain actors and forms of eco-
nomic activities from the same spaces, and, as a result, reinforce long-
standing economic and socio-cultural inequalities.
notE
1. Altiplano refers to the presence of vendors and goods from the Andean 
highlands.
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neoliberalism throughout the region, have particularly targeted ‘racially 
othered’ young males living in poor neighbourhoods. The Pink Tide did 
little, or nothing, to challenge this state of affairs. On the contrary, the 
targeting of ‘racially othered,’ poor, young males as criminals is a strong 
feature of securitisation in Brazil, Venezuela and Honduras alike, despite 
these countries’ radically different engagements with the Pink Tide. The 
massive targeting of ‘racially othered’ poor, young, males in Latin America 
also has important similarities to processes of securitisation in the United 
States (see, e.g. Goffman 2014). In this chapter, we focus on the particular 
case of Honduras, yet we also draw comparisons with other countries that 
allow us to reflect upon the broader implications of the country’s ‘iron fist’ 
approach to crime control. By doing so, we wish to emphasise how puni-
tive control over ‘surplus’ populations in neoliberalised societies are 
informed by and contribute to the reproduction of historically constituted 
‘racial’ and socio-economic hierarchies. As this chapter shows, the prison 
population in Honduras has not only dramatically increased in size, but 
once being inside the penitentiary system, the young prisoners end up 
passing important formative years in a system that has nothing to offer 
them in terms of rehabilitation or education. Whilst Honduras’ socio- 
economically better off can pay their way out of the prison system by legal 
or illegal means, poor men are systematically discriminated against even 
before they enter the prison. Indeed, the punitive profiling of certain 
groups of citizens, the inefficiency of the judicial system and the legal 
design of processual and penal codes indicates that the Honduran prison 
system is better understood as a place of containment for ‘unwanted 
 elements’ than as an instrument for the rule of law.
The official justification for pursing an ‘iron fist’ approach towards 
crime in Honduras is the escalating levels of violence in the country during 
the past two decades. In the early 1990s, Salomón (1994) observed that a 
Parts of this chapter have previously been published as part of the research project 
Everyday Manouvers. Military-Civilian Relations in Latin American and the 
Middle East, led by professor Nefissa Naguib and financed by the Norwegian 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The original paper was titled CMI Working Paper: 
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new type of violence was emerging that differed from the political violence 
in prior decades. This implied the gradual proliferation of criminal and 
delinquent acts such as armed robbery and theft, mostly involving male 
adolescents and young adults. Towards the end of the 1990s and early 
twenty-first century, various scholars recognised the emergence of ‘new 
violence’ in various post-conflict scenarios (Koonings and Kruijt 2004; 
Rotker 2002),1 including a variety of actors such as death squads, paramili-
tary groups, organised crime and youth gangs. In Honduras, youth gangs 
and, more recently, organised crime, proliferated. The former, known as 
the maras, appeared in the 1990s. Part of the reason why this happened 
was changes in the conditions for social reproduction, such as the family, 
the educational system and the labour market. These changes were brought 
about by the implementation of neoliberal policies, leading to increased 
poverty, inequality and unemployment.2 Today, around 60 per cent of the 
Honduran population live in poverty (UNDP 2014). Most of the popula-
tion, particularly the youth segment, has been hit by the lack of job oppor-
tunities in the country, forcing many to immigrate mainly to the United 
States. In other cases, entering the illicit drug economy or joining the 
gangs becomes a solution to the difficulties of overcoming economic 
hardships and for finding a place for identity and belonging (Strocka 
2006:139).
Another intersecting factor was the massive arrival of deportees from 
the United States with a background as active gang members in the 
1990s. Shifts in the US migration policy led to the deportation of docu-
mented and undocumented migrants who had criminal records. Many of 
the deportees were members of two street gangs from Southern California: 
the Mara Salvatrucha and the Eighteenth Street Gang (Dieciocho). Shortly 
after returning ‘home,’ a place where many had never lived and which did 
not even exist in their childhood memories, the deportees, who were 
members of either one of the maras, reorganised and merged the gang 
with the existing local ones. Following these ‘mergers’ (there had been 
gangs in Honduras since the 1950s), street gangs’ organisation became 
more complex due to increasing membership numbers, and the use of 
violence became more institutionalised (Salomón et al. 1999). However, 
even if the maras were framed as the main culprits for escalating violence 
and crime in the country, they were not the centre of the storm. Rather, 
organised crime was (Rodgers 2009; Jüttersonke et al. 2009; UNODC 
2012). However, these networks are much more difficult to target, whilst 
 COMING OF AGE IN THE PENAL SYSTEM: NEOLIBERALISM, ‘MANO DURA’... 
208 
also being tied to more powerful sectors in the country (Bosworth 2010; 
Shipley 2016).
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the prison population in 
Honduras has been on the rise. Currently, there are 17,017 female and 
male inmates, out of a population of 8 million (World Prison Brief 2016). 
This is almost twice the number of prisoners in 2002 and three times more 
than in the late 1990s. In 2012, the prison population rate was at 152 of 
100,000 per inhabitants. In 2014, it had risen to 194/100,000.
The Honduran government’s security agenda is one of the main rea-
sons for the increase of the inmate population. Introduced in 2002 by the 
administration of Ricardo Maduro (2002–2006) and continued by the 
subsequent administrations of president Manuel Zelaya (2006–2009), 
Porfirio Lobo (2010–2014) and Juan Orlando Hernández (2013–), the 
domestic security agenda has sought to reduce violence and crime by 
incarcerating not only convicted delinquents and criminals but also those 
who are perceived—judged by their physical appearances—to be associ-
ated with crime and gang membership. Typically, this includes clothing, 
tattoos and haircuts, but in practice, class- and ethno-racial identity mark-
ers is also enough to be singled out for arrest and imprisonment.
As we discuss further below, the ‘iron fist’ approach to crime taken by 
successive Honduran governments is typical of what Wacquant (2009) 
and others have theorised as an intrinsic part of the neoliberal state, a state 
that seeks to ‘control’ those who are structurally excluded and margin-
alised by the neoliberal order through an expanding punitive prison sys-
tem. Thus, our purpose in this chapter is not to single out Honduras in 
particular for maintaining this neoliberal approach to securitisation. As 
other chapters show, even Brazil, which has been one of the leading forces 
of the Pink Tide, has done the same (see Sørbøe (Chap. 5); Ystanes 
(Chap.  4), this volume). Rather, we take the firm continuation of this 
agenda across the political spectrum as indicative of the scope of possibili-
ties, and of imagination, of Latin American governments and the deep-
seated punitive ideology and structural features in which they are 
embedded. At the same time, Honduras’ particular geopolitical context as 
part of the US War on Drugs, and the increasingly authoritarian stance 
taken by its ruling elites, points to an increasing consolidation of ‘iron fist’ 
security politics that is undercut by a general repressive stance towards 
marginalised and excluded groups.
L.G. RIVERA ET AL.
 209
the PInk tIde In honduras: Zelaya’s BrIef Interlude
Honduras was briefly considered to be in the orbit of the so-called Pink 
Tide during Manuel Zelaya’s presidency until he was ousted by the mili-
tary and conservative elites in June 2009. Zelaya, a wealthy land and ranch 
owner belonging to one of the regional elites of the country, had been 
elected for the Liberal party in 2006. Initially, he took a slightly softer 
approach to security politics than his main contender, Porfirio Lobo. 
However, this softer stance never really came into effect, arguably because 
he was caught up in other economic and political issues (Bosworth 
2010:19).
Whilst in office, Zelaya introduced free school enrolment, increased the 
minimum wage, increased wages for teachers and attempted to reduce fuel 
costs (Gordon and Webber 2011). Moreover, he reformed the mining 
laws, introducing a new bill that would raise tax on foreign mining com-
panies, passed a Reforestation Law (Ley de Reforestación) designed to 
protect the environment and refused to privatise the state-owned electric 
and telecommunications companies.
The traditional elites and the military, though not happy with these 
reforms, did not initially feel threatened. Eventually, however, this attitude 
changed, mostly due to two of Zelaya’s initiatives. Firstly, in 2008, Zelaya 
decided to join the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 
(ALBA) led by Venezuela, in order to address an economic downturn in 
the country (Gordon and Webber 2011). Secondly, in 2009 Zelaya 
decided to call a referendum asking the Honduran population to vote for 
a new Constituent National Assembly that would reform the constitution. 
The traditional elites and the military, as well as other conservative sectors 
of civil society such as the Catholic Church, immediately reacted against 
Zelaya. They claimed the referendum was part of a plan for Zelaya to 
remain in power, and that he was becoming a puppet of Venezuelan presi-
dent Hugo Chávez.3
The military refused to comply with Zelaya’s order to distribute the 
ballots for the referendum scheduled to take place during the presidential 
elections in November 2009. Zelaya then fired the head of the Armed 
Forces, Gen. Romeo Orlando Vásquez Velásquez. Shortly thereafter, the 
Minister of Defense, Ángel Orellana, resigned. The Supreme Court ruled 
both the referendum and Gen. Vásquez’s dismissal as illegal. In Congress, 
Roberto Micheletti from the Liberal party and president of Congress, as 
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well as other members of the Liberal party, turned against Zelaya. This 
group, the right-wing faction of the Liberal party, allied with the military 
high officials, conservative groups such as the Catholic Church—especially 
the Opus Dei—and the traditional elites to overthrow Zelaya.4 On Sunday, 
June 28, Zelaya was ousted when the military arrived at Zelaya’s home 
and sent him to Costa Rica in his pajamas. Roberto Micheletti became 
interim president until the new elections in November 2009. These elec-
tions were won by Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo, who Shipley (2016:9) describes 
as ‘a coup-supporter and member of the Honduran oligarchy.’ Subsequent 
presidential elections in 2013 were won by Juan Orlando Hernández, who 
was president of Congress during Lobo’s presidency. The elections were 
strongly criticised by international observers (Shipley 2016:12). In recent 
years, political violence, murder and persecution of dissent has escalated in 
Honduras (see Blitzer 2016; Hallinan 2009). Escalating violence and 
impunity has also been linked to US military funding and presence in 
Honduras, through the so-called War on Drugs (Grosso 2014; Shipley 
2016). Honduras is now ranked as the world’s most dangerous country 
for environmental activists (Global Witness 2017), an issue that received 
increasing international attention following the brutal murder of the 
internationally known environmental activist Berta Cáceres in 2016. In 
January 2017, Juan Orlando Hernández, a staunch ally of the United 
States, announced the he would seek re-election as president. Paradoxically, 
one of the main justifications for overthrowing Zelaya was concerns that 
he would change the constitution in order to do the same thing.
neolIBeralIsm In honduras
Nearly 30 years of neoliberal reforms have not only left a wide gap between 
rich and poor in Honduras, but also they reinforced the racial and gender 
hierarchies established in the colonial period. This contemporary overlap 
between poverty and being ‘racially othered’ is, as discussed below and in 
the introduction to this volume, an outcome of long historical processes 
in the region.
The first attempts to introduce neoliberal reforms in Honduras occurred 
during the government of José Azcona Hoyo (1986–1990) under the 
supervision of USAID (Bull 2016:97). The United States had a strong 
military presence in Honduras during the 1980s, using Honduran terri-
tory as the base to launch its operations against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 
At the time, US ambassador John Negroponte was widely considered as 
‘the real power holder’ in the country (Shipley 2016:5). The first structural 
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adjustment programme was signed in 1988, whilst the government of 
Rafael Leonardo Callejas (1990–1994) implemented further reforms 
including economic liberalisation and the privatisation of state industry 
and public services (Bull 2016:97).
In general, neoliberal reforms favoured Central America’s elites and 
dominant economic groups, who seized upon new opportunities in 
emerging private markets whilst simultaneously gaining access to global 
chains of production and capital with little state intervention (Robinson 
2003; Bull et al. 2014; Bull 2016). However, these reforms also widened 
the gap between poor and rich. The privatisation of social services and 
economic liberalisation policies undermined both social security nets and 
opportunities in the labour market. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) estimates that 70 per cent of new jobs over the past 15 years have 
been generated in the informal economy (ILO 2007:5). Furthermore, 
they estimate that some 75 per cent of workers in Latin America are 
involved in the informal economy, generating about 40 per cent of the 
continent’s GDP (ILO 2007:5). As explanatory factors for this increasing 
size of the informal sectors, the organisation points to:
High rates of rural–urban migration, structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s and 1990s and/or for some from burdensome regulations and lack of 
recognition of the property rights and capital of informal operators. (ILO 
2007:5)
The reduction of the formal job market also resulted in the expansion of 
criminal economy, creating a new labour market for the least qualified part 
of the workforce (Ziccardi 2008:9). For Portes and Hoffman, it is ‘per-
haps remarkable’ (Portes and Hoffman 2003:70) that only a small per-
centage of the informal proletariat has succumbed to crime in reaction to 
increasing impoverishment and marginalisation over the past decades.
Despite a relative and often absolute deterioration of their situation, the 
large majority of informal workers continue to toil at minimally paid domes-
tic service, unprotected work in micro-enterprise, or by inventing some 
form of marginal activity. (Portes and Hoffman 2003:70)
In Honduras, neoliberal reforms in the agricultural sector also had severe 
ripple effects. The 1992 Decree of Modernisation and Development of 
the Agricultural Sector (Ley de Modernización y de Desarrollo del Sector 
Agrícola) restructured traditional forms of production and land tenure 
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by  prioritising the development of agroindustry business. Campesinos 
(peasants) were unable to produce these types of crops because, contrary 
to the regional elites, they did not have access to credit or technology. 
Unable to sustain themselves, many peasants were forced to sell their lands 
to the growing agroindustry and migrated to the main cities (such as San 
Pedro Sula or Tegucigalpa) or even abroad (mainly the United States) in 
search of better economic opportunities. In the cities, however, many 
migrants become un- and/or underemployed, which in turn added to the 
crisis of urban marginality that is fuelling the negative cycle of structural 
inequality, violence and security politics in contemporary Honduras, 
affecting young men in particular.
the neolIBeral PunItIve state
As Garland (2002) discusses, the 1970s marked the start of a significant 
international shift in crime control and the criminal justice system, which 
implied the transformation of various institutions and technologies for 
social control. Rather than the belief in the rehabilitation of criminals and 
delinquents that predominated until the 1970s, today’s contemporary 
societies are driven by a culture of anxiety demanding a ‘tough-on-crime’ 
approach. The result has been a considerable increase of the prison popula-
tion, changes in attitudes and perceptions towards ‘criminals and delin-
quents’ and the increasing use of technology for surveillance (for instance, 
cameras in public areas such as shopping centres) and private forms of 
security. The global ascendance of neoliberal ideologies and governance 
have also greatly contributed to this shift. Previous explanatory frameworks 
focused on the assumption that crime occurs due to lack of opportunities; 
an approach that sought to connect individual behaviour to structural fac-
tors. However, in the neoliberal culture of crime control, the focus has 
shifted towards explaining crime by individual deviance (Garland 2002).
As Wacquant (2011) has argued, the neoliberal state deals with the 
‘destructive consequences’ of economic deregulation—such as the increase 
of poverty, marginality and exclusion—with violence against the lower 
classes:
[The neoliberal state] practices laissez-faire et laissez passer toward corpora-
tions and the upper class, at the level of the causes of inequality. But it is 
fiercely interventionist and authoritarian when it comes to dealing with the 
destructive consequences of economic deregulation for those at the lower 
end of the class and status spectrum.
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Thus, in effect, the neoliberal state does not ‘retreat’ from the social arena. 
Rather, social investment and the provision of job security is replaced with 
punitive measures as a new form of regulation and control of those who 
become structurally marginalised in the neoliberal economy (Antillano 
et al. 2016:198). Resistance against the effects of neoliberal policies by the 
lower and working classes is labelled as disorderly and threatening by the 
dominant classes, propelling the increased use of police and imprisonment 
in order to prevent the ‘undermin[ing] the authority of the state’ 
(Wacquant 2011). Underlying these policies and the ideological moral 
framing of them is a re-articulation of the culture of poverty (Lewis 1966), 
placing the burden of guilt upon the poor themselves. As Garland 
(2002:196) notes, poverty is attributed to ‘lack of effort, reckless choices, 
a distinctive culture, a chosen conduct.’ The individualising underlying 
tenant of neoliberal ideology reinforces such explanatory models. This 
leaves the poor in a situation whereby they not only have to bear the bur-
den of being subjected to structural marginalisation as ‘surplus’ popula-
tions in a deregulated, precariatised economy, but they also have to bear 
ideologically and culturally codified stigmas of being ‘unfit’ and ‘unde-
sired’ citizens in a ‘sink or swim’ ideological social order. For those who 
end up, guilty or not, in the prison system, the combined burden of struc-
tural and cultural-ideological marginalisation hits them with full force; 
they are considered as unwanted and deviant castaways from the desired 
social order altogether.
racIalIsed crIme and PunIshment
Scholars have pointed out the overrepresentation in prison of persons 
belonging to certain racial groups or with other markers of distinction 
such as the colour of their skin (Hunter 2007; Bosworth et  al. 2008; 
De Lissavoy 2013; Golash-Boza 2015). The racialised targeting of poor 
men is both an aspect of neoliberal approaches to crime prevention in their 
US configuration (see Goffman 2014) and an outcome of particular Latin 
American historical trajectories. Indeed, scholars have shown that the 
emergence of the modern prison in Latin America in the late nineteenth 
century aimed at abolishing traditional forms of punishment whilst 
 maintaining racial and class divisions established in the colonial period 
(Salvatore and Aguirre 1996; Aguirre 2005). Hence, blacks and indige-
nous groups or persons with dark skin colour, who were at the bottom of 
Latin American societies and perceived as ‘racially’ inferior, populated the 
modern prisons in the late nineteenth century as well.
 COMING OF AGE IN THE PENAL SYSTEM: NEOLIBERALISM, ‘MANO DURA’... 
214 
The associations between poverty and ‘racial otherness’ established in 
colonial hierarchies are an important aspect of how this ‘racialised’ con-
cept of the criminal poor has come into being. For example, Cynthia 
Milton (2007) shows how in eighteenth-century Ecuador policies intro-
duced by the Spanish Crown to address poverty proscribed differential 
approaches depending on the ‘racial’ status of the poor in question. On 
the one hand, downwardly mobile Spanish elites could claim pobreza de 
solemnidad. The kind of assistance offered to such persons centred on 
maintaining their privileged position. In contrast, for persons of African or 
indigenous descent, poverty assistance involved various kinds of punish-
ment; imprisonment, enclosure in a poorhouse or a home for wayward 
women (recogimiento) or forced labour. Thus, poverty was not neutral; 
instead, people were poor according to their class, ‘race’ and gender 
(Milton 2007:66–67). For the ‘racially othered,’ lower spectrums of soci-
ety, then, the kinds of poverty assistance offered was difficult to distin-
guish from the deprivation of liberty handed out to criminals.
The long-term outcomes of such ideas and policies can be observed in 
contemporary Latin American societies. Despite numerous gains in iden-
tity politics and the challenging of racism on several fronts, notions of 
poverty and criminality remain ‘racialised’ (see, e.g. Ystanes (Chap. 4), this 
volume). It is well established that poverty discourse as well as poverty 
itself is gendered; women are both symbolically associated with poverty 
and carry the burden of poverty more often than do men (Broch-Due 
1995). However, conceptualisations of the criminal poor are more strongly 
tied in with images of young men (Bourgois 2003; Goffman 2014; Ystanes 
(Chap. 4), this volume). Furthermore, the increasing ‘talk of crime’ 
(Caldeira 2000) permeating the media and the public sphere has ‘natural-
ized some groups as dangerous’ (Caldeira 2000:2) and accentuated public 
demands for tough-on-crime approaches. In the neoliberal configuration 
of crime prevention, this has led to ‘racially othered,’ poor men being the 
main targets of policing and punishment.
crIme control PolIcIes In honduras
Honduras’s current hard-line security agenda, known as mano dura (‘iron 
fist’), is modelled after former New York mayor Giuliani’s ‘broken win-
dows’ policies (Müller 2009). The new security agenda has not only per-
petuated the perception of poor unemployable young male adults as 
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‘criminals,’ it has also led to severe changes in the institutions and legal 
frameworks dealing with crime, such as criminal codes, the police, the 
military and the penitentiary system.
The Honduran governments in the 1990s promoted mainly preventive 
policies towards violence and crime. Because most of the persons involved 
in crime and violence were adolescents and young adults, targeted preven-
tive programmes were introduced in the form of awareness programmes in 
public schools focusing on drug use and gang memberships. Importantly, 
civil society organisations, youth organisations, local scholars and govern-
ment officials attempted to draft a bill that directly addressed the mara 
phenomenon—Decree 141-2001 and 170-2001 known as the Law for 
Prevention, Rehabilitation and Reinsertion of Gang and Mara Members 
(Ley para la Prevención, Rehabilitación y Reinserción Social de Personas 
Integrantes de Pandillas o Maras). However, the bill was stalled in 2001, 
and the government opted instead for the hard-line security policies that 
are in force today. The new security agenda as of 2002 involves carrying 
out military and police raids in poor neighbourhoods (many of them con-
trolled by gang members), the massive incarceration of ‘criminals and 
delinquents’ and changes in the criminal justice system—in particular an 
increase in sentences.
Although local gangs and maras initially had been involved in illegal 
activities (e.g. theft), these did not account for the rise of violence, insecu-
rity and crime in the country. Rather, organised crime did (Rodgers 2009; 
Jüttersonke et al. 2009; UNODC 2012). Today, the maras are involved in 
the organised crime economy, but—to the extent that it is possible to 
establish comprehensive knowledge of this—hitherto mainly thought to 
be as associates further down in the food chain rather than as spiders in the 
web (Bosworth 2010:10).
However, through media representations conjuring up an imagery of 
gang and mara members as dangerous ‘criminals’ constituting a threat to 
Honduran society (Peetz 2011; Oetller et  al. 2009), the government 
drummed up public approval for far-reaching reforms of penal and proces-
sual codes targeting the maras in particular. In August 2003, Congress 
reformed the 332 Article of the Penal Code, known as the Anti-gang Law. 
The new article declared gangs to be illicit associations, meaning that the 
sole membership of any gang was a motive for arrest and incarceration. 
This law works in tandem with the 2002 Law of Police and Social 
Co-Existence (Ley de Policía y Convivencia Social), which allows police to 
detain ‘anyone suspicious or vagabonds’ (Ungar and Salomón 2012:30).
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However, because it was not clear, from a legal standpoint, how to 
define membership to a gang, police and security agents had discretionary 
power to arrest anyone who appeared to be a gang member. In practice, 
this translated into the targeting of young males between 18 and 30 who 
had distinct markers, including the way they dressed (baggy jeans and 
T-shirts, sneakers), the way they carried their bodies (buzz cuts, shaved 
heads) as well as the use of piercings and tattoos. Because of this gener-
alised targeting, gang members changed the way they dressed, covered 
their tattoos and resorted to other strategies for evading arrests (Gutiérrez 
Rivera 2010). However, the blurring of symbolic markers of gang mem-
bership led to new targeting practices directed against ‘criminals’ and 
‘delinquents,’ centred mostly on young males’ physical appearance such as 
skin colour.
GanG memBers’ lIfe trajectorIes
Studies of gang members’ social background in Honduras indicate that 
they often are school dropouts from violent homes, living in neighbour-
hoods with low income levels, high degrees of social exclusion and scarce 
access to public services (Gutiérrez Rivera 2010:495). Consequently, they 
have limited venues for being socialised into ‘normal’ adulthood through 
a youth-to-adulthood transition passing from school and into the labour 
market (Fawcett 2001). This serve as ‘push-factors’ for ‘street-corner’ 
socialisation, which, in turn, increases the risk of becoming involved in 
criminal activities and the drug economy (see Strocka 2006 for an in- depth 
analysis of the multiple causes for gang formation in Latin America; see 
also Bourgois 2003 and Strønen 2014). Additionally, high levels of social 
distrust and the consumption of drugs and alcohol foment local social 
violence (Gutiérrez Rivera 2010:495). As Gutiérrez Rivera (2010:495) 
notes, ‘gangs may thus impose local order or ‘street level politics’ through 
the use of violence, constituting a form of social structuration that under-
mines the existing local social fabric.’ Gangs in Honduras, as in other Latin 
American countries, are highly territorialised. Different gangs control dif-
ferent territories, and gang members are with different degrees of rapport 
and animosity part of the local social fabric (Penglase 2010). It was exactly 
this territorial control and presence in marginalised neighbourhoods 
that  the Honduran state’s new security policies were aimed at breaking 
up,  through constant raid carried out by the police and the military. 
As Gutiérrez Rivera (2010:497) has previously remarked:
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Mano Dura and the Anti-gang Law had a strong territorial component 
because they aimed at controlling a certain group (gang members) and ter-
ritories (marginal neighbourhoods). Police and military forces raided gang- 
controlled barrios looking for members hanging out on street corners and 
in their homes.
As noted above, the generalised targeting of ‘deviant youth’ through the 
anti-gang legislation prompts and justifies that arrests are being made at 
the officers’ own discretion. Increases in arrests furthermore works in tan-
dem with changes in the Processual Penal Code in 2002, which removed 
judges’ discretionary powers of pre-trial detention (prisión preventiva). 
Previously, judges had discretionary power to decide whether to send sus-
pect (or not) to a prison whilst waiting for the sentence. With the changes 
in the Processual Penal Code, everyone who was arrested was sent to 
prison to wait for their sentences. Furthermore, the time lapse between 
arrests and waiting for a sentence is considerable due to the inefficiency of 
the criminal justice system and Public Prosecutor’s Office. Seen together, 
all these changes not only significantly increased the prison population, 
and by extension, the number of families whose lives were marked by vari-
ous kinds of legal entanglements. It also led to an increase in the periods 
spent in prison whilst they wait for the sentence and, then, an increase in 
the time they spend in jail when they receive the sentence. The exception 
were inmates from the middle class or other inmates who could draw on 
considerable economic help from their family. These inmates hired lawyers 
and, in some cases, gave bribes to civil servants and judges in the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office or the Criminal Courts to accelerate the trials and 
hearings.
As a result of these combined effects of the new security agenda, the 
prison population has increased significantly during the past two decades, 
collapsing the penitentiary system. Currently, 98 per cent of the inmate 
population is male (CIDH 2013).
Bleak futures
In 2014, Gutiérrez Rivera interviewed inmates in the prison in the city of 
Comayagua. As other prisons in Honduras, the Comayagua prison is over-
crowded and self-governed by inmates. During one visit, Gutiérrez Rivera 
met ‘William’, an inmate who had been in prison for 12 years and was 
hoping to be released that year because of good conduct. He was not sure 
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though. ‘Only God knows’, he said. William appeared to be around 32–35 
years of age. When asked what he would do when released, he said: ‘Oh I 
don’t know…I haven’t thought about it. I mean, I need to see if I can find 
a job…,’ his voice trailed off. On average, an inmate spent 8–10 years in 
the Comayagua prison.
William’s lack of certainty about the future points to important ques-
tions concerning the consequences of mass incarceration of young, poor 
men. What lies ahead for them when released from prison? Will they be 
able to rebuild their lives after spending 5, 10 or 15 years in prison? What 
long-term consequences will it have for Honduran society that such high 
numbers of already disadvantaged young men spend such a long time in 
prison without any possibilities for ‘rehabilitation?’ And how may we bet-
ter understand the underlying rationale and structural underpinnings that 
legitimise such a punitive model?
The extended period that characterises prison life in Honduras rein-
forced the interruption of conventional youth-to-adulthood transitions 
set in motion by the neoliberal reforms. Youth unemployment rose signifi-
cantly in Latin America in the 1990s (Fawcett 2001:3), and low-income 
youth were hit the hardest (Fawcett 2001:5). The changing structures in 
the labour market from the 1980s and onwards crowded out parts of the 
potential work force, particularly those on the bottom rungs of society. As 
Fawcett notes: ‘for many unskilled youth of Latin America, the distance 
between the average schooling level and the “needs of the market” is too 
far. There is no job pathway, which continually rewards a student in school, 
and keeps the students in school’ (Fawcett 2001:16). This pattern was also 
present in Honduras. Large numbers of youth dropped out from the 
school system, which, as discussed above, makes them more vulnerable to 
ending up in the illegal street economy. A recent report shows that 23 per 
cent of the inmates in Honduran prisons are illiterate. Out of the 59 per 
cent of the inmate population that had access to primary education prior 
to entering the prison, only 26 per cent had actually finished primary 
school (CONAPREV5 2011).
Several of the inmates that Gutiérrez Rivera interviewed had not com-
pleted primary school (which consists of 6 years). Even fewer inmates had 
enrolled in middle and secondary school. However, through ethno-
graphic interviews, several of the inmates revealed that they would like to 
go back to school whilst in prison in order to have something lean on 
when they are released in the future. However, the only educational 
venue available to them is the EDUCATODOS programme, run by the 
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Honduran Ministry of Education and the US development programme 
USAID. Despite being partially state-run, EDUCATODOS is not offered 
free of charge. Rather, parts of the programme are privatised and incur 
costs for the students. For example, USAID owns the copyright of the 
books and learning material, and all inmates enrolled by the programme 
have to buy their own copies. For many of the poor inmates, coming from 
poor households, this is a cost beyond their reach. Because of the high 
prices of the learning material, many inmates gave up on the idea of fin-
ishing school through the EDUCATODOS programme. ‘Carlos’, an 
inmate who had finished primary school, was eager to finish secondary 
school whilst serving his sentence. However, upon hearing that 
EDUCATODOS demanded payment for the books, he dropped the idea 
of enrolling.
I was going to organise a group because many of us [inmates] want to finish 
school. But I don’t have money, we don’t have money, not enough money 
to pay for the material. The little money I earn here is not enough. Nothing 
is free in prison, I have to pay for my bed, my space, food, everything. 
My family can’t help either. They can’t come here [to visit at the prison] 
because they live in Tegucigalpa and that means time and money, and they 
can’t send me money either.
The other possibility for an inmate was to learn a skill from another 
inmates, such as carpentry, electric installation work or cooking. The 
Institute of Special Services for Prevention (Dirección General de Servicios 
Especiales Preventivos), part of the Ministry of Security, ran a programme 
for inmates who wanted to learn a skill in some of the prisons in Honduras; 
but the Comayagua prison was not one of them. Some inmates neverthe-
less organised the teaching of skill amongst themselves; however, this was 
highly subjected to the level of trust and tranquillity amongst prisoners. 
Neither was it of much worth to be ‘self-taught’ in prison when they had 
to search for work in a highly competitive labour market. As ‘Manuel’, an 
inmate who was scheduled to be released in four months, worded it:
I would like a job…in carpentry. I learned that here [in the prison]. [Other 
inmates] taught me…but you know, I don’t know… I pray I can find a job. 
But I don’t really if, you know, if anyone will hire me.
The limited access to education or professional training accentuated 
inmates’ levels of uncertainty regarding their lives when released from 
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prison. On the other hand, the long-term sentences served inside the 
prison wall contributed to strengthening their networks with other arrest-
ees and convicted prisoners, as well as socialising them even further into 
the harsh rules of ‘street corner society’—even within closed prison walls.
the self-Governed PrIson
As most prisons in Latin America, lack of funds and manpower have 
turned the Comayagua prison into self-governed prison (Darke and Karam 
2016). The hierarchical prison order is governed by the Presidente or president 
of the inmates, followed by the vice president and the Jefe de Bartolinas or 
the boss of the blocks. All inmates start from below and are expected to 
comply with this self-governing regime which has established a ‘prison 
order’ (See Gutiérrez Rivera 2017). The president delegates other inmates 
to oversee prison life and the prison economy, which includes selling food, 
handicrafts, medicine, as well as illicit activities such as selling drugs and 
arms. As Carlos alluded to in the quote above, everything in the prison 
costs money: food, medicines, somewhere to sleep, protection and so on. 
The prison economy is an enclosed free-market sphere in the extreme; 
everything is commoditised, and the consequences of not being able to 
pay are harsh. The internal rule of law is maintained by violence and bru-
tality, and the incumbent ‘president’ has to constantly demonstrate his 
willingness to subdue others by force in order to not be subjected to a 
coup or a mutiny.
This prison order is not unique for Honduras. Antillano et al. (2016) has 
carefully documented similar conditions in the prisons in Venezuela. Starting 
in the 1990s, Venezuelan prisons have increasingly been characterised by 
the retreat of state order and the ascendance of a complex self- governed 
prison hierarchy that is thriving on an illegal economy within and beyond 
prison walls. Venezuela’s prison population rose significantly in the 1980s 
and 1990s in line with increasing marginalisation and inequality under sub-
sequent neoliberal regimes (see Strønen (Chap. 7), this volume). However, 
as Antillano et  al. (2016) note, the current penal system in ‘Bolivarian’ 
Venezuela contradicts conventional wisdoms of a correlation between 
reduced socio-economic inequality and a milder punitive approach to crime 
and delinquency. Whilst Venezuela’s prison population dipped significantly 
in the beginning of the twenty-first century—a period characterised by 
expansive pro-poor social policies and a political discourse emphasising 
structural explanatory models for crime—the prison population has been on 
a steady rise for the past near ten years (Antillano et al. 2016:200).
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In contrast to the neoliberal period—when the rise of the incarcerated pop-
ulation coincided with the increase in poverty, exclusion and inequality—
during Chavismo the relation seems to be inverse: a substantial improvement 
social indicators for the poor goes hand by hand with an increase in the 
penal population. (Antillano et al. 2016:201)
Antillano et  al. (2016:2001) explain this apparent paradox through 
underlining the lopsided effects of social policies in the face of structural 
inequalities. Post-industrial societies, and not least rent-based countries 
such as Venezuela, continue to produce ‘surplus’ populations that ‘remain 
excluded and marginalized and that are resistant to strategies of social 
inclusion’ (p. 201).
Gledhill (2013) has also pointed out contradictions in the Brazilian 
state’s security politics under the Lula and Rousseff administrations. As 
also noted in several of the chapters in this volume (Ystanes (Chap. 4), 
Sørbøe (Chap. 5), Costa (Chap. 3) and Lavros Pinta (Chap. 6)), these 
governments rolled out a series of reforms that effectively reduced poverty 
and inequality levels in the country. Yet so, security policies implemented 
in the major cities during their tenure were also characterised by the tar-
geting of poor communities—and young men in particular. Above all, this 
included the increased police and military presence in impoverished com-
munities and a ‘war’ against gangs involved in drug trafficking. Focusing 
in particular on policies rolled out in Salvador do Bahia aimed at detract-
ing young men from entering into the consumption and trafficking of 
drugs, Gledhill writes that:
The danger of this focus is that it singles out particular communities as the 
source to delinquency and violence for the whole city, transforming their social 
problems stemming from poverty, the lack of clarity in land- and property 
rights, and the deficient infrastructure and life conditions, into the problems 
that threatens the security of all residents of the city. Such a “securitisation” of 
social problems runs the risk of brushing all the residents in these communities 
over the same comb. (Gledhill 2013:30, authors’ translation from Spanish)
These comparative observations alert us to the structural underpinnings as 
well as cultural framing of ‘mano dura’ policies, regardless of political 
inclination right or left. Whilst Brazil, Honduras and Venezuela followed 
significantly different political trajectories during the Pink Tide époque, all 
three countries are carrying the legacy of long-term structural inequalities 
and marginalisation that has produced a ‘surplus’ population of primarily 
young, poor, coloured and unskilled male. In a de-proletarised economy, 
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combined with the ascendance of a cross-border drug and crime economy 
across the Latin American continent, many of these young men end up in 
the penal system. Simultaneously, rising levels of violence and the pan- 
continental rise of the ‘mano dura’ approach consolidate public and politi-
cal demands for taking a punitive, rather than rehabilitory stance, towards 
(real or perceived) criminal elements.
fInal reflectIons
The US sociologist Alice Goffman speaks of two different trajectories that 
take persons from childhood to adulthood; one goes via the education 
system, the other goes via the penal system. As many young men in the 
neighbourhood she worked entered their late teens or early 20s, ‘the penal 
system has largely replaced the educational system as the key setting of 
young adulthood’ (Goffman 2014:107). In the United States, it is mostly 
black men living in poor, segregated neighbourhoods that end up reach-
ing adulthood via the penal system. This process reinforces ‘racialised’ 
socio-economic inequalities that the full granting of civil rights to African 
Americans was meant to eliminate. While other teenagers are freshmen or 
seniors in high school, the young men and boys Goffman worked with 
were defendants and inmates, spending time in courtrooms rather than 
classrooms, attending sentencing hearings and probation meetings rather 
than proms and graduations. As she notes:
As the criminal justice system has come to occupy a central place in their 
lives and by extension those of their partners and families, it has become a 
principal base around which they construct a meaningful social world. It is 
through their dealings with the police, the courts, the parole board, and the 
prisons that young men and those close to them work out who they are and 
who they are to each other. (Goffman 2014:107)
Of course, there are numerous differences between the Honduran and the 
US legal system, and the inmate-governed prisons in the former cannot 
meaningfully be compared to the highly securitised US prisons. 
Nevertheless, Goffman’s work points to some important comparative par-
allels. The prison system itself serves as a centrifugal site for the socialisation 
of group membership cut off from ‘official society.’ Just as in the United 
States, inmates in Honduras are stuck in the punitive system during their 
most formative years, making it extremely difficult to rebuild their lives 
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once they get out even if they should so wish. Moreover, just as the young, 
black men in Goffman’s case, the Honduran prison population belongs to 
those groups in society that were crowded out from the educational system 
and the labour market in the first place. In sum, all of these features under-
line how structural processes, legal systems and punitive ideologies are con-
ditioning the individual life trajectories and opportunities of the prison 
population.
By stressing this point, it is not our intention to underestimate the seri-
ousness of crime and violence in the Latin America continent or to deprive 
criminal actors of a will and agency of their own. However, we contend 
that it is paramount to take a critical look at the historical trajectories, 
local/international political agendas and underlying racial and social pro-
filing that propels and justifies hard-line security agendas. As Gledhill 
notes, ‘it is necessary to look beyond the smoke screen created by the 
securitisation of poverty in order to capture social realities and power rela-
tions’ (Gledhill 2013:53, authors’ translation from Spanish), and ulti-
mately, be able to create public policies that lead to permanent 
transformations. As this chapter has sought to address, the current ‘iron 
fist’ approach to crime in Honduras is taking place within a dense history 
of structural marginalisation, fuelled by the effects of the neoliberal era 
and its continuation up until today. Moreover, since the coup in 2009, 
these policies are taking place in the context of an escalating political pro-
clivity to subdue unwanted social groups. Additionally, the US War on 
Drugs has contributed to a further violent and militarised persecution of 
real or perceived criminal elements, whilst the underlying factors and pro-
cesses fuelling the drug economy are largely left unchallenged. Ultimately, 
this has resulted in a dramatic increase in the targeted incarceration of 
young, poor and dark-skinned men with few prospects for becoming 
inserted into an ‘ordinary life’ when they eventually are released from 
prison. This bodes for a perpetuation of, rather than a solution to, 
Honduras’ security situation, which, in turn, will continue to reproduce 
the country’s historically informed legacy of entrenched inequalities.
notes
1. Koonings and Kruijt aptly point out that the ‘new violence’ means that ‘a 
variety of social actors pursue a variety of objectives on the basis of coercive 
strategies and methods’ (2004:8). This new form of violence is not directed 
towards the state, that is, to overthrow the status quo. Rather, it is a 
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‘democratisation’ of violence (Koonings and Kruijt 2004; Rotker 2002) 
that can target anyone.
2. On the other hand, these neoliberal policies also entailed modernising the 
state institutions opening up for more citizen participation. For instance, 
human rights groups become more organised. The Honduran governments 
also attempted to increase youth participation through the creation of the 
National Institute of Youth (Instituto Nacional de Juventud) and the 
National Forum for Youth (Foro Nacional de Juventud).
3. The traditional elites and the military believed Zelaya wanted to change the 
constitution to allow re-election for a second term, which is prohibited in the 
current constitution. Ironically, Honduras’s current president, Juan Orlando 
Hernández from the National Party, is also seeking to change the constitu-
tion to allow re-election. However, contrary to Zelaya, the  traditional 
elites and the military have backed him. On 26 April 2015, the National 
Congress approved the re-election of the Honduran president.
4. There are also strong indicators of US complicity in the coup, see Beeton 
and Chun Tang (2016).
5. Comité Nacional de Prevención Contra La Tortura, Tratos Crueles 
Inhumanos o Degradantes,
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CHAPTER 10
Settlers and Squatters: The Production 
of Social Inequalities in the Peruvian Desert
Astrid B. Stensrud
IntroductIon
The Majes Irrigation Project (MIP) in southern Peru has transformed 
15,800 hectares of previously unoccupied desert into fertile and produc-
tive land. MIP was constructed shortly after the land reform in the 1970s, 
in a time when progress and equality were on the political agenda. The 
first settler farmers, who arrived in 1983, are celebrated as strong pioneer-
ing men that started from zero and made progress through hard work. 
One of the goals in MIP, as it developed in the 1980s and 1990s, was to 
transform farmers into entrepreneurs that would compete on the global 
market. More than 30 years later, and after the most radical and quickest 
programme of neoliberal structural adjustment in Latin America, many of 
the first settlers have lost their farms or are struggling with debt. In the 
same period, Majes and its main urban centre Villa El Pedregal, has evolved 
into a hub of business and work and has become known as ‘a place of 
opportunities’ (un lugar de oportunidades) with a booming economy. 
During the last decade, thousands of people have migrated from the poor 
rural highlands in search of work or informal business in Majes, and 
these new migrants settle in the desert surrounding the irrigated areas. 
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The inhabitants of Majes come from different places, with various cultural, 
educational and economic backgrounds, and this diversity is emphasized 
interchangeably as a problem or strength.
In this chapter, I will discuss how Majes has emerged as ‘a place of 
opportunities’ through relations of capital and labour, in which inequality 
is also (re-)produced.1 The analysis is inspired by Bear et al. (2015), who 
express an interest in ‘how inequality emerges from heterogeneous pro-
cesses through which people, labour, sentiments, plants, animals, and life- 
ways are converted into resources for various projects of production’. I 
argue that economic inequalities, which are embedded in differences 
based on conceptions of race and gender, have increased during the past 
three decades of neoliberalism in Peru, where working conditions have 
worsened and informality, precarity and uncertainty prevail. I refer to neo-
liberalism as a set of policies and practices inspired by a political ideology 
according to which human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework that secures private property rights, free markets and free trade 
(Harvey 2005). The neoliberal paradigm relies on individuals who are 
induced to self-manage according to market principles of discipline, effi-
ciency and competiveness (Ong 2006). However, for most workers and 
farmers, the neoliberal ‘freedoms’ have implied increased vulnerability and 
uncertainty. I will therefore explore how families experience debt and loss, 
yet continue struggling to get ahead in a precarious informal economy.
In Latin America, including Peru, working conditions for the poor have 
always been precarious (Millar 2014). The analytical concepts have changed, 
however; the term citizenship had largely replaced class as a means of analys-
ing the political struggles of the poor in Latin America at the beginning of 
this century (Roberts 2004). I argue that the inequalities in Majes are mani-
fest in structures of gender, ideas of race and culture and emergent class 
relationships, understood as bundles of ‘unstable, uneven, contradictory 
and antagonistic relational interdependences’ (Kalb 2015:14). However, 
these class formations, which are emerging from the unequal conversions of 
humans into resources, are not always complete, consistent or coherent 
(Bear et al. 2015). I will show how inequality is embedded in the intersec-
tions of class, gender and race and argue that these differences did not 
diminish with the so-called Pink Tide that Ollanta Humala (2011–2016) 
barely flirted with (see Introduction (Chap. 1) of this volume), just as they 
did not disappear with the left-wing reforms in the 1970s.
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the dIversIty of Majes: aMbIvalent racIsM
The population of Majes consists of people from all over Peru. The  majority 
of the recent migrants come from the impoverished rural Andean high-
lands: mostly from the south, but also from central Peru. The southern 
and central highlands constitute the main areas of what has been called 
‘deep Peru’ (Perú profundo). The expression ‘deep Peru’ was first used by 
the Peruvian historian Basadre who in 1943 distinguished between ‘two 
Perus’: the state (país legal, or legal country) and the nation composed by 
its people (país profundo, or deep country). While Basadre referred to all 
sectors of the population, and not only indigenous culture, later usages of 
the phrase have changed and now it has come to mean ‘the historical roots 
of Indianness as a component of Peru’s sense of nationhood’ (Mayer 
1992:192). In his report from a massacre in the south-central highlands in 
1983, during the war between the guerrillas and the armed forces, the 
Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa used the phrase to describe a country 
divided in space and time. One part was the official Peru and the other 
profound, consisting of the indigenous population: an ‘Indian Peru’ that 
was economically depressed, ‘miserable’ and ‘primitive’ (Mayer 1992:193). 
In an article in New York Times, Vargas Llosa described the village where 
the massacre happened: ‘At these altitudes, the land is poor, the isolation 
is almost absolute, and the customs are archaic’ (Vargas Llosa 1983). 
More than three decades have passed, but the phrase ‘deep Peru’ is still 
used in Majes and the rest of (mostly coastal and urban) Peru to describe 
the indigenous character of people in the Andean highlands, and racist 
connotations are still prevalent.
However, since most people have family and connections to the indig-
enous Andes, racist attitudes are highly ambivalent. When talking to peo-
ple in Majes—whether they were municipal workers, state engineers, 
farmers or businesspeople—many complained to me that the people here 
‘have no [local] cultural identity’, because ‘they come from all places and 
they all come with their own culture’. Some went on to explain that there 
is ‘a struggle of cultures’, ‘a clash of cultures’ or ‘a crossing of cultures and 
races’. A more positive comment was that ‘we drink from all the cultural 
sources’. In his book on the local history of Majes, Edgar Zamalloa writes: 
‘the population of Majes is made up of men of all the bloods [sangres], 
coming from all parts of deep Peru, who have come and/or have brought 
or are introducing dances and customs from their different places of ori-
gin’ (Zamalloa 2013:347). Zamalloa is also the author of the Majes hymn, 
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Himno de Majes, which has provided the phrase that was chosen the  official 
slogan of the district municipality of Majes: Con la fuerza de todas las san-
gres, ‘With the force of all the bloods’. Coming from the highland region 
of Apurímac, Zamalloa was inspired by his compatriot José María Arguedas, 
the anthropologist who authored the novel Todas las sangres (‘All the 
bloods’), a title that refers to the cultural diversity of Peru. From the colo-
nial era, differences in culture and class have been—and are still—racialised 
in Peru, and this is reflected in the (often used) plural form of blood.
Nevertheless, ethnic and racialised categories are intrinsically linked to 
social class and place, which in practice means that a person from a 
Quechua-speaking rural community who moves to the city, acquires for-
mal education, learns Spanish and adopts an urban lifestyle is no longer 
considered to be ‘indigenous’ but mestizo (van den Berghe and Primov 
1977). Class and education is translated into economic and social capital 
and can make a person to be considered ‘socially white’, given the geo-
graphical construction of race, where the coastal line is ‘white’ and the 
highlands are indigenous (de la Cadena 2000). In other words, racialised 
categories are fluid and can be changed through social and geographical 
mobility. These categories can also vary with gender, however, as women 
are often considered to be more ‘Indian’ (de la Cadena 1991). In Majes, 
this is mostly reflected in clothing and language, as women from the high-
lands often dress in traditional skirts and hats and sometimes talk in 
Quechua or Aymara among each other at the marketplace, while men tend 
to dress in urban clothes and only speak in Spanish.
The precarity and uncertainties that have followed neoliberal deregula-
tions affect everyone, yet in different degrees: those who have historically 
been discriminated against based on their ethnicity and/or gender, and 
who always have had less access to resources and social capital, are also 
those who suffer most from the new kinds of precarity in labour and farm-
ing. In today’s Majes, inequalities are manifest in access to water, land and 
capital and also in the ability to plan a future, which is a privilege that 
financial security allows.
‘Peasant, the landlord WIll no longer eat your 
Poverty’: agrarIan reforM
In 1971, the military left-wing government of Juan Velasco Alvarado 
(1968–1975) started the execution of MIP: the Condoroma Dam was 
built 4158 meters above sea level, from which water is released downriver 
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and led into a system of 101 kilometres of tunnels and canals through 
Colca Valley. In Majes, the water is led into a network of irrigation canals 
crisscrossing the arid pampa at 1000 m.a.s.l., where a stable and warm 
climate all year round secures good conditions for agriculture. MIP aimed 
to create economic growth based on agricultural and industrial produc-
tion, and to foster development for the whole region. After the water 
arrived to the pampa of Majes in the end of 1982, the first settlers (colonos) 
started to work on their land. In the first group, there were 592 colonos 
who had been selected by draw according to the different categories they 
belonged to: smallholding farmers, landless peasants, agricultural workers 
and professionals—mostly agronomists, but also doctors, lawyers and 
engineers (Zamalloa 2013). One engineer who had worked there for 30 
years, called the Majes project a populismo culto, which can mean a ‘cul-
tured’, ‘learned’ or ‘educated’ populism, because of these different catego-
ries. Therefore, he said, here we have all kinds of people; the irrigation 
project was not only for the poor, but also for people of all professions, and 
from all parts of the country. By calling it culto, he alluded to the general 
praise of formal education in Peru, which elevates people in the hierarchies 
of class and race. In MIP, all settlers got an equal start: each got the oppor-
tunity to buy 5 hectares of land, which was considered a basic family unit, 
with a subsidised loan from the state-owned Agrarian Bank (Zamalloa 
2013). Today there are 2600 farms in the irrigated areas of Majes.
MIP was implemented soon after the 1969 agrarian reform and became 
part of Velasco’s endeavour to bring Peru out of feudalism and poverty 
and into an era of equality and progress. Before 1969, 3.9 per cent of the 
population controlled 56 per cent of the land, most of it in the form of 
large holdings (Seligmann 1995). In 1968, Velasco’s ‘Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces’ (Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas 
Armadas) started to nationalise the land, water, industry and banks. By 
using the power of popular mobilisation, the plan was to defeat the oligar-
chy, to reduce the power of the landowning elites and increase economic 
productivity. Cant (2012) shows how posters were used in mobilising the 
peasants: ‘Slogans such as “Land without masters” and “We are free, the 
revolution is giving us land” put forth an emancipatory vision of a “new 
Peru”, articulating the government’s aspirations towards a more equal and 
integrated society’ (Cant 2012:3). In his speech to introduce the agrarian 
reform on the Day of the Peasant, 24 June 1969, Velasco talked about forg-
ing a better nation that would be the owner of its own destiny, with justice 
and freedom. He famously concluded by saying: ‘Peasant, the  landlord 
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will no longer eat your poverty!’ (Velasco 1969). Between 1969 and 1974, 
175,000 families received 4.5 million hectares of land (Cant 2012:4). In 
less than a decade, the land reform succeeded in ending the dominant 
power of the hacendados and introducing a system of cooperative farms 
(Collier 1978). The Velasco regime believed that they could uproot racial 
discrimination by destroying the power of the landed oligarchy, but they 
were unable to achieve economic equality and a respect for ethnic differ-
ences at the same time (Seligmann 1995). Velasco officially replaced the 
ethnic and racial term indio (Indian) by the class-related term campesino 
(peasant), but peasants are still discriminated against in today’s Peru.
However, the new agrarian cooperatives, which were largely managed 
by technocrats and bureaucrats, encountered huge problems. State con-
trol led to corruption, clientelistic relationships and internal conflicts 
(Hunefeldt 1997). Lack of planning, training and technical support for 
the farmers were some of the reasons that the reform mainly failed 
(Rénique 1991). The shortcomings of the reform, in addition to rural 
poverty and expectations of a better life in the cities, led to a massive 
increase in migration from the highlands to the urban coast. A major part 
of the current population in Majes come from the regions of Puno, Cusco 
and Apurimac, where the agrarian reform had profound effects on socio- 
economic relations. In the Colca Valley, however, the peasants were never 
dominated by the haciendas (Guillet 1992), yet many have migrated to 
Majes because of poverty and lack of opportunities, and more recently due 
to climate change, experienced as seasonal instability and water scarcity 
(Stensrud 2015).
La Ley deL chinito: the neolIberal turn
Well, now we have the law of el chinito [Alberto Fujimori]2: the law of sup-
ply and demand […], so the market manages itself. When the production is 
high – boom! – [the price] falls. […] So then there is an atrocious loss for 
the farmer.
The farmer who told me about the ‘law of the chinito’ arrived in Majes in 
1983. Since then, he has built a dairy farm with 20 cows, and has been 
combining the cultivation of alfalfa fodder with various other crops. As 
many other farmers in Majes, he describes the production of food as a lot-
tery, because one never knows if one will win or lose until it is time to sell 
the products. Therefore, he has kept the dairy production as a secure base: 
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although milk does not pay well, it is a safe income. Dairy farming has 
been the main economic activity in Majes since the start, but it is domi-
nated by the monopsony of the Gloria Group that buys the milk from the 
farmers.
The turn towards neoliberal economic policies started with General 
Morales Bermúdez (1975–1980), who replaced Velasco in a coup d’état, 
and was continued under President Belaúnde Terry (1980–1985). In his 
first presidency, Alan García (1985–1990) tried to reverse the liberalization 
process through what was termed a ‘heterodox’ economic policy. García 
ambitiously proposed social reform for the poor majority, without wanting 
to alienate the business elites. The result was a deep economic and social 
crisis, with soaring inflation, devaluation, rising unemployment, shortages 
of staples and malnutrition (Klarén 2000). In 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a 
populist with no affiliation to any traditional political party or to the white 
oligarchy, was elected president. He quickly established an extreme variant 
of the structural adjustment that was advocated by the ‘Washington con-
sensus’ and the World Bank (Gonzales de Olarte 1993). The so-called Fuji 
shock consisted in radical austerity measures: higher interest rates and taxes 
and a slashing of price subsidies and social spending. The shock was fol-
lowed by deregulation of markets, massive privatisation and incentives for 
international investment (Klarén 2000; Crabtree 2002). In 1991, President 
Fujimori issued a ‘labour flexibilisation’ decree, which significantly altered 
the laws regulating job security and the right to organise (Klarén 2000). 
Since then, the majority of workers in Peru are informally employed and 
thus deprived of benefits and protection. Simultaneously, a strong ideology 
of entrepreneurship as the way out of poverty and towards progress has 
been fostered (see also Ødegaard, Chap. 8 in this book).
In agrarian policy, the neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s entailed a 
total reversal of the agrarian reform. All forms of subsidies to farmers were 
cancelled, and the last vestiges of protectionist agrarian laws were removed, 
allowing unlimited private property (Mayer 2009). The 1995 Land Law 
(Ley de Tierras) promoted the titling of individual land ownership, abol-
ished the previous upper limits on personal landholding and allowed the 
state to sell land currently in public ownership. The new law opened the 
way to the capitalisation of agriculture by enabling titleholders to raise 
mortgages (Crabtree 2002). This deregulation had long-term conse-
quences, and in Majes it has led to a dramatic increase in the price of land. 
Peasants from the highlands can no longer afford to buy land and are 
reduced to rural proletarians working for landowners and the large-scale 
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agribusiness that was welcomed in Majes in the 1990s. In 1998, a land 
property of 1288 hectares called Pampa Baja, where new irrigation infra-
structure just had been installed, was sold to a private company. Today, the 
Pampa Baja Group has employed 2000 workers and produces fruit for 
export.3 Fujimori’s structural adjustment also affected farmers’ ability to 
plan cultivation of food and future incomes. Among his first moves was to 
scrap price controls, allowing these to be set by market forces. He also 
closed down the institution that controlled food imports and eliminated 
the Agrarian Bank as a source of subsidised credit to producers (Crabtree 
2002). Private lenders charge very high interest rates when they lend 
money to small-scale farmers due to the high risk involved.
The election of Alejandro Toledo as president in 2001 was seen as a 
return to democracy after Fujimori’s authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, in 
spite of promises about ending privatisation and creating employment, he 
continued on the neoliberal road and so did Alan García in his second 
presidency (2006–2011). Toledo started the work on a Free Trade 
Agreement with the USA, and when García signed the agreement in 2007, 
he declared that this was a great day for democracy, social justice and free-
dom. Earlier that year, however, García had made social protests and 
strikes illegal, accusing the opponents of private investment and free 
trade—labour unions and indigenous movements—for obstructing prog-
ress due to old ideologies, laziness and inertia (García Pérez 2007).
During the presidential election campaigns in 2006 and 2011, Ollanta 
Humala, who became leader of the Nationalist party (Partido Nacionalista 
Peruano) in 2005, promised to fight against privatisation and imperialism, 
decrease the gap between rich and poor and work for ‘social inclusion’. 
Humala, who is son of a Quechua-speaking communist lawyer and has 
great admiration for Velasco, got massive support, especially among indig-
enous peasants and working poor in the central and southern highlands. 
This support was a clear expression of popular anti-neoliberal sentiments, 
and Humala’s candidature is associated with the ‘Pink Tide’ in South 
America. However, after winning the election in 2011, he did not keep his 
promise of a ‘great transformation’. He appointed neoliberal technocrats 
from the previous administration and maintained the neoliberal policies 
favouring private investment (Poole and Rénique 2012). When Majes- 
Siguas II, the second phase of the irrigation project, was inaugurated in 
2014, Humala promised that water would never be privatised. Yet, he 
allowed the private consortium Angostura-Siguas to get the concession 
for Majes-Siguas II. Farmers in MIP are afraid that the consortium will 
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increase the water tariffs in order to recover its investments, and that this 
concession will benefit large agribusiness corporations and not small- and 
medium-scale farmers. In the presidential elections of 2016, the left-wing 
candidate Veronica Mendoza got huge support from people in the high-
lands who had also voted for Humala. She did not enter the second round, 
however, which was fought between Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of 
Fujimori, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, a white man with extensive experi-
ence from banking and mining industry, who was minister of energy and 
mining under Belaúnde and minister of economy and finance under 
Toledo. Hence, the election of Kuczynski is seen as a victory for continued 
neoliberalism in Peru.
‘PeoPle suffer here also’: chIldren of settlers
The very first settler arrived in Majes in October 1982, two months before 
the water came, and he has seen many of his fellow farmers lose their land: 
‘Of the first group of settlers, now there is only half left’. When I inter-
viewed him about agriculture in Majes, he talked about the volatile prices 
of the free market and the farmers’ dependency of the intermediary 
merchants:
The prices always fall, when everyone sow potatoes, the prices fall […] In 
2009, there was a good harvest of ají paprika; then the price fell from 2,80 
USD per kilo to 0,80 cents. The same happened with the onions […] There 
is more risk now than 30 years ago; now there is free market. Earlier we had 
stable prices, but Fujimori made free market. […] The financial institutions 
that give loans take a lot of interests; 18 per cent and until 30 per cent! Some 
get indebted because the intermediaries don’t pay the products that they 
have bought and taken away. (17 February 2014)
Among the farmers in Majes, Velasco is remembered as a hero, both for 
ending the power of the landowning oligarchy and for starting the con-
struction of MIP. Fujimori, on the other hand, is given much of the blame 
for everything that went wrong because of the ‘free market’.
José is the son of one of the settlers who lost his land because of debt.4 
José’s grandparents were very poor when they lived in his home village; 
they only had a tiny piece of land and a couple of cows, and they mostly 
worked as labourers on the land of others. Their nine children went to 
Arequipa city very young to work and go to school. When the Majes proj-
ect opened, all the siblings registered and four brothers got farms: 
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José’s father and three uncles. They were all dreaming about coming here 
and changing their lives; ‘to have another way of being’. The brothers 
were always united and worked together, they told me. Instead of hiring 
help like others did, they helped each other. However, José’s father had 
bad luck and was not able to pay his loan to the bank. The debt accumu-
lated and he was forced to sell the farm. José’s three uncles still have their 
farms, and sometimes José works with his cousins in the fields; he helps to 
rent machinery, to buy seeds and to sell the harvest. To make a living, José 
has worked in all kinds of jobs in different public offices, mainly as a driver 
or assistant, on temporary contracts. Steady employment is hard to find, 
and many people try to start businesses of their own. José and his wife 
bought a mini-bus on credit with the intention of making money in the 
transport business. When they finally got permission to work on one of the 
bus routes in Majes, however, they soon realised that the income was not 
enough to pay the debt and have a profitable business. They ended up 
selling the car.
As the daughter of a farmer who came with the third group of settlers 
and later got into debt, Martina has first-hand experience of the tensions 
and sufferings that debt creates. ‘People suffer here also. Not everyone has 
access to credits and capital to work, they have debts’, she said. She came 
from Colca Valley as a ten-year-old in 1990, when her parents settled into 
the new farm, and she learned early the value of hard work. Her father was 
not only a farmer but also a merchant who sold groceries from a market 
stall in Villa El Pedregal. When his potato harvest failed three times in a 
row and the prices fell, he got caught up in debt. He is still carrying these 
debts until today. ‘The interests are very high; you pay off and you pay off, 
but you never finish paying the debt’, Martina said. When she was 17 or 
18 years old, her father gathered his eight children to tell them that they 
should not expect any inheritance, but should take the opportunity to 
study. ‘This stayed in my mind, and therefore I never expected anything 
from my parents’, Martina told me.
Today, she is the owner of a market stall in Villa El Pedregal where 
she sells juice and sandwiches and also CDs and DVDs with popular 
Peruvian music. Martina started her business ten years ago, without any 
bank loans and credits, and it has grown little by little. She observes how 
all farmers and merchants work with credits nowadays; the merchants 
even take out credits from two or three banks. ‘It is terrible to enter into 
debt’, she said, remembering how she used to help her dad in his busi-
ness and how she took part in his constant worries: ‘it is stressful!’ 
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As I had been living in Colca Valley, I told Martina that people there 
think that the people in Majes are rich. She agreed, since she had expe-
rienced the same attitudes in Colca: ‘Yes, there they think that we have 
money. I see how they look at me: “she got money, therefore she is aloof 
and does not talk to us” … and I’m there all shy! They don’t know that 
we also suffer. I live off my work!’.
Apparently, the fact that Martina lives in Majes with its booming econ-
omy, and that she works in her own business, make people in her home 
village assume that she believes herself to be ‘better’ than them. She cer-
tainly has climbed economically and socially according to the dominant 
hierarchy of class and race: she is no longer a peasant living in the high-
lands, but a businesswoman who lives near the coast. Within the market-
place in Majes, however, her small fruit juice stall, where she works long 
days and where her children do their homework after school, is one of the 
least profitable businesses compared to the meat and grocery vendors or 
the large-scale merchants (Photo 10.1).
In an upcoming expansion of the irrigation project—Majes-Siguas 
II—38,500 new hectares of land in the adjacent desert of Siguas will be 
Photo 10.1 ‘New Hope’ (Nueva Esperanza) is the name of one the market-
places in Villa El Pedregal and the name of the association of vendors and mer-
chants (asociación de comerciantes) who work there (Photo by the author)
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irrigated. However, the land will be sold in large units of 200, 500 and 1000 
hectares and not in five-hectare family units as in the first phase of MIP. Hence, 
there will not be any opportunities for the children of farmers to buy land, 
and people fear the dominance of large-scale agribusiness. Martina, how-
ever, was carefully optimistic about her children’s opportunities in the future:
We will grow here. As there is industrialisation all over, it will be the same 
here. In Siguas there will be companies like DANPER and Pampa Baja, and 
we will be employed in those companies. That is why I want my children to 
study and become professionals and technicians (profesionales y técnicos), so 
that they will not be only [unskilled] labourers (peones).
Most people still think that education is important for social mobility, 
although it is no guarantee to get formal and steady employment, which 
has become scarcer since the 1990s. Education as a means of ending pov-
erty, social exclusion and ‘underdevelopment’ was for a long time a 
national project embraced by all social classes in Peru (Degregori 2008). 
Until the mid-twentieth century, there was a strong belief in the power of 
education to improve the ‘Indians’ racially, and the hegemonic acceptance 
of legitimate social hierarchies based on levels of formal education has 
prevailed until today (De la Cadena 2000). However, as part of neoliberal 
reform, state support to public education has decreased since the end of 
the 1970s (Degregori 2008), and the state’s strategy for ending poverty 
and achieving development has gradually shifted its focus from education 
to the importance of entrepreneurship (see also Ødegaard, Chap. 8 in this 
book). Individuals are encouraged by state institutions and NGOs to start 
their own micro-enterprise in order to get ahead in life. In most of the life 
stories that I heard in Majes, men and women expressed great pride in 
being self-made. In the later years, however, the competition to get jobs, 
a successful business and a place to live have increased. The farmers’ chil-
dren not only compete against each other but also against the new migrants 
that come in search of a livelihood and a future.
‘We should Make an effort’: 
squatters In the desert
Today, the majority of the population no longer consists of farmers: new 
people move in every day in search of work, business and land. According to 
the census of 2005, there were 35,334 inhabitants in Majes, while in 2014 
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the municipality considered the number of inhabitants to be  somewhere 
between 100,000 and 120,000. The engineers who planned MIP originally 
designed urban centres and infrastructure for 40,000 inhabitants. Today’s 
population is spreading out in the surrounding desert, where there is no 
infrastructure for the provision of water and electricity. The majority make a 
living as land labourers or factory workers or work in mechanical workshops 
or in the service sector. Many are self-employed as taxi drivers or food-and-
drink vendors in the streets, in the marketplace or in small restaurants.
These migrants are not only searching for work but also a piece of land 
to build a house of their own. Earlier, the state distributed land lots at 
subsidised prices, but today many of these lots are sold expensively. 
Alternatively, those without money can ‘invade’ a piece of empty land and 
claim ownership. If a person can prove that she/he has built a house 
(many use straw mats, which is the cheapest material) and has lived on a 
lot for a certain amount of time—this is called ‘possession’ (posesión)—
she/he can apply for the right to buy the land and get a formal title deed. 
In March 2014, the sub-director of the Municipal Office of Formalisation 
said that they had 20,000 case files in the office. Many of these have 
already paid their properties, and some have contracts, while others have 
yet to present documentation to support their case. In order to formalise 
ownership, obtain title deeds and eventually get access to water pipes, 
electricity, roads and other infrastructure, it is common to organise in 
neighbourhood associations. Meanwhile, people buy potable water from 
trucks that come once a week, or they boil water from the irrigation canals. 
Many of the recently arrived migrants join squatter groups, called ‘inva-
sion groups’ (grupos de invasión), to occupy desert land collectively in and 
around Ciudad Majes. This practice has led to a lot of problems, however, 
since some of the leaders of these squatter groups have become land traf-
fickers. The situation was often described as chaotic and corrupt, with 
many illegal transactions, conflicts and violence.
One of the women that live in the desert is Lucía, who was 38 years old 
in 2014. She was born into an Aymara-speaking peasant family in the high-
lands of Puno, and as a seven-year-old, she was sent to an aunt in Arequipa 
city. Lucía started working as a servant in the house of a middle- class fam-
ily, but she did not know how much she earned because her aunt took the 
money. During the next ten years, she went back and forth between 
Arequipa and Puno, and then to the coastal city Tacna. She worked as a 
domestic servant for several families and experienced different degrees of 
exploitation. When she was 14 years old, an elderly man working at the 
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marketplace in Tacna taught her how to read and write. At the age of 19 
she got pregnant with a man who was also from Puno. They married and 
moved to Villa El Pedregal. He would not allow her to work, however, and 
she had to stay home in their rented room, taking care of their four chil-
dren. After six years, she convinced her husband that she had the right to 
an education, and she studied hairdressing. She also started to work as a 
shop assistant. After 14 years of marriage, she left him.
Lucía dreamt about having her own grocery shop, and she joined an 
association of vendors who collectively invaded a piece of empty land. The 
goal was to obtain ownership to the land and to start their own market-
place, in which all participants would have a shop of their own. Although 
the leaders told them that the land was empty, they soon found out that 
another group had already invaded it, and that they were the second 
invaders. Still, the leaders gave all of them a kiosk of a few square meters 
to have a place to work and make their business. There were 600 stalls, 
and as some vendors brought their partners, children or cousins for sup-
port, they were more than a thousand people in total. They all paid their 
fees to the association, built kiosks and defended their place. The first 
invaders attacked them with homemade bombs, exploding bottles, and 
Lucía was very scared. She wanted to escape, but the others wouldn’t let 
her go: ‘You just have to endure’, they told her, ‘we do this to have a place 
to work’. And since she already had paid 200 soles,5 she stayed. Some 
vendors started selling groceries there. Everyone had to attend the meet-
ings, do collective work and pay the fees for the lawyer and other expenses. 
The leaders handled everything, and ‘we were the stupid ones who fol-
lowed them’. She stayed for two years before she left. Two months later, 
she heard that the police had evicted the ones that stayed. Everything was 
destroyed and the vendors had lost all their supplies.
Although Lucía studied hairdressing, she did not have the courage to 
exercise it at first. When she at last started working in a hair salon and 
received payment for her first haircuts, she finally gained self-confidence. 
She rented a chair in a salon, and she got regular clients. But when she had 
a baby with her second husband, the others complained that the baby 
disturbed their work. Therefore, shortly before I met her, she decided to 
rent a locale where she would run her own hair salon. She got a credit loan 
from a bank to buy equipment, and she planned to pay it back in two 
years. ‘Everything that I have, I have achieved it by myself’, she said, and 




In 2013, she married her second husband, Alfredo, who is also from 
Puno and works as a night watchman, in addition to occasionally driving a 
pirate taxi. His first wife stayed in their house in one of the new neighbour-
hoods in the desert, and Alfredo moved in with Lucía in a rented room in 
Villa El Pedregal. They soon decided to build a house of their own on a 
land lot in the desert that Lucía had acquired when the state was handing 
out subsidized lots and that she had been paying little by little. They built 
the house together, one room at a time, and today they live there with 
their son and Lucía’s children from her first marriage. There are no roads, 
water pipes or electricity in the area. Once a week, a truck brings water, 
which they store in plastic containers. At night, they light candles so that 
the children can do their homework for school.
When a squatter group tried to invade the area, the people living there 
decided to organise in a neighbourhood association, and Alfredo was elected 
leader. The purpose is to defend their land and to obtain access to electricity 
and water. They also wish to have a marketplace and a primary school. They 
have meetings once a month on Sunday mornings, since most of the neigh-
bourhood’s residents are agricultural workers and Sunday is their only day 
off. However, only a few of the property owners actually live there because 
of the lacking infrastructure. Alfredo tried to convince more people to build 
their houses, in order to put pressure on the municipality. He was constantly 
knocking on doors in the municipality in order to obtain electricity and 
water. Lucía supported him: ‘we should make an effort; if one doesn’t insist, 
nothing happens’.
Like Martina, Lucía had gained economic and social mobility by her 
own work and effort, in spite of her lack of formal education and the other 
hindrances that life had offered her. Instead of becoming a peasant, a 
domestic worker or a subdued housewife, she had made an effort to gain 
skills, work experience and finally her own business. In this sense, she—
just like Martina—embodies the entrepreneurial and neoliberal ideal that 
the government envisions: that people can come out of  poverty through 
individual entrepreneurship. Neither Martina nor Lucía wore traditional 
clothing from their home places but dressed and talked Spanish like urban 
mestizo women. Both had moved from their rural communities as small 
children and had lived most part of their lives in cities and/or in 
MIP. However, for every business that succeeds, there are many that fail. 
Martina and Lucía were very aware of the danger of working with credit 
and entering into debt, especially in a precarious economy where the com-
petition from other vendors and micro-businesses are increasing every day.
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eMergIng InequalItIes: ‘race’, class and gender
After 30 years of neoliberal policies, the processes of differentiation in 
Majes are becoming evident. With the broad availability of expensive credit 
loans, and production based on uncertain anticipations of the fluctuating 
product prices, a few farmers have prospered and expanded their farms, 
while others have drowned in debt. The second generation of the first 
farmers who settled in MIP often work on temporary contracts in export-
oriented agribusiness factories, in the service sector, transport, construc-
tion sites, or in state and municipal institutions. As job security is practically 
non-existent and the informal economy is growing, many young people try 
their luck as micro-entrepreneurs. Most of the new migrants, who come 
from all over the country, but mostly from the southern highlands, work as 
land labourers (peones) on a day-to-day basis. Each morning, they go very 
early to a place behind the main market in Villa El Pedregal, where the 
farmers come and take the workers they need to their farms. They are usu-
ally paid 50 soles a day or 60–70 soles if it is specialised work. Hence, there 
are days when they earn money and days when they don’t (Photo 10.2). 
Many of the new migrants also make a livelihood by selling food on the 
streets, but they are regularly removed by the municipal agents who do not 
tolerate vendors without a municipal license. As the population grows, the 
social inequalities and structures of prejudice, stigmatisation and discrimi-
nation that predominate in Peru are also reinforced in Majes.
Jorge is one of the few first settlers who have been economically suc-
cessful. He has tripled the size of his farm where he cultivates grapes and 
avocados for export. As most of the successful farmers, however, he did 
not have a background as a poor peasant from the highlands. He was 
originally from the coastal city of Tacna and was educated as an agrono-
mist, and had thus the social and cultural capital that provide an advantage 
in the Peruvian social and racial hierarchy based on geography and educa-
tion. Moreover, he and other farmers with similar interests got organised, 
and he is today the elected president of the Avocado Association. In an 
interview, he talked about the people coming to Majes in search of work, 
who he hires as day labourers on his farm: ‘The people who live in the high 
parts where there is no work, where there is hunger; the ‘deep Peru’ as we 
call it, where the government does not come; those people come here, and 
the next day they have work, because here there is a lot of work’. With this 
statement, he not only confirmed the stereotypical and stigmatised image 
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that people on the coast have of the highlands, but he also implied that 
these people are lucky to get work as land labourers.
It was often pointed out to me that ‘the majority’ of the population in 
Majes were people from Puno (puneños). In Villa El Pedregal, most of the 
merchants and market vendors are puneños, and the women are especially 
easy to recognise because of their characteristic skirts and bowler hats. The 
leader of the ‘Association of Residents from Puno’ roughly estimated that 
there are approximately 50,000 puneños in Majes because of the job 
opportunities. He said that the majority of the population in most Peruvian 
cities are from Puno: ‘we have always been characterized by our presence’, 
he said. He continued: ‘The puneños stick out (son sobresalientes), mostly 
because of the force of labour that they put in: you will never find a worker 
from Puno who is lazy; el puneño is always a hard worker (de chamba)’. 
People from Puno, as in the rest of the Andes, are proud of being good 
Photo 10.2 Day labourers (peones) harvesting potatoes on the land of a settler 
farmer (colono) (Photo by the author)
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workers; to be able to work hard is a virtue. However, success in economic 
activities, and more importantly, a visible display of material wealth, is not 
always appreciated by others. The puneños have brought their customs 
from Puno, and every year they celebrate the Virgin of Candelaria with 
famous splendour and colourful dances (see also Stensrud 2016). I heard 
others comment that it ‘looks more like a display of riches and of the ones 
with most money than a devotion of the Virgin’. In other contexts, I heard 
comments that reflected the racist attitudes against people from the high-
lands, such as ‘be careful with the puneños’. One informant told me: ‘the 
puneños are all over: they get many children, like rabbits. They multiply 
and need space’.
Since the creation of the municipal administration in 1983, the mayors 
of Majes have been keen to create and promote symbolic events, objects 
and performances—monuments, a coat of arms, a flag, songs and poems—
that show the uniqueness of Majes and that simultaneously evoke patriotic 
feelings in the local population, feelings that should unite a diversified 
population (Zamalloa 2013; Stensrud 2016). These objects—as well as the 
dominant narratives about the creation of MIP—emphasize and promote 
a mestizo identity: neither indigenous nor Spanish (or white elite), but a 
mix that has become the new generic racial category of Peruvian national 
identity. The narratives are, however, highly gendered: the settlers who are 
praised for their hard work and sacrifice in speeches, poems, songs and 
monuments are represented as male mestizo pioneers and brave frontier 
men. Zamalloa’s Himno de Majes, which was declared the official hymn of 
the district in 2003, says: ‘Great men are your strength, ranchers and farm-
ers, who are cultivating the furrow of progress…’. At the entrance of Villa 
El Pedregal you are met by the impressive statue of General Velasco, who 
is considered the founder of MIP. In Villa El Pedregal, the monument of 
the settler, el Monumento al Colono, which is a statue of a farmer holding a 
milk can, has a central place. Women, on the other hand, are included in 
the Cow Monument, Monumento a la Vaca: a statue of a cow being hand-
milked by a milkmaid. Women are mainly celebrated on Mothers’ Day—in 
their capacity as mothers, wives, caretakers and nurturers—and in beauty 
contests, where the winner is given the title ‘Queen of Majes’. Some peo-
ple commented that the queen always is a ‘daughter of a settler, someone 
of economic resources’, and never a girl from the highlands. Hard-working 





Majes is portrayed as the land of milk and honey, a place of hope and 
 progress that is bustling with opportunities of jobs and business. On the 
one hand, there is a desire and pressure to transform farmers into business-
men, yet on the other hand, there are processes of dispossession, proletari-
sation and precariasation going on, and social inequality is increasing. In 
1983, all the settlers started with equal five-hectare farms in a project to 
create economic growth and ‘progress’, through the domestication of des-
ert, water, seeds, animals and human labour. Thirty years later, a few have 
prospered and bought new land, while many have been forced to sell their 
farms. The majority keep working, hoping to make profit and praying that 
the prices will not fall. Today, it is not the hacendados that ‘eat’ the farm-
ers’ poverty, but the banks and the agro-corporations. Among the second 
generation, that is, the children of settlers, there are differences between 
those who have completed higher education to become engineers or other 
professionals and those who work in factories, construction, transport and 
the service sector. Many have started their own micro-enterprises: mechan-
ical workshops, beauty salons, restaurants or grocery shops. Most of the 
recently arrived migrants are day-to-day land labourers, taxi drivers and 
vendors in markets and streets, with or without formal licenses. Formal 
employment is scarce, working conditions have worsened since the dereg-
ulations in the 1990s, and informality, precarity and uncertainty prevail.
Farmers and working poor are being transformed into precarious entre-
preneurs, highland peasants are transformed into land labourers, and unsuc-
cessful entrepreneurs are transformed into street vendors or factory workers 
on insecure contracts. The ideal citizen of Majes is a male mestizo farmer 
with an entrepreneurial spirit who has gained economic success through 
hard work and the taking of risks. Migrants are portrayed as coming from 
abject poverty and as they are used to a miserable condition, they should be 
content with finding work as day-to-day labourers. Women are publicly cel-
ebrated as mothers and housewives, while their reality as hard- working farm-
ers, labourers and entrepreneurs is often disregarded. These inequalities did 
not disappear with the land reform, or with Toledo’s promises of ‘more 
work’ or with Humala’s ‘social inclusion’. In fact, social inequalities will 
never disappear with top-down state reforms. On the one hand, political 
pressure from grass roots social movements is needed to obtain large-scale 
changes of economic structures. On the other hand, as inequalities, and the 
cultural attitudes that support them, are reinforced in daily life, they can only 
be altered through small-scale changes in everyday attitudes and practices.
 SETTLERS AND SQUATTERS: THE PRODUCTION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES... 
250 
notes
1. The research for this chapter has been funded by the European Research 
Council (grant no. 295843) and the Research Council of Norway (grant 
no. 222783). The analysis in this chapter is based on 13 months of ethno-
graphic fieldwork in Colca and Majes in 2011, 2013 and 2014, and also 
informed by research in Cusco in the period 2001–2008.
2. Fujimori is son of Japanese immigrants and is colloquially called ‘el Chino’ 
by most Peruvians, who tend to call any person with a physical ‘Asian’ 
appearance chino/a, just as they have other nicknames that are informed by 
racialised stereotypes: indigenous cholos, dark-skinned negros, white gringos.
3. http://www.pampabaja.com/eng/main.php. Website accessed 6 September 
2016.
4. All personal names have been anonymised.
5. In 2013 and 2014, 1 Peruvian Nuevo Sol PEN = 0,35 USD. PEN is referred 
to as sol in colloquial language and one sol = 100 centavos.
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CHAPTER 11
Latin American Inequalities and Reparations
Marvin T. Brown
Whatever our social differences and unequal relationships with each other, 
we all share a common humanity. We have the same basic six emotions—
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, happiness, and sadness (Ekman and Friesen 
2003). We all have a primal consciousness of ourselves as living beings 
(Damasio 2010). We all live on the same planet. We begin our life breath-
ing in the air of the biosphere and our life ends when the breathing stops. 
We are all contemporaries. We all acquire a story that gives us a place in 
the world. When inequalities emerge as a result of violations of this com-
mon humanity, the only adequate response is to work at restoring every-
one’s place in the world and at repairing distorted relationships.
Let’s remember that inequality, by definition, is a relational term. One 
cannot be unequal alone. To understand inequality is to understand rela-
tionships. This means that one cannot understand Latin America inequali-
ties without understanding the relationships between Latin American and 
the continents of Africa, Europe, and North America. The reverse is also 
true: you cannot understand Africa, Europe, or North America without 
understanding Latin America. Or, to be more concrete: Just as you cannot 
understand Haiti without understanding France, you cannot understand 
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France without understanding Haiti. If that is true, and I assume it is, then 
the ocean that connects these continents—the Atlantic—can be seen as 
the original context of Latin American inequalities. The triangular trade 
among Europe, Africa, and the Americas created this context, and as long 
as we ignore it, we will never fully grasp the background of our current 
situation, as well as what is necessary to change it.
As Europeans immigrated to the Americas, of course, unequal relations 
were transferred to American soil. The appropriation of American land by 
Euro-Americans was only limited by the lack of labour, a problem they 
solved by first enslaving native populations and later importing millions of 
enslaved Africans. Their wealth and their honour—wealth was honour—
depended on the enslavement and stigmatizing of others. On the surface, 
their honour was based on their wealth. Under the surface, their wealth 
was based on the exploitation of others. We all know this, but many of us 
also share an economic narrative that omits this truth—the truth about 
capitalism and slavery.
Capitalism and slavery
The exploitation of labour and the appropriation of land began in Latin 
America almost two centuries before the publication of Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations in 1776. Many economists today, especially neoliberals 
who think within Smith’s framework, rarely connect capitalism with slav-
ery. And with good reason! Of the many contradictions we witness 
between fact and fiction, none are more telling than the contradiction 
between the small-town image commonly used to represent the essence of 
free enterprise and the real context of early capitalism—the Atlantic trade 
between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Here is the fiction:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk 
to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith 1994, 15)
Such an image is not so difficult to imagine. Small shop owners provide 
different goods to each other, and the best way of doing this is for each to 
be guided by his or her self-interest, since in this intimate setting, it is 
certainly in one’s self-interest to provide a good product at a good price. 
How nice that when we do what is best for us, it is best for everyone else.
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The reality of commerce when Adam Smith was composing The Wealth 
of Nations was something else. The centre of this trade was not the town 
square, but the Atlantic Ocean, which Europeans used for the trafficking 
of millions of enslaved Africans to the Americas, who worked the land to 
produce products for Europeans. To complete the triangle, the Europeans 
sent other products, such as credit and guns, to Africa to buy more 
enslaved Africans. The “success” of early capitalism, in other words, 
depended not on individuals acting in their self-interest but rather a global 
system of buying and selling human beings as though they were no differ-
ent than cattle.
Robin Blackburn estimates that of the 21 million Africans enslaved 
between 1700 and 1850, 9 million slaves were delivered to the Americas, 
5 million were lost during the passage, and another 11 million were 
enslaved in Africa (Blackburn 1998). The numbers are astonishing. In 
fact, more Africans than Europeans lived in the Americas during the sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth century.
Indeed, in every year from about the mid-sixteenth century to 1831, more 
Africans than Europeans quite likely came to the Americas, and not until the 
second wage of mass migration began in the 1880s did the sum of net 
European immigration start to match and then excel the cumulative influx 
from Africa…. In terms of immigration alone, then, America was an exten-
sion of Africa rather than Europe until late in the nineteenth century. (Bailey 
1990, 377)
True, one finds slavery in earlier historical periods, but Atlantic-based slav-
ery was unique. For the first time, slavery was an integral part of the global 
economy. Yes, the Romans and Greeks had many slaves, but people were 
enslaved mostly due to conquest. As Blackburn writes: “One might say 
that many Roman slaves were sold because they had been captured, while 
many African slaves entering the Atlantic trade had been captured so that 
they might be sold” (Blackburn 1998, 11).
In the commercial world of the Atlantic, slavery was an economic insti-
tution. As Klein and Vinson say in their book on African slavery in Latin 
America, “It was without question American labour market conditions 
that most influenced the growth of the Atlantic slave trade” (2007, 18). 
This conclusion has been carefully documented in Eric Williams’ book, 
Capitalism and Slavery. He traces the history of the plantations in the 
British West Indies from first using indigenous slaves and then indentured 
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servants brought from Europe. As the plantations grew and needed more 
labour, and as indentured servants heard of the high rate of deaths on the 
plantations and refused to volunteer to move to the Caribbean, there rose 
the need for another source of labour, and African slaves were chosen. The 
motive for enslaving Africans, Williams writes, “was economic, not racial; 
it had to do not with the colour of the laborer, but the cheapness of the 
labor” (Williams 1994, 19). Only later, as whites became afraid of slave 
rebellions, did they begin to see Africans as racially inferior. As Williams 
says. “Slavery was not born of racism; rather, racism was the consequence 
of slavery” (7).
Although Williams’ work has not been included in the canon of con-
temporary economics, recent scholarship has confirmed what has become 
known as the Williams thesis; namely, slavery was essentially economic. 
Blackburn, for example, supports this thesis by describing how the sugar 
plantations in the West Indies were not just institutions of agriculture but 
also commercial institutions:
The plantation evidently belonged to the world of manufacture as much as 
to that of commercial agriculture. The plantation crops, especially sugar and 
indigo, required elaborate processing, and both permitted and required the 
intensive exploitation of labour …. On the productive side, the plantation 
required the coordinated and meticulously timed activities of between 10 
and 300 workers. Specialist slaves, working long hours but receiving some 
small privileges, came to work in the responsible positions in the sugar 
works, as planters discovered that this was cheaper than hiring specialized 
employees. (Blackburn 1998, 333–334)
Plantations, in other words, were part and parcel of capitalism. They are 
actually great examples of how the division of labour increased productiv-
ity (much better than Smith’s example of the pin factory). Plantations, of 
course, entailed not only the exploitation of forced labour, but also the 
appropriation of land for commercial use. The plantations turned a living 
biotic community into a machine for producing commodities.
If mainstream economists had recognized the plantations as a major 
source of wealth creation in early capitalism, we might have had many more 
conversations about how the inequalities in capitalistic economies have 
their origin in the enslavement of people rather than some sort of “invisible 
hand.” Such inequalities—inequalities that are the result of violations of 
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our common humanity—raise questions about reparations. What should 
we do to bring some sort of commonality to relationships that are so radi-
cally out-of-balance? I think this question can direct us toward what we 
need to talk about not only in terms of repairing the past but also in terms 
of securing a future. Conversations about reparations in Latin America, of 
course, belong to the larger narratives about land reform.
land reform in latin ameriCa
In the occupation and domination of Latin America, the Spanish and 
Portuguese granted large tracks of land to former Conquistadors and 
other favourites of the Crown as a reward for their efforts in gaining con-
trol over the Americas. In contrast to the policy of the United States, 
where indigenous people were removed from their homeland and finally 
forced to live on “reservations,” the policy in Latin America—encomienda—
was much closer to old world feudalism: indigenous people remained on 
the land and paid tribute to the “owner.” This created a massive popula-
tion of landless people and a small powerful elite. Policies of land reform 
were attempts to improve these unequal conditions.
Most Latin American governments engaged in some form of land 
reform in the twentieth century. Mexico led the way in the early decades 
and others followed, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The reasons were 
multiple, but perhaps the one that received the most support from the 
United States was the idea that land reform would prevent revolutions like 
the one in Cuba. The Alliance for Progress (1961) organized by the 
Organization of American States persuaded most governments to engage 
in some kind of land reform. With globalization and the advent of neolib-
eralism in the 1980s, progress in land reform was brought to a standstill 
(Teubal 2009). With the beginning of the twenty-first century, a majority of 
Latin American countries shifted to more leftist and populist governments—
known as the Pink Tide—and although they improved the welfare of 
many people, they did not engage in a significant redistribution of land. 
Although land reform may not occupy Latin American politics now as 
much as it has in the past, it has led to the development of different prin-
ciples than those of neoliberalism about the meaning of land and the 
rights of collectives.
 LATIN AMERICAN INEQUALITIES AND REPARATIONS 
258 
two prinCiples of land reform
For most countries in Latin America, land is interpreted as having a social 
function. The French Jurist, Léon Duguit, first articulated this idea in 
1919 (Ankersen and Ruppert 2006). He reasoned that since the purpose 
of the state was to provide for certain social needs, the state had an obliga-
tion to ensure that land was being used productively—that it was fulfilling 
its social function. This view of land, of course, differs from the liberal 
assumption voiced by John Locke that land belongs to its owner and the 
state’s primary obligation is to protect the owner’s right to control his/
her property. As Ankersen and Ruppert point out, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, most Latin American countries had incorporated the 
Social Function Doctrine in their constitutions (99). This doctrine gave 
the state the right to confiscate lands that were not serving any social func-
tion and distribute it to landless people who would use it. In Brazil, the 
organized squatter movement—the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais 
Sem Terra, or MST—used the Social Function Doctrine to justify their 
occupation of large landholdings. In the past 30 years, MST has assisted 
over 350 thousand landless families to take unused land (Stedile 2002). 
Another group, the Workers Homeless Movement—Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST)—has carried out similar strategies as 
MST to fight for housing in urban areas. Both groups have focused on 
creating a place for landless and homeless people.
While the Social Function Doctrine has supported land reform, it has 
also had an unintended consequence. Landowners have cut down forests 
to make sure their land fulfils a social function through ranching. In 
response, governments are adding to the land’s social function an ecologi-
cal function. Land, in other words, is seen as belonging to both social and 
ecological systems.
Along with seeing land as having a social and ecological function, Latin 
American governments have also acknowledged the rights of collectives as 
well as individuals. In fact, the recognition of collective rights has now 
been affirmed by the United Nations. In the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, Article 26 states: “Indigenous peo-
ples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”1 As with 
the notion of the social function of land, the rights of indigenous peoples 
have not always been respected. Also, this principle is quite different from 
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a neoliberal view that only individuals have rights. Bettina Ng’weno’s pro-
posal that we think in terms of the rights to a territory highlights the dif-
ference between individual and collective control (Ng’weno 2007, 84). 
Individuals do not own territories, territories belong to groups, and the 
acknowledgement of collective rights gives them territorial rights.
The idea of reparations has not played a major role in most decisions 
about land reform, but the two principles of the social function of land 
and of collective rights provide a useful context for understanding current 
conversations about reparations.
Conversations About Reparations
Reparations differ somewhat from the task of redistributing land. 
Reparations involve not only compensating those who deserve it but also 
changing the relationships among the different parties. At the very least, 
those who benefited have to acknowledge that their gain depended on 
others’ expense. But it goes deeper. It involves both sides in a process of 
reflection about how to live together. This means that we can see repara-
tions not only as a process of making payments on past debts but also of 
transforming social relationships.
In 2001, the United Nations “World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and other Forms of Intolerance” called for 
the recognition of “the Black Holocausts (Slave trade/Slavery and 
Colonization) as Crimes Against Humanity” (Marable and Mullings 
2001). On the issue of slavery and colonial responsibility, the NGO writ-
ten document at this conference was direct and unequivocal:
We demand that the United States, Canada, and those European and Arab 
nations that participated in and benefited from the Trans Atlantic Slave 
Trade, the Trans-Sahara Slave Trade, the Trans-Indian Ocean Slave Trade, 
Slavery and the Colonization of Africa … [as well as] … the United Nations 
… shall … Ensure that … all nations, groups and their members who are the 
victims of crimes against humanity based on race, colour, caste, descent, eth-
nicity or indigenous or national origin are provided reparations … [includ-
ing] … Restitution … encompassing the unconditional return of land … 
Monetary compensation that will repair the victims, including Africa, Africans 
and African descendants, by closing the economic gap created by these 
crimes…2
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This is a serious challenge. We now turn to two countries—Brazil and 
Haiti—that have taken up the question of reparations. In Brazil, the 
descendants of what are called Quilombo communities—communities 
founded by escaped slaves—are petitioning for the return of their ances-
tors’ land. In Haiti, people are demanding compensation for the billions 
of dollars they paid France since gaining their independence in 1804. As 
we shall see, both stories demonstrate an intriguing link between freedom 
and land. First, the story of the Quilombo movement in Brazil.
Quilombo Communities
The term “Quilombo” refers to communities of runaway slaves in the 
sixteenth century. Such communities, of various numbers, dotted the 
Brazilian countryside in the seventeenth century. The most famous, 
Palmares, in Northern Brazil, grew to more than 15,000 inhabitants 
before the Portuguese destroyed it in 1694. Palmares survivors are only 
one of many such communities that continue to exist today. Almost 100 
years after the abolition of slavery, in 1986, Benedita da Silva, a member 
of Congress, convinced the body of lawmakers to pass legislation that 
recognized the right of the Quilombo communities to a legal title to their 
ancestors’ land. Rogue Plantas has suggested that carrying out this policy 
could be the world’s largest slavery reparation programme (Plantas 2014).
In 2003, the government officially defined a Quilombo community as 
a “self-identified, ethno-racial group with their own historical trajectory, 
a specific relationship to the land, and the presumption of a black ances-
try connected to forms of resistance to historical oppression” (Farfán-
Santos 2016).
The government policy was to grant land title to Afro-Brazilian com-
munities that could demonstrate they were a Quilombo community—their 
memory and experience could match the government’s definition. In her 
book on the Quilombo communities, Elizabeth Farfán-Santos describes 
many of the difficulties black communities had in bridging the gap between 
their everyday experiences of struggling to make a living in extremely 
adverse conditions and this official description (2016). Also, the process of 
being recognized as a Quilombo community took years of moving through 
the government’s bureaucracy. These difficulties were largely due to treat-
ing Afro-Brazilian communities as ethnic minorities.
M.T. BROWN
 261
As ethnic minorities, the Quilombo communities enjoyed the same col-
lective rights as Brazil’s indigenous groups. They have a right to their own 
culture and ways of living. At the same time, as Farfán-Santos points out, 
treating Quilombo communities as ethnic groups also has its drawbacks: it 
failed to recognize the social structures of anti-black violence and inequal-
ity. As she says:
Cultural recognition grants black and indigenous communities the right to 
difference, even self-identification, without necessarily changing the unequal 
structural distribution of rights. (Farfán-Santos 2016, 45)
Here we see a separation of land rights and social rights, when in fact they 
are closely related. Perhaps omitting the question of social relations 
accounts for the fact that of the more than 2400 communities that identi-
fied as Quilombo communities, less than 220 have received land titles 
(Thomas 2016). Still, we should not discount the meaning of a land title 
for those communities that now enjoy the right to their land.
Securing the right to land, although not the end of a larger battle, symbol-
izes more than just a property title; it signifies the recognition of a life that 
is intimately, emotionally, and physically intertwined with the land, without 
which quilombolas would be left without a home but, more importantly, 
without a sense of life security and belonging. (Farfán-Santos 2016, 145)
So the securing of a land title could be seen as the first step toward chang-
ing social relations. The prospect for further progress, however, has 
dimmed considerably since the current Temer government has closed the 
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), which 
was responsible for reviewing applications from Quilombo communities. 
The government placed its titling function under the Ministry of 
Education, headed by a party leader opposed to recognizing Quilombo 
rights (Bledsoe 2016). Still, the claim for reparations has been recognized 
and in time it may once again receive consideration.
If reparations simply meant payment for a debt, one could imagine the 
Quilombo descendants asking for money instead of land. If land is merely 
a commodity, as neoliberals assume, then one could use the land market 
to settle on the payment. We totally miss the point, however, when we 
take this stance. For the Quilombo communities, land is their habitat—a 
living place. As Farfán-Santos points out:
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Thus quilombolas desire the freedom and legal right to work in the man-
groves, plant manioc, and live from the forest; however, they want to do 
these things within a secure space where they can build a future for their 
children without the constant fear that it might be taken away. (Farfán-
Santos 2016, 50)
These desires match the doctrines of the social and ecological functions of 
land and even expand them by recognizing that having a title to land can 
provide a secure place. The failure of the current Brazilian government to 
respond to the demands for land titles is a form of reneging on these prin-
ciples. How significant are these principles? One can see them as expressions 
of a deeper truth—the close connection between the right to freedom and 
the right to land. To explore this connection we turn to the story of Haiti.
the story of haiti
A number of events are central to the story of how the French colony of 
St. Domingue became Haiti—the first and only successful worker’s revo-
lution in the Americas. Spain granted France a portion of the island of 
Hispaniola in 1697, which became the major Caribbean supplier of sugar. 
In the 1780s, St. Domingue accounted for 30 per cent of the world’s total 
sugar production (Klein and Vinson 2007). The colony’s mountainous 
regions were just as fruitful as a source for coffee as the northern plains 
were for sugar. In stark contrast to our image of Haiti today, during its 
colonial period, it was extremely productive for the white planters.
Whites, however, were a very small minority of the total population. At 
the end of the eighteenth century, blacks outnumbered whites 10 to 1. 
Joan Dayan quotes the figures of Moreau de Saint-Mery, who gives the 
numbers of 40,000 whites, 28,000 free coloureds, and 452,000 slaves 
(Dayan 1998, 146). The whites included the descendants of “buccaneers, 
filibusters, and nobles,” as well as European settlers and American Creoles. 
The free coloureds included slaves who had bought their freedom, slaves 
who were freed by their owners, and runaway slaves. The almost 500,000 
blacks were primarily from Bight of Benin and West Central Africa, with 
smaller populations from such places as Senegambia and Sierra Leone 
(Manning 2009).
Following the French Revolution, the French in Paris debated what 
rights should be granted to the different groups in the French colonies. 
The white plantation owners sought the recognition of their rights, but 
not that of the free coloureds and of course not the slaves. That, after all, 
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was the model provided by the United States’ revolt against the British. In 
Haiti, however, the slaves also revolted against their masters and eventu-
ally against the French. Perhaps the most dramatic event was the meeting 
in 1791 organized by Dutty Boukman, a voodoo priest.
From the number of slaves involved and the coordination that took place, 
the August 20 meeting must have been just one of the many such gatherings 
and only the final session of what was a well-planned movement with a close 
tie to the secret African cults. On the first night a large number of the 
island’s best sugar plantations were put to the torch and in the next several 
days the island’s richest plantation region, the Northern Plain was destroyed. 
(Klein and Vinson 2007, 186)
In 1802, Boukman was killed and Toussaint Louverture emerged as the 
leader of the rebel slaves. Louverture brought together disparate forces—
the Spanish forces on the island and pro-royalist Frenchmen—and tried to 
revive the plantation sugar economy but was not successful in persuading 
the freed workers to leave the land they had occupied during the revolu-
tion and return to the plantation as wage earners. Without workers, of 
course, the economy was at a standstill. The French government plotted 
to replace Louverture and reinstitute slavery. Louverture was taken to 
France. A new revolutionary leader, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, organized an 
army of ex-slaves to fight against the French and forced them to leave the 
island. Haiti became an independent republic in January 1804..
The Haitian successful revolutionary war reverberated throughout the 
Americas and Europe. There is evidence that the German philosopher, 
Hegel, had the Haitian revolution in mind when he wrote his famous 
piece of master and slave relationships in The Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Buck-Morss 2009). At the time, the United States viewed a free nation of 
blacks as a threat to its prosperity, which was largely dependent on the 
labour of its enslaved population. It stopped trading with Haiti after their 
revolution and did not recognize it as a nation until 1863, following 
Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation that freed the enslaved 
people of the United States (Wesley 1917).
For the Haitians, however, freedom was not only about the relation-
ships between master and slave but also about the relationship with the 
land. The Constitution of 1805, declared that “no white, whatever his 
nation, could set foot on the territory of Haiti as master or owner of prop-
erty” (Dayan 1998, 24). For Dessalines, it seems that freeing the Haitian 
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land from foreign ownership was part and parcel of freeing the Haitian 
people from slavery. No better evidence of the importance of land for 
Haitians than the following lines from their national anthem:
For Haiti in the name of the Ancestors
We must toil, we must sow
It is in the soil, that all our strength seats
It is it that feeds us
Let us toil the soil, let us toil the soil
Joyfully, may the land be fertile
Mow, water, men like women
Must we come to live only by our arms’ strength.3
At the same time, we should not underestimate how offensive white peo-
ple must have found Dessalines’ position that they could not own land in 
Haiti. The French plantation owners, in any case, did not ask for compen-
sation for losing their slaves, but for losing the income from the appropria-
tion of Haitian land. In 1825, with gunboats in the Haiti harbour, the 
French required compensation for the land in exchange for recognition of 
Haiti as a sovereign republic. The French demanded 150 million francs, 
which was reduced to 90 million in 1838, comparable to $40 billion as of 
2010. The amount was calculated on the estimated value of the revenues 
generated by the plantations in 1789, which was determined by taking the 
Haitian exports in 1823 of 30 million francs over ten years (300 million 
francs) at 50 per cent profit, which came to 150 million francs (Dupuy 
2015). Behind the math, of course, was the political intent to bury Haiti 
in debt. The response of the French government seems to have been that 
if whites could not own land, at least they could keep the Haitians so poor 
they could not prosper from it. The debt was twice what France received 
from the United States for the Louisiana Purchase, which was ten times 
the land mass. Haiti made regular payments on the debt plus interest for 
close to 60 years until 1883 (Popkin 2012). To finally pay off the French, 
Haiti borrowed from US banks, and only in 1947 were they out from 
under burdensome loan payments. So Haiti remains poor after paying 
France and the United States millions of dollars on a loan to compensate 
French slaveholders for losing their land.
The massive debt was not the only burden Western nations—especially 
the United States—placed on the people of Haiti. The United States refused 
to recognize or trade with Haiti until 1863. In 1915, the United States 
occupied Haiti and stayed until 1934. During that time, they collected 
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taxes, controlled customs, and ran many government institutions. Also, the 
US occupation facilitated the transfer of millions of hectares of land from 
the Haitian people to foreign companies. As Dupuy points out, from the 
time of the revolution to the US occupation, Haitians had refused to leave 
the lands they had acquired to become dependent on plantation wages. 
Even though they remained poor during this period, they were not desper-
ate. Not unlike the enclosure movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in Europe that produced the first population dependent on wages 
for survival, the US occupation brought about what Dupuy called the “pro-
letarianisation of the peasants” (Dupuy 2015). More recently, this process 
has been accelerated by the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions to make Haiti a source for cheap labour in the global market.
In short, though ostensibly designed to alleviate poverty by stimulating sus-
tainable economic growth, the policies of the Bank and the other IFIs in fact 
maintained Haiti’s position in the international division of labor as a supplier 
of cheap labor for foreign capital (96).
These neoliberal policies have taken their toll not only on the Haitian 
people but also on the land. Once land is nothing but a commodity, it no 
longer functions as a place for security—it has lost its social function.
As Philippe Girard points out in his book on Haiti, blaming foreign 
powers for Haiti’s problems leaves out its own mistakes and failures, espe-
cially the failures of governance and the cycles of violence (Girard 2010). 
Still, its indebtedness to Western powers for most of its history has cer-
tainly played a significant role. In 2003, Haiti demanded reparations, in 
the form of debt restitution, which was calculated around $21.7 billion. 
Although the French parliament did declare that the slave trade was a 
crime against humanity in 2001, they rejected the lawsuit (Lves 2013).
If we compare the stories of the Quilombo communities’ demand for 
reparation and Haiti’s call for restitution, they are both about land and 
recognition, but they are also quite different. The Quilombo communities 
want title to land, which would give them security in living their own lives. 
This would improve their situation, but it would not necessarily bring 
about a more balanced relationship between Afro-Brazilians and White-
Brazilians. That would be a second step. Haiti, on the other hand, has not 
asked for a restoration of its land. It seems to have discarded the early 
Haitian principle that whites would never again own Haitian land. What if 
they had demanded that their land be restored so they could achieve food 
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sovereignty—so they could provide for themselves? That might have been 
a first step toward a more balanced relationship between Haitians and the 
International community?
Remember the principle I proposed earlier: If you cannot understand 
Haiti without understanding France, then you cannot understand France 
without understanding Haiti? The refusal to make restitution for Haiti’s 
debt seems to violate this principle. So, what would one have to assume to 
agree with France’s refusal to make restitution? The following assump-
tions come to mind:
• Past actions do not affect future possibilities
• We can divorce our future from the future of others
• Haiti is not part of our global community
• Haiti does not exist
These are my assumptions, of course, but they seem to follow from the 
refusal to engage in a conversation about reparations. They not only con-
tradict the principle that inequality is always a relationship among different 
parties—one cannot be unequal alone—but they also fail to recognize the 
common humanity that the French and Haitian people share. What would 
happen if we begin the conversation about reparations on the basis for our 
common humanity instead of our social differences? If we begin with the 
recognition that we all belong to the earth, then land would not be defined 
primarily as someone’s private property, but as a habitat for human and 
non-human communities. One terminology that would allow us to think 
together from such the perspective of a common humanity would be to 
speak of land as a commons.
land as a Commons
Although the idea of land as a commons is not directly linked to the 
Brazilian notions of the social and ecological functions of land, it is also 
not that far afield. It is certainly much closer than the neoliberal idea that 
land is nothing but a commodity. Land as a commons is also close to the 
views of many Native American and African cultures.
Land was treated as a commons even in Europe before the enclosure 
movements at the beginning of the modern period. This all changed with 
the rise of our modern commercial society, and it has changed even more 
with the rise of modern cities. In cities today, the value of land depends 
not only on its use but also on its location.
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Through analysis of how land values change in cities, the early twentieth-
century economist, Henry George, developed a creative link between the 
more traditional view of land as a commons and the modern view of land 
as location. He begins with the idea that land is a source of wealth.
Wealth, then, may be defined as natural products that have been secured, 
moved, combined, separated, or in other ways modified by human exertion 
to fit them for the gratification of human desires. (George 2010, 42)
The term “natural products” refers to land in the ordinary sense as the 
ground we walk on. George’s definition may seem rather limited today, 
when we speak of many different kinds of wealth, but let’s stay with his 
focus on the production and distribution of natural products. From this 
perspective, we can easily notice not only that land can be cultivated to 
produce goods for use and exchange, but also that land itself acquires 
value as property. The owners of land, in other words, not only receive 
rent from the land’s productivity but also from its increased value as prop-
erty. This increase in value depends largely on the land’s location, and as 
that location increases in value so does the wealth of the owners. At the 
same time, those who do not own land see their expenses rise. As this 
trend continues, so does the inequality between those who own land and 
those who do not. George draws the following conclusion: “The great 
cause of inequality in the distribution of wealth is inequality in the owner-
ship of land” (2010, 163).
Let’s compare two empty lots in Rio: one in a favela and the other in an 
affluent neighbourhood. If both were assigned their market value, the two 
lots would have very different prices. Could there be any other reason for 
this difference than their different locations? I don’t think so. It was not 
the owner, in other words, that caused the higher value of the lot in the 
affluent neighbourhood, but rather the city’s social structures. Since social 
conditions caused this difference, George argues that the extra rent 
received from selling the lot in the affluent neighbourhood should be 
returned to society, probably through taxes (see Costa in this volume for 
a discussion of the Brazilian tax system).
If rent were taken by the state in taxes, then land would really be common 
property—no matter in whose name or in what parcels it was held. Every 
member of the community would participate in the advantages of owner-
ship. (George 2010, 224)
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This seems to make sense. As members of a city, we could all enjoy the 
benefits of the increased value of city properties. Our collective rights 
would entail rights to share in the city’s growth and prosperity. Such a 
view of a city would certainly oppose the liberal view of private property, 
but it would not necessarily eliminate the ownership of property. It would 
simply change its meaning.
the meaning of ownership
In a credit-based market economy, owning property is important. As the 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has pointed out, people may have 
assets, but if they do not have a legal title to them, these assets will not 
count as “property” (De Soto 2000). De Soto has tried to get govern-
ments in South America to give property titles to people living in build-
ings they have built on the edges of cities so they could use them as 
collateral for obtaining credit, as well as other benefits. Such a title, how-
ever, is not based on possession, but rather on the law.
The crucial point to understand is that property is not a physical thing that 
can be photographed or mapped. Property is not a primary quality of assets 
but the legal expression of an economically meaningful consensus about 
assets. Law is the instrument that fixes and realizes capital. In the West, the 
law is less concerned with representing the physical reality of buildings or 
real estate than with providing a process or rules that will allow society to 
extract potential surplus value from those assets. Property is not the assets 
themselves but a consensus between people as to how those assets should be 
held, used, and exchanged. (De Soto 2000, 157)
If we agree with de Soto, then belonging to a civic community—a com-
munity of law—is the first step toward owning property. Possession by 
itself, in other words, is not enough. Legal title is also necessary. This 
explains the Quilombo movements drive for acquiring a legal title of land 
they already occupy. Still, we need to remember that property is a legal 
creation. Land is not. Law is something like a map, which is never the 
same as the territory. The territory belongs to all inhabitants. This is 
George’s view of land as a commons:
The equal right of all people to the use of land is as clear as their equal right 




Treating land as a commons does not mean, for George, that we try to 
give each person his or her share of land, but rather that each person 
should have a share of the land’s wealth. So let owners own their property, 
but when the land value increases because of social trends, that increase in 
value should be shared. A person’s right to property, in other words, exists 
within, and is limited by, the collective rights of all city members to share 
in the prosperity of their city. The city, in other words, should be treated 
as a territory. We belong to it and it belongs to all of us.
When the Europeans crossed the Atlantic, they approached the “new” 
land as something they could own and treat as they wanted, much like 
they believed that they could own people and treat them as they wanted. 
Neoliberalism has similar assumptions. We know they were wrong on both 
counts, and we now live with the consequences of these mistakes. The 
question is whether reparations can correct them.
ineQuality and reparations
We need to remember that inequality has two sides: some receive less than 
they deserve and some receive more than they deserve. As long as we focus 
only on those who deserve more—on the poor—we have limited our 
options. Henry George reminds us that when people receive more than 
they deserve—unearned income—they should not be able to keep it. It 
should be returned to the community that created the increase. In a city, 
the increase and decrease in land values—real estate—depends mostly on 
the city’s policies on granting titles, establishing taxes, police protection, 
and so on. Given the role of white privilege in determining such policies, 
one can understand that cities today not only reflect inequality among citi-
zens but also perpetuate it.
Reparation requires more than increasing the welfare of the poor and 
homeless. It also requires the repair of human relationships. What this 
repair will entail remains to be seen. It will depend on who becomes 
involved in the struggles for justice and equality. What we do know is that 
the story of economics that we have inherited from Adam Smith prevents 
us from even recognizing the inequality created and maintained by capital-
ism. Smithian economics blocks out from view the violations of our com-
mon humanity that are the basis of its success. If we want to move our 
societies toward equality, we will need to first acknowledge our common 
humanity and from that perspective work on policies that will create more 
just social relations.
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The chapters in this volume assess the state of inequalities in Latin America 
today, in the context of the interplay between recent attempts by the Pink 
Tide (PT) regimes to tackle inequality and the deep divisions within Latin 
American societies since colonisation. Together, they show how inequali-
ties intersect, as income inequality and class interact with gendered and 
racialised inequalities, and are expressed in spatial distinctions and associa-
tions of some communities or categories of persons with crime and vio-
lence. These ‘entangled inequalities’ (Costa, Chap. 3, this volume) are 
complex to analyse, not least because the ethnographic approach taken by 
most of the contributors seeks to explain how these intersections play out 
in the relation between experience (‘lifeworld’) and structural economic 
conditions, which of course change over time.
One of the orienting questions is an evaluation of how PT regimes dealt 
with poverty and inequality. They are of course not the same thing, but 
the signs are quite good on both fronts, as Pedro Mendes Loureiro argues 
in his survey piece, and Sergio Costa and Iselin Åsedotter Strønen for 
Brazil and Venezuela, respectively. Significant strides were made, to the 
point that analysts now debate not whether these regimes achieved reduc-
tions in poverty and inequality, but to what extent can those reductions be 
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attributed to state policy, rather than (just) to economic growth, and the 
related problem of how sustainable they are likely to be in the longer term. 
The jury is still out, but as the editors say in their introduction, the out-
look is sobering.
For Mendes Loureiro, state actions were effective and influential, and 
he points especially to the rise in living standards due to Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) and rising minimum wages. The latter is related to 
increased formalisation of the economy, but is also thought to have a 
knock-on effect on employment in the informal sector. Neither of these 
policies are especially anti-neoliberal, but nor should they be dismissed too 
lightly. For Mendes Loureiro, PT governments used a positive interna-
tional scenario—high commodity prices—to finance social goals, and as 
such they made some important gains in the fight against inequality. Sergio 
Costa agrees at least partially, and he gives some impressive numbers for 
Brazil, showing increases in employment, formal employment and social 
policy expenditure, along with reductions in poverty rates and a decline in 
the GINI inequality coefficient over the years of the Lula-Rousseff regimes 
of the PT. However, he suggests that the consensus for Brazil at least is 
that this was due more to economic processes rather than social policy.
If correct, this is a problem because it makes reductions in inequality 
highly vulnerable to changes in economic and political conditions. As is 
well known, the downturn in the commodity super cycle from about 2011 
onwards left PT governments with less income to spend on social pro-
grammes. In the absence of policies for actual wealth redistribution, that 
inevitably had consequences for tackling inequalities. With high incomes 
from healthy commodity prices, governments had been able to spend 
more on social programmes—principally CCTs, but also housing, infra-
structure and other welfare projects. However, that expenditure is vulner-
able to shifting governmental priorities, reduced budgets and erosion of 
value through inflation. Costa argues that increased state spending is not 
the same as redistribution of wealth, and that different fiscal policies would 
have had a greater redistributive effect, and hence a more dramatic and 
longer-term effect on reducing inequality.
Specifically, he discusses taxation reform. Latin American tax regimes 
are highly regressive, because they focus on taxation of consumption; if 
taxes on higher incomes and on capital and financial profits were set at 
more European levels, Brazil’s GINI coefficient could reduce by about 
20%, we are told. This is shocking. Outside of Scandinavia, European taxa-
tion levels are hardly radically redistributive. Yet even in quite low taxation 
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regimes such as the UK, the GINI coefficient changes significantly after 
taxation: in 2013, it was quite close to Brazilian levels before taxation, at 
0.527, while after, it was 0.3581. Nonetheless, even mildly progressive 
legislation was not politically possible in Brazil, even under a PT regime. 
Across the region, governments have found themselves constricted in 
what they can do to confront inequality, even if they wanted to: Evo 
Morales, for example, struggled against well-funded and well-organised 
resistance from lowland elites until he signalled that he would set aside 
plans for land reform in the eastern region of Bolivia. Celina Sørbø argues 
that the successful impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff was a 
conservative counter-reaction to the challenge to entrenched inequalities 
represented by the PT regimes in Brazil. In Venezuela, that opposition 
was articulated through nastily racist discourses, as Iselin Åsedotter 
Strønen documents.
This hints at one of the most important reasons for the limits within 
which PT and other regimes had to operate, namely the deeply embedded 
divisions within society, which are conceptualised in this collection as 
intersecting inequalities, or ‘entangled inequalities’ in Costa’s words. All 
of the contributions one way or another outline the complex social life of 
these entangled inequalities, as class divisions between poor and wealthy 
intersect with topographical divisions of urban space, gender inequalities, 
violence, generation and race. The chapters on Rio show how the division 
between the morro (hill) and the asfalto (street) justifies differential access 
to and militarisation of urban space. As Margit Ystanes points out, the 
association of the morro with the favela and with drugs is matched by an 
association of the state with whiteness and violence, envisaged as protect-
ing the wealthy (white) areas of the asfalto from the dangerous dark favela 
residents. In state discourse, this is resignified as ‘accelerated development’ 
for the sake of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. She 
argues that this in fact reversed some of the gains of PT social policy—as 
state expenditure on a specific version of urban space for the mega-events 
diverted funds from public services. For the poor, that meant resentment, 
but also fear, prompted by the highly militarised nature of this 
‘development’.
That said, the topographical distribution of wealth and poverty in Rio 
is not quite as straightforward as a morro-asfalto distinction, as Michele de 
Lavra Pinto shows in her study of attitudes to the most famous CCT pro-
gramme in the region, the Bolsa Familia. Although the poorest live higher 
up the hill, the favela displays complex class differentiation internally, 
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nowadays very much associated with car ownership and other forms of 
consumption. Here, we see some of the strides made by the PT govern-
ments, as people have a sense of coming out of poverty and aspiring to a 
more middle-class lifestyle.
Nonetheless, topographies and urban spaces are inflected with under-
standings of violence, crime and the appropriate state response to such 
social problems. The favela is seen as dangerous, and therefore it is accept-
able for the police to sweep in, engage in gunfights with local gangs and 
plant the Brazilian flag in a highly symbolic act of conquest of this space 
understood as dark, violent and criminal. The criminals they find—and 
sometimes kill—are poor, dark-skinned, young and male. Honduras is a 
little different, and Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera et al. outline how the develop-
ment of mano dura (iron fist) security policies has affected young men 
from poor neighbourhoods, many of whom now spend 7–15 years of their 
lives in prison. While men from wealthier families can pay for their court 
trials to proceed without delays, poorer men must spend months or years 
in jail waiting for their sentence; and youths are picked up by police on cues 
such as their clothing, tattoos or skin colour. This is social policy as penali-
sation of young, dark-skinned men, and although its full effects are yet 
unknown, the signs are deeply worrying. Gutiérrez Rivera et al. argue that 
the prisoners cannot transition from youths to adults, precisely because the 
penal regime is so punitive. They have no access to educational programmes 
or other forms of rehabilitation. According to the general public, perhaps 
they do not deserve such treatment. But what will happen when they com-
plete their sentence? What will be the outcome of this punitive turn, which 
has targeted a whole generation of men?
The entanglement of class inequality with inequalities of gender, topog-
raphy and race has a long history, as the editors of this volume point out 
in their introduction. Marvin Brown describes the region’s deep colonial 
history of invasion and slavery, and the effects of that on landholding and 
territory. That history of conquest underlies most of the inequalities dis-
cussed in this volume, but emerges in complex ways. In Venezuela, it has 
contemporary expression in a discourse of civilisation versus savagery from 
the opposition to the Chávez and Maduro regimes. Iselin Åsedotter 
Strønen documents a real schism between the ‘Americanised’ upper 
classes, who see themselves as modern, global and civilised, and subaltern 
struggles for alternative political conceptualisations of the relation between 
market, state and society. For the upper classes, the poor are barefooted 
lumpen hordes; and this disdain was frequently expressed in racialised 
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insults directed at Chávez, whom they attacked as ‘monkey’. Subaltern 
political agency was delegitimised by these discourses that saw chavistas as 
duped masses, resentful of the civilised wealthy and seeking power and 
resources that they had no right to.
But oppression or exploitation modelled on colonial (or capitalist) rela-
tions is not inevitable; rather, it is the result of political will and specific 
choices. Astrid Stensrud describes a project of land reform begun in 
Southern Peru in the 1970s, following the progressive military regime of 
Velasco Alvarado. The Majes irrigation project has attracted immigrants 
from the highland region of Puno, leading to ethnicised tensions between 
mestizo Peruvians from the coast and Aymara-Quechua Peruvians from 
the highlands. This is exacerbated by the ways that the distribution of the 
irrigated land has changed over the years. At first, in the early 1980s, land 
was sold to families in 5 hectare plots; in the upcoming expansion, the 
plots available for sale will be 200, 500 and 1000 hectares (current price 
per 5 hectare is 400 000 US dollars). It is clear that the prospects for the 
children of the first generation of immigrants do not lie in farming their 
own land; rather, they can only be wage labourers, at best educated tech-
nicians, at worst day labourers. They compete with new immigrants from 
the highlands, who have contributed to remarkable population growth in 
the area over the last few decades.
Policy decisions about how to regulate the economy are also central to 
Cecilie Vindal Ødegaard’s chapter, which shows how changes in free trade 
agreements affect informal vendors in Arequipa, Peru. A trade promotion 
agreement signed by Peru with the USA in 2006, and ratified in 2009, has 
meant that Peruvian authorities have attempted to formalise economic 
activities via checkpoints and control over commodity flows at the bor-
ders. The 2009 trade agreement between Peru and China put small-scale 
vendors in competition with large-scale actors who can now import 
Chinese goods legally through Lima. The vendors in Arequipa who used 
to move goods between Bolivia, Chile and Peru are therefore subject to 
increased competition and border checks, which have led them to reduce 
the amounts of stock they bring across, and diversify their investment 
strategies, including into more risky ventures. This has a gendered effect 
as the small-scale vendors are in the majority women, in contrast to the 
large business owners benefitting from reduced controls on Chinese 
imports. The trade agreements are economic arrangements negotiated at 




Politicians could have decided to negotiate free trade agreements 
differently, or to continue the allocation of irrigated land in Majes in small 
family plots. They could have developed alternative security policies in 
Honduras to address increases in urban crime, or a more progressive taxa-
tion regime in Brazil. They could have decided to make Rio ready for the 
recent mega-events in ways that took into account the views of the favela 
inhabitants. Inequalities of class, race and gender are deeply entrenched 
and historically embedded, but their emergence in and through state pol-
icy is the result of political decisions.
The inequalities are, then, both inevitable and not, both structural and 
the outcome of particular decision-making processes. And so, in the face 
of this, how do the subaltern subjects respond? All of the chapters in this 
volume answer that question to some extent, demonstrating one of the 
advantages of an ethnographic approach that seeks to document lifeworlds 
in the context of structural economic conditions. We see how people live 
their lives, as entrepreneurs in ‘neoliberal’ modes, or as educated profes-
sionals, as in the chapters by Cecilie Vindal Ødegaard (Chap. 8), Astrid 
Stensrud (Chap. 10) and Michele de Lavra Pinto (Chap. 6). People bor-
row money to set up a business, buy land or buy a car to travel between 
two jobs; they cross borders with smuggled goods hidden under their own 
clothes, and dress as either tourists or poor farmer women to disguise their 
lucrative endeavours. They encourage their children to go to school and 
university, to become engineers and technicians rather than day labourers. 
They negotiate the entangled inequalities in which they find themselves, 
and make the best of it.
They also resist. Margit Ystanes describes the development of subaltern 
counterpublics through citizen media projects from the favelas that 
denounce police violence and forced evictions in social media. Iselin 
Åsedotter Strønen argues that popular mobilisation under Chávez created a 
‘Bolivarian political space’ comprised of popular appropriation of the state’s 
pro-poor political alignment. Pedro Mendes Loureiro highlights the neo-
corporatist incorporation of social movements by PT governments, giving 
the example of Argentina under the Kirchners. There, the piquetero organ-
isations so prominent in the anti-neoliberal uprisings of the turn of the cen-
tury were ‘absorbed’ into the state as channels for the distribution of some 
social policy programmes. Why not? he asks. For the government, when 
money is available from increased export revenue, ‘why attempt a larger 
overhaul of macroeconomic policies if there had been growth and this would 
require confronting powerful interests?’ (Mendes Loureiro). The social 
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movements took pragmatic decisions to cooperate: why seek to be any more 
radical if neo-corporatism has delivered wage gains? The interesting aspect 
of this will be to see what happens now, after the election of the right-wing 
Mauricio Macri in late 2015. The signs from the first two years of his gov-
ernment are that the social movements, including the piqueteros, are reluc-
tant to give up the gains of the Kirchner years.
As I write this postscript in April 2017, the PT is ebbing. With the 
exception of Ecuador, where Lenin Moreno recently won the presidential 
election, the more radical ALBA2 states look vulnerable. Economic and 
political troubles in Venezuela become more acute every day, and tensions 
are also rising in Bolivia, as Evo Morales seeks to extend his presidential 
reign beyond constitutional provisions. The Right gained power elector-
ally or by parliamentary coup in 2015–2016 in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. 
We are facing a new wave of neoliberal or rightist regimes across the 
region, and consequently we are facing the reaction of those who suffer 
the effects of such regimes. The true test of the PT will be whether prog-
ress on fighting inequality has meant a shift in terms of debate, such that 
some economic and social policies—for example, repeal of CCTs—are 
simply not politically possible, because subaltern subjects will not allow 
them. In Argentina, social movements that were re-empowered during the 
Kirchner years are repeatedly filling the streets to protest budget cuts and 
the authorities’ refusal to negotiate salary increases in line with inflation. 
On 6 April 2017, Argentina’s main union federation, the CGT,3 held its 
first full-blown strike as a unified body in more than 10 years. Latin 
America has a long history of entrenched inequalities, but it also has a long 
history of resistance to inequality, both collective and individual. The bal-
ance of power between oppression and resistance has characterised eco-
nomic and political life for centuries, and seems likely to do so for years 
to come.
Notes
1. OECD.  Stat http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=66670; retrieved 
4 April 2017.
2. Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas; the main ALBA countries are Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Cuba.
3. Confederación General del Trabajo; General Confederation of Labour, the 
body that coordinates most of the traditional trade unions in the country.
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